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17 August 1984

# USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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17 August 1984

USSR REPORT  
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

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ERRATUM: In JPRS-UPS-84-063 of 23 July 1984 of this series article titled INFORMATION ON AUTHORS p 66 lines 6-7 should read: "Zagladin, Nikita Vadimovich--candidate of historical sciences, docent, deputy chief of the international communist movement department of the AON [Academy of Social Sciences] of the CPSU Central Committee." On the same page in line 9 the acronym should read AON.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SEEN GROWING IN JAPAN

Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM in Russian No 21, 18-24 May 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Pavel Alekseyevich Naumov international journalist, chairman of the board of APN, and Aleksey Kirillovich Panteleyev, international journalist, member of the board of APN, editor-in-chief of APN's Main Editorial Office for Asia: "Japan--Concerned About the Present and the Future"]

[Excerpt] At time it is not easy to perceive the other Japan hidden behind the impressive numbers of Japan's economic potential, the reports on her indisputable scientific and technical achievements, the propagandistic jabber about "an equal opportunity society". This other Japan is a country where unemployment grows from year to year and where millions of people do not have suitable lodging, where the hiring system in essence turns workers into slaves and social inequality has in truth become scandalous. Meanwhile, this "other Japan" is a reality. It is no accident that the voices of those who reject the anti-popular domestic and adventuristic foreign policies of the Liberal-Democratic Party which has ruled for more than a quarter of a century are ringing out all the more resolutely in the country.

But the Prime Minister's estimates will not easily solve the economic problems of which there are enough in the country. And the first is the problem of the huge state budget deficit. It is 110 million yen, more than two and a half times greater than Japan's total annual financial means. They have suggested resolving this problem by the classical method which is first to give "unprofitable" state enterprises to private capital and to throw more than 100,000 workers and employees out of work. Secondly, to develop mainly scientific-intensive branches in industry which produce miniaturized goods with increased competitiveness. Dislocation of environment-polluting industries outside of Japan so that they can disrupt the ecology of other countries without troubling Japanese industrialists has been proposed.

They are also talking about liberalizing trade, i.e. about lowering quotas on the importation of foreign goods into Japan. This naturally promotes the export of Japanese goods to other countries which would also lower quotas (but they still have to agree on this).

And finally, this estimate is based on the free influx of foreign workers, primarily from southeast Asian countries, into Japan. These people will fill the labor-intensive, unqualified positions. But what will they then do with their own unemployed, who are--albeit slowly--growing in number?

Such are the plans of those who created the model of Japanese 20th century economic prosperity. However, in developing them they did not take into account the main issue--difficulties of the Japanese economy are not a temporary or natural phenomenon but are tied to the crisis of the capitalist system as a whole. These problems cannot be overcome with half measures.

We are traveling through the city's clean, orderly streets, so unlike traditional, usual Japan. Here there is no density of sky-high buildings, window to window, door to door, no narrow, almost sidewalk-less twisting by-streets and cross-streets constructed with the total rationalization that there is not enough land. On the right and left are single-story buildings built to individual plans and the spaces between them hold small garden-like dwelling. This is Tsukuba, Japan's scientific center located 60 kilometers northeast of Tokyo.

Our guide, an employee of the local office of the ASAKHI newspaper, said that 20 years ago the government decided to build this scientific town. It had two goals, the first of which was to create a modern scientific center which would provide the highest level of research and specialists training. The second goal was to move part of the higher educational institutions from Tokyo to Tsukuba, thus somewhat relieving the capital which was suffering from overcrowding.

By the end of 1980, 45 state research institutions had begun to work in the Tsukuba scientific center. However, many of their workers either do not have the ability to move there permanently, or will not risk it, preferring to leave their families in their old homes in Tokyo or its suburbs and commuting to work daily.

Nonetheless Tsukuba is growing and today there are almost 140,000 inhabitants. The modern planning and absence of industries which pollute nature make Tsukuba as the Japanese say, "sumiyey mati", a "city good to live in". It has many places set aside as green zones for public use such as children's playgrounds, public gardens and parks.

They are also putting a lot of hope on the World's Scientific Exhibition scheduled for Tsukuba in 1985. The exhibition pavilions are already being built next to the central city park on a site with an area of nearly 100 hectares.

Visiting the two scientific research institutions, one electronic and the other electrical engineering, was like a superficial tourist trip. Representatives of their administrations talked about their institutes in very general terms, literally like an advertising prospectus. The slides of their research were extensive, from the development of new materials and instruments for electronics and the power industry, different laser equipment and "intelligent robots" to new methods for transforming energy and its conservation to materials from bioceramics and biomixtures used in medical industry.

We asked our host, "How are research results used and what percentage in the end result go into production?"

"Research results are published in scientific editions and are patented," answered the director of the Todoroki Electronic Engineering Institute.

The answer from the deputy director of the Kimura Mechanical Engineering Institute was even more laconic. "It is difficult to say as we do not produce goods..."

Later in Kokubu on the island of Kyusyu the Kiosera Company showed us manufacturing with the latest material out of the 21st century.

In 25 years the Kiosera Company has gone from a small enterprise with 25 people to a large, modern combine whose factories and research laboratories employ more than 10,000 people. Leaders of the Kokubu factory speak with pride about how their company is a "pioneer in the production of new materials" from semiconductor alloys and electronics equipment to various components of industrial equipment and solar battery elements.

The day before we had seen a television tape on "new ceramics." It told about a material which Kiosera had developed which practically eliminated the problem of the space Shuttle's heat shielding. We asked our interlocutor a question prompted by the TV tape. "Does this mean that Kiosera is somehow involved in the U.S. space program?"

Who does the work?

We were taken to a shop where they made electronic integrated circuits. It was sterile cleanliness with machines maintaining a constant microclimate. There were primarily young women at the conveyor belt ("only 25 percent of our workers are men" explained the engineer) who, without lifting their eyes, completed a simple, rote operation. The conveyor speed was such that the assemblers could not be distracted for a second. The work was debilitating and the wages low.

"Now 45 percent of our products are for export. In order to keep the company's products competitive we have frozen wages of all workers," they explained.

Well, not even the most modern technology can reverse the classical pattern of capitalistic exploitation.

The short trip to the factory ended with a look at an experimental car with a motor built from "new ceramics." The car exterior is no different from a production model but the motor had absolutely no cooling system as the ceramics do not require one.

"The experiments will continue and continue until the car goes into production," explained one of the company engineers. "But our car is a unique symbol of new technological possibilities."



True, we were unable to see the motor in operation as at the last moment it turned out that the ignition key has "disappeared".

And the works which they showed us "by chance coincidence" were also not operating and we had to familiarize ourselves with their operation by TV tape.

And everything that we saw or heard in the institutes and companies allows one to reach several conclusions. First, it is clear that Japan's economic difficulties are forcing them to energetically build research and practical operations thus in order to conserve a stable supply of industrial energy and raw material and to rush toward quick technological innovation and an assortment of products. The goal of scientific research is to win the leadership in maintaining world science and technology.

Secondly, private capital is being invested more widely in scientific research. According to some data, Japanese private capital is spending more on research than the state is. Actually two-thirds of scientific research expenses relate to the non-governmental category. Having invested capital in research work, firm owners press for its rapid return by putting the results into production which helps them guarantee their "bouyancy" in the stormy waves of the competitive struggle.

In short, both science and production are oriented on a tempo of Japanese economic development that will help it to maintain its position strength in the world's capitalist system.

But there are other Western countries striving for the same goal!

#### Will The Liberal-Democrats Retain Power?

Our conversations with colleagues and the country's social leaders often touched on Japan's domestic political situation. At the parliamentary elections which took place last December the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a serious defeat when it lost 36 deputy seats, thus getting a vote of no-confidence in its policy which is oriented along the global strategy of the present U.S. administration.

True, the LDP adherents, recognizing the very fact of the party's loss of an "insignificant number" of seats in Parliament, are convinced that it was no defeat since the party held political power in the country. The LDP feels that they are still superior to their rivals among Japanese political parties and the lack of success in the December election was nothing more than an "approving and incidental mistake that could happen to the strongest."

Another point of view (expressed by opposition representatives) is that the elections started the transitional process from the era of one-party policies to a time of political coalition since the LDP alone is not in a position to guarantee a leading role in the country's political life.



Apparently the truth as always lies somewhere in the middle. Actually the results of parliamentary elections beginning with 1960 show a steady trend toward a weakening LDP position in the country's highest organ of power. In 1960 the LDP got 57.6 percent of the votes cast. This gave it 296 seats in the lower parliamentary house. At all subsequent elections the LDP has invariably lost both voter support and parliamentary seats and in 1979 only 41.8 percent of the voters supported the LDP, giving it only 249 seats.

Every time the policy of the Liberal Democratic Party seemed dead-ended and when support of the regular ruling party cabinet got to a critical minimum, a propagandistic campaign began to "sanitize" both the LDP and its policies. Those factions in power in the party and the nominal opposition struggled and the mechanism for the intra-party was developed to perfection. Up until now this has worked smoothly. The basic factions, having assumed "responsibility" for the events which caused the political crisis, resigned and removed the extra political tension in the country. Their "opponents" took their place at the helm of power until the next crisis. This particular arrangement of political action always gave the same results in that conservatives continued to rule the country.

In June 1976 when the LDP had a real crisis, a group of junior parliamentary deputies left it, proclaiming that their goal was to create a new conservative party able to "eliminate the gulf that was increasing daily between the people and the party." Thus the New Liberal Club (NLK) appeared. It was evident even then that the junior conservatives' departure from the party was itself a subtle political maneuver calculated to attract voters who had turned away from the conservative LDP, thereby providing the LDP support at the critical moment.

The tactical calculations proved to be exact and when in December 1983 the LDP lost its absolute majority in the parliamentary house of representatives the coalition with the NLK and the entrance of "independent" conservatives into the party guaranteed the same result. As before power was in the hands of the LDP, although less than half (45.7 percent) of the voters supported it.

However, the very fact that the LDP and the huge businesses behind it had to resort to such complicated maneuvers confirms that the balance of power is changing against it and that Japan is one the threshold of an aggravation of the intra-party struggle, the outcome of which will depend not only on the LDP, but also on the ability of the opposition parties to consolidate their forces.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### JOURNALISTS VISIT ANGOLAN WAR ZONE

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA ZEGODNYA in Russian No 5, May 84 pp 16-18

[Article by N. Semerov, TASS correspondent in Luanda: "Angola: a Repulse for the Interventionists"]

[Text] The intense tropical heat settles over the capital of Angola long before midday. It is replaced at night by drenching rains. The country has been transformed before one's eyes. The yards are covered with a green carpet, the acacias and magnolias blossom brilliantly, the rhododendrons are dressed in pinks and whites, and the royal palms have become even more magnificent.

The work rhythm of Luanda is cadenced and efficient. Each morning factory and plant workers and office employees flow through its streets, and large buses set out one after the other for the city's industrial outskirts. The Port of Luanda is efficiently serviced by ships bearing the flags of many nations of the world, including Soviet vessels delivering various commodities, industrial and agricultural equipment to far-off Angola. More than 150 of the capital's enterprises took part in the socialist competition to fulfill and exceed planned assignments in honor of Victory Day—27 March. The nation proclaimed 1984 "a year of defense and production." "In order to advance along our chosen path of building a socialist society, we must produce as much as possible,"—this basic principle of the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]—Labor Party, is fervently supported by the Angolan workers.

Luanda lives a full life with its day-to-day concerns. People scurry to the markets. Traffic controllers see to it that the traffic rules are strictly observed, and they always give priority to pedestrians. It might appear from the outside that peace and tranquility reign in the capital and throughout Angola. How deceptive that superficial impression, though!

...The latest, large-scale invasion of Angola by Pretoria's aggressive military forces began on the night of 12 December 1983. The screaming of Mirages and Impalas cut through the quiet of the southern provinces of Huila, Cunene and Cuando-Cubango, and a number of populated areas were subjected to intense bombing.

It is literally a stone's throw from Marshal Tito Street, where the TASS office is located, to the editorial office of the newspaper JORNAL DI ANGOLA, but during

those days the paperboys would not reach our door before the latest issues were snapped up by the city residents, who immediately immersed themselves in reading the newspapers. The looks on their faces were serious and concentrated. Three brigades of the racists were sweeping toward the north--toward the cities of Cahama, Cuvelai, Cassinga, Mulondo and Caiundo. Pedro Maria Tonha (Pedale), member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party and the republic's minister of defense, issued the order to resolutely withstand the aggressor. The military district command, located in Lubango, the administrative center of Huila Province, called upon the soldiers and officers of the People's Armed Forces of Liberated Angola (FAPLA) to protect every inch of their native land, and they were fighting to the death. The large headline of an editorial on the front page read: "Work the Way the FAPLA Soldiers Are Fighting at the Front."

It cost our group of Soviet journalists a great deal of effort to obtain permission to visit the area of combat operations. We knew, of course, that the Angolan leaders were concerned for us and did not want to risk our lives, but in order to write about the courage of the FAPLA fightingmen and commanders we absolutely had to see as much as possible with our own eyes, to talk with those who were not sparing themselves to defend the revolution and the homeland of Agostinho Neto.

We finally reached Lubango on 10 January, taking advantage of an opportunity to travel there by air. We could see an enormous poster from afar, with the appeal: "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory Over the Aggressor!". We were met by Joao Rodrigues de Castro, head of the ideological and propaganda section of the provincial committee of the MPLA-Labor Party.

"The Pretoria racists, with the direct assistance and support of Washington, have unleashed the next, totally unprovoked round of aggression against our nation," he said. "They say that they are 'pursuing partisans of the South-West African People's Organization.' This is nothing but a pretext. There is no justification and there can be no justification for Botha's clique, which has long since become the same as Hitlerite fascism and Israeli Zionism in its cynicism and brutality. You will soon see for yourselves that it is conducting a barbaric war of destruction against the Angolan people."

We could see the aftermath of fierce air raids by the racists 8 or 9 kilometers to the west of Lubango, actually in a suburb: deep bomb craters, marks on the walls of the houses, destroyed bridges, burned crops. The South African air pirates had skimmed the ground, "hunting" for peaceful residents attempting to find shelter in the woods.

The Agostinho Neto Hospital: Soldiers and civilians, many of them in serious condition, lay on cots in the wards and in the halls.

"As soon as I get well, I will return to the ranks," I was told by Sergeant Antonio Fael, wounded in both legs. "We will never forgive the racists for their crimes and their mockery of our nation's people!"

I spoke with Matuba Kikebe Filipe, chief of the medical service in Huila Province, in his tiny office.



"Doctors-and-internationalists from the Soviet Union, Cuba and Bulgaria work alongside the Angolan personnel in the hospital from morning to evening and even at night. Let's go up to the fourth floor," he suggested. "They brought in some wounded during the night. They cannot be brought in during the day because of air attacks by the racists. For them the red cross is just an excellent target."

Nurses Raisa Devetayeva and Filomena Mario were assisting Soviet surgeon A.P. Borisov in the operating room. One's blood boiled at the sight of the maimed children. Some of them had tags with numbers, since their names were not known. They had not regained consciousness.

"These are the ones the racist monsters are fighting!" Matuba Kikebe Filipe exclaimed with rage and bitterness.

The next day we journalists had the opportunity to travel to the front line. We had previously been invited to visit the chief of staff of the 5th Military District, who explained in simple terms what sort of precautionary steps we should take in the area of Cahama and to the south of the city. The conversation soon took on far broader scope.

"The Pretoria military clique," we were told by Captain Arnolano Costa, "began making reconnaissance flights over Angolan territory as early as 6 December 1983, and on 14 December, following a series of bombings, they switched to an 'all-out offensive' against the FAPLA. Nine infantry battalions outfitted with a large number of armoured personnel carriers, tanks and other combat equipment, three artillery groups armed, among other things, with 140-mm howitzers of South African make and 155-mm guns of American and Canadian manufacture, up to 100 Mirage and Impala aircraft, Puma and Alouette helicopters, took part in it.

"By unleashing the current aggression," Major Daniel Dala, chief of the military district's political directorate, continued, "the racists of the Republic of South Africa wanted not just to intimidate the Angolan people but also to clear a 'corridor' in the eastern part of the country for their underlings--bandits of the counterrevolutionary grouping, UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola]. Pretoria could see that UNITA was suffering one defeat after another and apparently decided 'to inspire' its rank-and-file members, the majority of whom no longer believe their ringleader, Jonas Savimbi, and are accusing him of profiting while dooming them to certain death."

"Savimbi is still clinging to the hope of sitting down at the negotiating table with the government of the People's Republic of Angola. But what is there to talk about with an agent of the CIA, a traitor to the Angolan people, an individual who has no principles and is incapable of having them? The ringleader of the UNITA gang continues to expound on the creation of a 'buffer state' in southern Angola, but this is only an impossible, delirious dream. The Pretoria racists and the American imperialists who have placed their hopes on Savimbi are soon in for a bitter disappointment. Although Bandit No. 1 is bending over backwards to curry favor with his bosses, there is a sad and shameful end in store for him," Daniel Dala said in summary.

We set out for Cahama, accompanied by three armoured vehicles with machine guns at the ready. The driver and an armed guard sat in the front seat of the aged but fairly powerful Landrover; the chief of the political directorate and the Soviet correspondents rode in the back seat. The trip took no more than 4 hours. Bombed homes, rubble piles of bricks and concrete, craters left by bombs and shells everywhere--this is how we found the city of Cahama in Cunene Province, part of which has been occupied by racists from the Republic of South Africa since August of 1981. There was not a soul in the streets. Lukas Kabinga, who was miraculously saved, told us the following:

"I am alone here right now. My comrade will join me today. Together we will guard these warehouses. The racists bombed our little city every day. Look what they've done to it! The residents will come back, though, and rebuild what has been destroyed. We will have a library and a school once again, and once again the children will take their places at the school desks."

The front line ran 5 kilometers south of Cahama. We were at the command post of Captain Lima Coelho, commander of the 2nd Brigade.

The enemy attacked our positions and wanted to capture the city no matter what. The brigade soldiers and officers, however, demonstrated courage, valor and bravery and thwarted the racists' plans. Yes, they bombed Cahama, but they did not succeed in taking it."

"The personnel in our formation," Fernando Mateus, brigade chief of staff, said, "demonstrated what people protecting their homeland and defending the cause of the revolution are capable of. The enemy is now rolling back to the south under attack by the FAPLA," he said, running his finger along a map, "although they have not halted their air raids or reconnaissance flights. Our antiaircraft gunners are good ones, though. They have destroyed six South African planes and helicopters. Many of the aggressors have found their graves in Angolan territory."

I was shown the soldier's service and pay book of B. Robert, a pilot in the South African Air Force, who had been shot down. He was born in 1963, and the book, No. 63705, was issued in January of 1983. I was also shown military pass No. 822559375, which had belonged to Sergeant R. Gabb. Among the captured items were military maps with ominous black arrows pointing toward Angola's north, plans for capturing the republic's cities and FAPLA positions, money, a large quantity of weapons and ammunition, including rifles, machine guns and shells for 145-mm and 155-mm guns, and an entire mountain of uniforms and military personal equipment.

"Immediately after the UN Security Council passed the resolution calling for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, Pretoria hastened to announce they had already been removed. As always, however, this was a blatant and hypocritical lie of the racists," the chief of the military district's political directorate underscored. "Typically, the USA and England abstained from the voting. This is not surprising: Washington and Pretoria are allies and friends."

On 13 January we met with Rafael Sabilinha, member of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party and commissar of Huila Province, whom I had seen the first

time 8 years previously in the northern part of Angola, in Lunda Province, near the city of Teixeira de Sousa. There was also a war underway at that time, in January of 1976. Detachments of the counterrevolutionary organization FNLA [National Front for the Liberation of Angola] were sweeping toward Luanda from the north, and regular units of the South African Army and UNITA bands reinforced with mercenaries from many of the imperialist nations, from the east and the south. Major Rafael Sapilinha commanded a special grouping of the People's Armed Forces. I reminded him of what he had said at that time: "When we end the war, I'll go to work restoring the national economy." Unfortunately, however, the war virtually never ended for Angola. It never had a single day which could be called completely peaceful.

In an interview with Angolan and Soviet journalists R. Sapilinha stated that during the bombings of populated areas the racists had used toxic substances which paralyze the nerves. He totally rejected Pretoria's fabrications to the effect that it has undertaken the new invasion of Angola for purposes of "pursuing SWAPO [South-West African People's Organization] partisans." The main objective of all aggressive acts by the Republic of South Africa was to destabilize the situation in the republic, undermine its economy and ultimately, overthrow the legal government and place its puppets into power. The Angolan people will never be broken, however! Under the leadership of their revolutionary vanguard, the MPLA-Labor Party, they are confidently continuing to build a new society. They have true and loyal friends on their side--the Soviet Union, Cuba and other nations of the socialist commonwealth, and all the world's progressive forces.

The Angolan people's heroic resistance has convinced the imperialist aggressors of the impossibility of breaking the People's Republic of Angola and forced them to agree to talks with it on a new basis. As a result of these talks it was announced that South Africa's troops were being removed from Angola under the observation of a joint Angolan-South African commission. The future will show how much we can believe that the racist regime is capable of observing the agreements achieved.

...Today, after celebrating May Day, People's Angola is honoring its fightingmen, who protected the homeland with their bodies, and is working hard to implement its economic plans.

There are many advanced enterprises in Luanda and other cities of the nation. Take, for example, the capital's Textang factory, which produces highly diverse fabrics for the population. They come off the modern looms in a multicolored flow, later to be turned into bright-colored women's dresses, men's shirts and creepers for babies. Four out of every five workers at the enterprise are participating in socialist competition, its technical director Pedro Garcia told me with pride.

The Panga-Panga Wood-Working Factory in Cabinda Province, second in importance in all of Africa, is operating smoothly. Its products are exported not only to other nations on the continent, but also to Europe, Asia and Latin America. I also visited a fish cannery on the northern edge of Cabinda. There are a dining hall and nurseries right on the premises. In one of the shops I was met by L.S. Reznikov and Jilberto Moleko, directors of the joint Soviet-Angolan Fishing Expedition.

"We are learning from our Soviet colleagues both at the plant and when we are fishing at sea," J. Maleko said. "Their assistance is internationalism in practice."

By the nature of my work I frequently get to talk with Angolan political figures, members of the intelligentsia, workers and peasants. They all express an enormous liking for the Soviet Union. Friendship and all-round cooperation are the typical features of relations between our nations and our peoples. There is probably no area in which that cooperation has not been felt. Agriculture, industry, public health, the training of personnel--the Soviet Nation is providing People's Angola with fraternal international assistance throughout.

How much more easily and successfully the young republic would advance along the path of social progress and how much fewer "shortages" of all kinds there would be, and how much more harmony, in its national economy, not to speak of the most terrible and irreparable harm--human sacrifices and ruined lives--if not for the permanent aggression of imperialism, primarily that of the racist Republic of South Africa backed by the USA, which the choice made by the Angolan people does not suit. They are not alone in their just struggle, however. This was reaffirmed during the Soviet-Cuban-Angolan consultations in Moscow on 11 January 1984. The Soviet Union and Cuba once again firmly declared their solidarity with Angola and their readiness to continue helping it to build up its defense capability.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### U.S., FRANCE BLAMED FOR CHAD CONFLICT; LIBYAN ROLE BACKED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 5, May 84 pp 23-26, 43

[Article by V. Yevgen'yev: "Chad: Who is to Blame for the Bloodshed"]

[Text] Shots have resounded, blood has flowed, and the encounters between armed groupings have not ceased in Chad for more than 20 years now, and the Chadian problem has not been absent from the world press for the same period of time. A unique craft has developed in the nation during those years. Local craftsmen have learned how to cast figures of various African animals out of the brass rifle cartridges scattered over the land in profusion. I recall how 10 years ago, when Chadian officials visited foreign states, they presented those figures as souvenirs, as typical examples of their folk art. Many of those officials are no longer alive, and the cartridges from the shells which proved fatal for them have also, no doubt, been turned into brass antelopes and giraffes....

The conflict did not arise in a vacuum. It has a long history and graphically illustrates the practical implementation of the commandment of all colonizers: "Divide and conquer." Unnaturally pitting various clan and tribal groupings against one another and playing on ethnic, communal and religious conflicts and on the personal ambitions of certain figures, the French administration was always attempting to create dissention in the Chadian national liberation movement, to replace it with rivalry among leaders of the military-political factions.

Forced to grant independence to Chad in 1960, the metropolitan country made an effort to put people obedient to it into power. They were headed by Francois Tombalbaye, who represented affluent groups of the population in the nation's catholic and animistic south. Giving preferential treatment to one ethnic group to the detriment of the others, it deliberately set the stage for the future conflict.

A rebel movement flared up in Chad almost during the very first days following the proclamation of independence there. It was caused, on the one hand, by the dissatisfaction of progressive, patriotic groups with the former metropolitan country's continuing dominance, and on the other, by the dissatisfaction of the Islamized tribes in the nation's north, east and west with the fact that they had actually been removed from participation in state and political life. A specific feature of that movement was the great number of armed groupings taking part in it on an ethnic basis, which were not only fighting the central authorities but were also fighting among themselves.



It was not until 1966 that the opposition forces managed to overcome the disagreements, which had been exacerbated from without, and to unite most of the rebel forces in the Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINA). The latter was based chiefly in the northern part of the country. The program advanced by the FROLINA leadership, which calls for the consolidation of national sovereignty, the securing of equal rights for all citizens, regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation, and the implementation of a number of social and economic reforms, made it possible to unite the various military and political groupings for a time.

The personal ambitions of certain FROLINA leaders, however, which were encouraged by the opponents of real independence for Chad, led to the front's breakup in 1976. Out of it came a group headed by Hissein Habre, who formed the so-called Armed Forces of the North (FAN). In 1978 H. Habre reached agreement with the French henchman General Malloum, who had replaced Tombalbaye as president in 1975, and became prime minister in his government. In February of 1979, however, the FAN led by him, interacting with the People's Armed Forces led by FROLINA leader G. Oueddei, overthrew Malloum.

With the assumption of power by leaders of the rebel movement the nation found itself actually split up among the rival military-political groupings involved in the armed conflict. Agreement was reached in Lagos in August of 1979, but only following a number of conferences on national reconciliation with the participation of representatives from 11 Chadian groupings, as well as representatives from Libya, Nigeria, Niger, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, the Congo, Benin, Senegal and Liberia. It called for the formation, based on the principle of equal representation, of the Transitional Government of National Unity of Chad (TGNU), which was formed on 10 November 1979. It was headed by G. Oueddei, and H. Habre was its minister of defense.

The independent course taken by the TGNU, which obtained the withdrawal of French troops from Chad at the beginning of 1980, evoked sharp resistance on the part of the imperialist powers, particularly the USA and France. Once again they provoked internecine conflicts. As early as March of 1980 H. Habre's grouping came into direct conflict with FROLINA forces, and civil war flared up again.

The USA, which provided H. Habre with extensive military assistance through the Sudan and Egypt, Chad's neighbors, played a particularly role in the incitement of the Chadian conflict during that period. In that situation the TGNU was forced to turn to Libya for support, concluding a joint defense agreement with the latter on 15 June. The arrival of units of the Libyan army in accordance with that agreement led to the defeat of the FAN, which had been driven back to the area of the Chadian-Sudanese border by December of 1980.

Taking advantage of the withdrawal of Libyan units from Chad in November of 1981, H. Habre, who received additional material and military assistance from the USA, as well as from a number of African and Arab nations with conservative regimes, immediately renewed combat operations. "International peace forces" sent to the Chadian capital of N'Djamena at the beginning of 1982, which included military contingents from Nigeria, Zaire and Senegal, did not prevent the FAN from advancing, and on 7 June 1982 they captured the capital.

The FAN succeeded fairly rapidly in establishing control over most of the nation's territory, except for northern areas adjacent to Libya and the southern provinces, where Chadian armed forces led by Lieutenant Colonel Kamuge held their positions. Only a split in their ranks and the direct betrayal of certain officers who had entered into a conspiracy with H. Habre and incited a revolt made it possible for the FAN to capture the southern part of Chad in August and September of 1982. FAN detachments, which were made up of natives of the north, behaved like occupiers and massacred entire villages. Naturally, this could not but evoke an extremely negative attitude toward H. Habre on the part of the local residents.

In October of 1982 Habre formed a government in N'Djamena, in which he included his closest associates and proclaimed himself president of Chad and prime minister. At almost the same time G. Oueddei was forming a new transitional national unity government in the city of Bardai in the northern part of the country, with the participation of representatives of various military-political groups.

After the TGNU had reorganized the detachments it had managed to retain despite its defeat, it undertook a counteroffensive against H. Habre's regime in the spring of 1983. On 24 June its forces captured the city of Faya-Largeau, which is of great strategic importance, and then took the cities of Oum Chalouba, Arada and Biltine. On 10 July they entered the city of Abeche, located in the eastern part of the nation, thereby creating a threat to N'Djamena's military supply line running from the Sudan through that point.

The successes achieved by the PPNE forces caused extremely serious concern in the USA and France, whose ruling circles had taken the path of unconditional support for H. Habre's regime. On 25 June 1983 the French government made the decision to provide N'Djamena with military assistance under a 1976 agreement on technical military cooperation. Weapons, ammunition, armoured vehicles, artillery, transport equipment and so forth began entering Chad at an accelerated rate over the "air bridge." During a brief period H. Habre received a total of more than 40 million dollars worth of military materiel from France. French military and civilian advisers and mercenaries of every stripe simultaneously began streaming into N'Djamena.

The American administration followed the French. On 20 July 1983 it made the decision to provide H. Habre with 10 million dollars worth of emergency military equipment and munitions. It also erected an "air bridge" to N'Djamena, over which military instructors and communications subunits were sent to the city. The "emergency aid" was subsequently increased by 15 million dollars, bringing it to 25 million dollars.

In addition to this Paris and Washington took steps to have neighboring African states provide the N'Djamena regime with military assistance. A considerable quantity of weapons was sent from the Sudan and Egypt, and as early as the beginning of July, 1983, Zaire had sent military subunits and combat aircraft to support H. Habre.

The large military shipments from the Western powers and the direct participation in the combat operations by French aircraft and Zairian servicemen permitted the

D'Djamena regime to recover fairly rapidly and to organize a counteroffensive. On 14 July H. Habre's troops regained Abeche and moved to the north. They took Faya-Largeau on 30 July.

After gathering reinforcements and regrouping, however, the TGNU forces blockaded Faya-Largeau and retook the city on 10 August after subjecting it to systematic shelling. After routing a large group of N'Djamena's forces, they continued the offensive to the south and had established control over practically the entire northern half of the nation by mid-August.

Hissein Habre appealed once again to his Western protectors. France responded by speeding up an operation to move an expeditionary corps and weapons to Chad, which was subsequently given the code-name "Manta." According to the newspaper QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, France's military aid to the N'Djamena regime soon reached a billion francs (125 million dollars). The numerical strength of the select French contingents--paratroopers, marines and foreign legion soldiers--sent to Chad reached 3,500 men by the end of August, 1983. They were armed with ultra-modern combat equipment. The Paris LIBERATION stated that the intervention in Chad was the largest military operation conducted by the French army at any time since the end of the war in Algeria.

France assumed general coordination of the operations of all formations fighting on the side of the N'Djamena regime, including not only its own expeditionary corps but also the Zairian contingent (3,700 men) and H. Habre's forces (2,500 men), as well as mercenaries from the nations of Western Europe. This task was assigned directly to Brigade General Jean Pouilly, considered to be "an important specialist on African affairs."

The French military units were deployed along a line between the cities of Abeche and Salal, designated the "red line" separating the opposing sides and falling approximately on the 15th parallel. They were to prevent the TGNU armed forces from advancing further to the south. The Paris LE MONDE wrote that the Habre regime was "saved thanks to the French intervention in August" of 1983.

The 10th Conference of Heads of States and Governments of Africa and France was held in the French resort town of Vittel on 3 and 4 October. It was attended by representatives of 38 states. Paris's objective at the meeting was to obtain the approval of the African nations for France's interventionist operations in Chad and the "right" to continue interfering in its internal affairs. Most of the conference participants opposed internationalizing the Chadian conflict, however, and spoke out in favor of settling the conflict as rapidly as possible through talks among the Chadians themselves. H. Habre, who insisted on "direct French military assistance" for restoring his control over northern regions of Chad held by the TGNU forces, found himself isolated and was ultimately forced to announce his readiness to meet without any preconditions with TGNU head G. Oueddei and with members of the other Chadian groups for talks to settle the conflict.

The General Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity took the initiative for convening a conference to achieve national reconciliation in Chad. In the last third of November, 1983, it sent a mission to N'Djamena, Paris and Tripoli to learn the opinion of all the parties involved. After the commission had



completed its consultations the General Secretariat of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] concluded that it would be expedient to have all 11 groups which had signed the Lagos agreement of 21 August 1979 take part in the peace talks.

It was initially agreed to conduct the conference in Addis Ababa at the end of December, but at H. Habre's request it was postponed to January of 1984.

In an attempt to facilitate national reconciliation TGNU head G. Oueddei announced on the eve of the meeting in Addis Ababa that he was "prepared to give up political activities if this would help to achieve peace." The TGNU had worked out a draft program for settling the conflicts, which he planned to submit to the conference. It called for the establishment of an interim committee, which would be authorized to form an interim government for Chad and to name a head of state (furthermore, it was not planned to include any of the leaders of the existing groups on the committee). The interim government was to work out within a period of 12-18 months the draft main documents pertaining to the state system for Chad, and there was to be national discussion of these. The task of maintaining security in Chad was to be assigned to the joint armed forces of the OAU. All foreign troops were to be removed from the nation. The opposing groups were to halt combat operations, disarm and be transformed into political parties.

With respect to H. Habre, he did not propose any sort of settlement program of his own.

By the beginning of the conference, which was scheduled for 9 January 1984, the leaders of all the Chadian military-political groups had arrived in the Ethiopian capital. At the last minute H. Habre refused to attend, giving the excuse that G. Oueddei had been given "too friendly a welcome" in Addis Ababa. He stated that he would appear at the conference only if he were given the honors of a head of state, although it had been agreed in advance that he would be received as a leader of one of the groups.

(I. Miskin), minister of foreign affairs in H. Habre's government, who was considered to be a proponent of talks, died under extremely strange circumstances, ostensibly from malaria, literally on the eve of the conference. Interestingly, relations between him, the second man in the N'Djamena leadership, and H. Habre had recently been fairly complicated. (Ibris Miskin) enjoyed a certain degree of prestige in Chadian political circles and in Paris, and according to certain information he held to a more realistic line than H. Habre for settling the situation in Chad. At one time rumors had filtered into the Western press that in Paris people were studying the possibility of replacing H. Habre, who had become too offensive, with (I. Miskin), who could suit both the former metropolitan country and many Chadians.

Be that as it may, H. Habre sent T. Guinassou [sic], his minister of internal affairs, to Addis Adaba instead of (I. Miskin). He did not grant T. Guinassou any authority but ordered him to avoid any discussion of specific questions pertaining to normalization of the situation in Chad and to limit himself to bringing up complaints having to do with protocol and procedure. In an official statement on the matter OAU Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam pointed out that "during the consultations the N'Djamena delegation had essentially canceled out the numerous efforts made by the OAU to organize the meeting, which was to bring peace

to Chad and save that country's national unity." H. Habre's line, members of the Chadian groups opposed to him feel, was clearly coordinated with Paris and Washington, which from all indications set for N'Djamena the task of undermining the emerging process for achieving a settlement in Chad, thereby imperiling the OAU's efforts and personally compromising its chairman--the leader of revolutionary Ethiopia.

Following the breakdown of the conference in Addis Ababa the imperialist forces once again began exacerbating tensions in Chad. On 25 January 1984 French combat aircraft attacked a military column of the TGNU near Ziguei, 300 kilometers north of N'Djamena and 70 kilometers north of the "red line" declared by the French themselves. They were repelled. One Jaguar ground-attack plane was shot down and another was damaged. Just 2 days later, on 27 January, France's ministry of defense took advantage of that incident and ordered its expeditionary force to enlarge the area it controlled by almost 100,000 square kilometers by advancing more than 100 kilometers north of the "red line," the dividing line between the warring parties. The new line runs approximately along the 16th parallel between the cities of Koro Toro and Oum Chalouba, which creates a direct threat to Faya-Largeau, the TGNU's main support point, and increases the danger of a direct confrontation between the TGNU forces and the French. The troops were also ordered to open fire without warning upon all "hostile elements" penetrating into the area under their control. Simultaneously, France began an intensive buildup of its air forces in Chad, transferring additional combat planes and helicopters there.

A study of the situation in Chad shows that intervention by the USA and France, which is increasingly being led by the USA, in purely Chadian affairs is the main reason why the conflict has dragged on for so long and has not been resolved despite all efforts. Stabilization of the situation in Chad is not in keeping with the plans of the American administration, which has recently stepped up its interference in the affairs of Central African nations and is clearly out to consolidate its position in that area by creating a sort of belt of pro-American states. It is precisely the intensification of the USA's aggressive policy and its attempts "to replace" France in a number of African nations and get its hands on the valuable strategic raw materials which they possess, which ultimately produced Hissein Habre's new appearance on the Chadian political scene (1981-1982), the assumption of power in N'Djamena by the FAN group and the drastic exacerbation of the situation in and around Chad. It was precisely the financial and military support provided H. Habre's defeated rebel forces through Egypt and Sudan which contributed to the renewal of civil war in Chad.

The American administration cites some sort of "Libyan intervention" as a cover for its own intervention in the affairs of that nation and tries to depict the civil war and the struggle for power among the various Chadian groups through the prism of the so-called "anti-Libyan syndrome," which is based on the assertion that Libya somehow plans to use Chad as a staging ground for penetrating into other African nations. Deliberately ignoring the fact that the struggle against H. Habre's forces and the interventionists is being conducted not by Libyans but by detachments of the Transitional Government of National Unity headed by G. Oueddei, which until June of 1982 was officially recognized by Washington and which even received some American aid at one time, the United States is stubbornly inciting around the events in Chad anti-Libyan sentiments both in its own West European allies and in "friendly" African states.



One of the main tasks which Washington has set for itself is to provoke a clash between France and Libya, which would permit it to "kill two birds...": to strike a blow at the progressive regime of the Libyan Jamahiriya and to weaken the French position in Africa. Both the one and the other would suit American imperialism exceedingly well.

Expanding its interference in the Chadian conflict, Washington has from the very beginning urged France to do so as well. It has recently been applying great pressure upon France. It has frightened France with talk of the possibility of "Libyan expansion" to states adjacent to Chad, former French colonies, stating that without France's intervention the West "will have to pay too dear a price at Habre's defeat," and so forth. The situation has reached the point of open acts of provocation. For example, Washington has passed off all steps to expand its intervention in Chad as being coordinated with Paris, even though the latter has not only not agreed but has even objected to them at times.

The insolence with which the USA has "insinuated itself" into Chad, while perfectly aware of the fact that President Reagan announced at a press conference in the White House on 11 August 1983 that this nation is "not an American but a French sphere of interests," could not but disturb France's governing circles. They were essentially given clearly to understand that if they did not support Habre the Americans would do so, in which case France would lose all its say in Chad. This was extremely crude blackmail, which had its effect.

We know that when President F. Mitterrand formulated his government's African policy, he particularly stressed the fact that from now on France would not interfere in the internal affairs of the African nations and would stop playing the role of policeman there. The French socialists did not want to provide grounds for accusing them of conducting a neocolonialist policy in Africa.

Following the renewal of the armed conflict in Chad, France, which recognized the Transitional Government of National Unity and cooperated with it, initially demonstrated a certain degree of restraint, all the more since the person of E. Habre, who was relying upon assistance from the Americans, from all indications did not evoke any special trust in him on the part of France. When the FAN captured N'Djamena and created their own government there, Paris, apparently not wanting to give the Americans a free field of action there, took H. Habre's side and subsequently provided him with substantial assistance in obtaining international recognition.

Deciding under pressure from the American administration to engage in armed intervention in Chad, the French at first still attempted to conduct their own policy there, which took into account their interests in the region and the specific nature of their relations with Chad and with Libya. They disavowed Washington's statement that it had conducted consultations with them on the problems of Chad. They announced that for them "there was no point in operating systematically or exclusively together with the Americans" and refused the "services" of the USA, which on 6 August 1983 sent two AWACS radar planes to Sudan, to the Chadian border, and proposed that they be used in the conduct of combat operations. France's leaders stressed the fact that "French forces have returned to Chad not to fight but to restore peace there." In keeping with this the French forces avoided becoming directly involved in the combat operations.

At the same time French diplomats were actively announcing their intention to contribute to the achievement of national reconciliation among the Chadian groups and to the creation of a coalition government, indicating their readiness to act as an intermediary among the opposing parties. France supported the efforts of OAU Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam to convene a conference of leaders of the Chadian groups.

The position taken by Paris certainly did not fit in completely with the plans of the American administration, which had not given up its intention of forcing France to operate "more resolutely." The breakup of the conference in Addis Ababa and the incident involving the French aircraft could not have suited better the USA's designs with respect to further involving France in the armed conflict.

Although the French leaders continue to speak of a desire to contribute to reconciliation in Chad and propose a new "round table" under OAU aegis, their actions are making the achievement of that reconciliation increasingly problematic. This was borne out also by the results of a trip to N'Djamena, Addis Ababa and Tripoli on 2-5 February 1984 by C. Cheysson, France's minister of external relations, the official purpose of which was "to determine prospects for settling the Chadian conflict." According to a report in the newspaper MONIE that trip "did not produce the desired results and did not make it possible to renew the talks."

They understand very well in Paris that should the French forces be removed from Chad H. Habre's regime would fall. His position within the nation is extremely weak. Military failures, economic chaos, cruel acts of repression, and violence and looting by both N'Djemena's servicemen and the occupying forces of France and Zaire have sharply reduced H. Habre's popularity even among his supporters. At the same time the partisan movement in the southern and eastern parts of the nation has been stepped up, and this has forced H. Habre to transfer some subunits to the south, removing them from positions along the front in the north. According to the foreign press the real authority of H. Habre's regime covers only an insignificant area around the capital and individual populated areas.

Can France go on forever supporting such a regime with bayonets and keeping its forces in Chad? After all, its suction into the Chadian military-political "quagmire" would inevitably have negative consequences for France itself. Internationally, it is becoming increasingly difficult for France to counter accusations that its African policy is neocolonial, and on the internal political level it is increasingly difficult to explain the enormous cost of maintaining the expeditionary corps. Should French forces be drawn into a direct armed confrontation with the TGNU forces this would increase French losses, and this is also not in the interest of Paris. Logic would indicate that a settlement in Chad is in its interest. Exacerbation of the situation, and especially direct participation by the French expeditionary corps in military operations, would inevitably undermine France's position in the region. American imperialism would be the "indirect beneficiary."

Finally, of course, the halting of the bloodshed is desirable for the much-suffering Chadian people, who have been thoroughly exhausted by the warfare and

who are simply not being permitted to end it. The conflict in Chad is totally the internal affair of the Chadians, and they themselves can and must resolve it peacefully by settling their disagreements without interference by uninvited oversea "do-gooders."

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## INTERNATIONAL

### 'ISLAMIC' CHARACTER OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION ASSESSED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 5, May 84 pp 27-31

[Article by Doctor of History S. Agayev: "On the Concept and the Essence of the 'Islamic Revolution'"]

[Text] The powerful rise of truly national, antimonarchical and antiimperialist revolution in Iran was an important event in international life at the end of the '70s. It was at the same time a brilliant example of how extremely broad masses in nations of the East are rejecting the paths of bourgeois social modernization and Westernization of their original way of life, which are being imposed upon them. Opposition to the shah's policy of accelerated capitalist transformation of the Iranian society in the Western pattern resulted in various groups of the population turning to traditional cultural and spiritual values, among which the Islamic religion has always played an important role. In this situation Islam became the banner of the general antimonarchical and anti-imperialist struggle, and following the overthrow of the shah's regime the Muslim (Shiite) clergy, which had led the revolution, was able to gradually seize all political power in the nation.

The Marxist-Leninist classics repeatedly stated that a political protest movement with religious slogans is a phenomenon which occurs in all peoples at a certain stage in their development. From this basic statement of fact stems the need for a specific historical approach to the problem of Islamic slogans being used for political purposes. The CPSU Central Committee's Accountability Report to the 26th party congress states: "We communists respect the religious convictions of the people who practice Islam as well as other religions. The main thing is the kind of goals pursued by the forces enunciating certain slogans... the real substance of this or that movement."

Due to the increased importance of Islamic slogans in political movements in nations of the East (especially in light of events in Iran) the term "Islamic Revolution" has become a part of the political lexicon not only of the Western bourgeoisie, but in part also of Marxist historiography, in recent years. A natural need has developed for a precise definition of this term. One such attempt was made in a reference book on Islam published in the USSR in 1983. "Islamic revolution," it states, "is a name given by the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the anti-shah, antiimperialist Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. In their opinion, 'Islamic revolution' should spread to the entire Muslim world and then embrace the planet as a whole."<sup>1</sup>



While affirming the clergy's leading role in the Iranian revolution, S.M. Aliyev writes: "This feature, however, cannot be used as a pretext for advancing the basically erroneous thesis of the Islamic nature of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. Despite the significant role played by religious figures, the Iranian revolution was not a religious movement, of course."<sup>2</sup>

A.B. Reznikov noted the logical contradictoriness and methodological vulnerability of totally denying the Islamic aspects of the Iranian revolution: "One sometimes reads statements in the literature to the effect that the Iranian revolution was not an Islamic revolution. If we link the term 'Islamic revolution' with a denial of that indisputable fact that there is a class struggle in Iran, as there is in all nations of the world, and that revolution is the most consistent manifestation of that struggle, then the Iranian revolution should in fact not be called an Islamic revolution. This would be a very strange and invalid interpretation of the term, however. The Iranian revolution was nothing other than the highest degree of intensification of the class struggle, but at the same time it seems to us that the term 'Islamic revolution' is perfectly applicable to that which occurred in Iran. Islam was the integrating ideology behind the revolution; its political leadership was exercised by the Shiite clergy; the slogan of the revolution was a 'just Islamic system'; the mosque was the chief organizing cell, where the masses underwent ideological and political training in an antiregime spirit; and the bourgeoisie's political organizations only acknowledged the hegemony of the clergy. All of this provides the grounds for considering that an 'Islamic revolution' occurred in Iran. It is absolutely invalid, however, to interpret the term to mean that the revolution led to the establishment in Iran of that system which is preordained in Islam.... When we consider the revolution's political leadership, its ideology, its system of slogans, its organizers and leaders, however, there is every basis for calling the revolution an Islamic revolution."<sup>3</sup>

In his foreword to A.B. Reznikov's book R.A. Ul'yankovskiy states that "one can obviously agree with this relatively limited and specific interpretation of the term," and stresses along with this the fact that this does not rule out a positive social content in the Iranian revolution.<sup>4</sup>

The author of this article attempted in 1981 to define the character of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979, with all the complexity and contradictoriness of its internal structure: popular with respect to moving forces, methods of struggle and universal demands for social justice; antimonarchical, antimonopolistic and antiimperialist with respect to its basic orientation; bourgeois democratic with respect to its urgent tasks and immediate results (since the anticapitalist trends manifested therein were not developed); Islamic with respect to the clergy's leading role and the organizational and ideological basis.<sup>5</sup> This overall assessment was generally supported by R.A. Ul'yankovskiy.<sup>6</sup>

This sort of complication of the substance of revolutionary processes began to emerge at the time of world capitalism's transition to the imperialist stage. Let us recall Lenin's assessment of the first Russian revolution in 1905-1907, which is ordinarily described as the first popular revolution of the imperialist era. Describing it as bourgeois democratic in its social content, V.I. Lenin at the same time noted the proletarian nature of that revolution--the means of



This brief definition, we can see, focuses attention on the origin of the term but does not reveal its objective essence, and this gives rise to a large number of questions and comments.

For one thing, the term "Islamic revolution" has long been used not only by leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but also by the leaders of opposition Muslim political groupings in the most diverse nations of the East. Furthermore, each of them interprets the term in his own way. It is extremely difficult to summarize various interpretations, sometimes contradictory, of this concept, but the emphasis on a "third path of development" (neither capitalist nor socialist) and especially on the Islamizing of all aspects of social life, which is to one degree or another characteristic of them all, can apparently be used as a general guideline.

In the second place, the stressing of the subjective aspects of the term "Islamic revolution," on which the above definition is based, is clearly limited even within this very framework and actually distorts the overall picture, making it appear that the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran are trying to spread nothing other than an "anti-shah, antiimperialist" revolution to the "planet as a whole."

In the third place, the fact should be pointed out that the Islamic leaders are taking the concept "Islamic revolution" far outside the context of the period 1978-1979. After initially using this term to refer to the revolutionary movement which overthrew the shah's regime in February of 1979, Khomeini then repeatedly stated that it is not a goal in itself but only a means of achieving the main goal--the society's Islamization--the first step toward the achievement of which is the creation of an Islamic political structure. In November of 1979, during the holding of the American hostages in Tehran and the removal of M. Bazargan's government from power, Khomeini called those events "a second revolution, larger than the first." In June of 1981, following the removal of President A. Bani-Sadr, some Iranian leaders began speaking of a "third Islamic revolution."

It is perfectly clear from what we have said that in order to more or less completely and precisely define the concept and the essence of "Islamic revolution," we must take a profound, methodologically consistent approach not only to the events of 1978-1979, but also to subsequent stages in the development of the revolutionary process in Iran, the only Muslim nation in which that which is expressed by the term "Islamic revolution" has taken on the features of objective reality to some degree. To deny such significance for this concept, we believe, would be to exhibit the vulgar sociological approach which assumes that any form of political movement can be reduced to the direct and strict expression of the interests of a certain class, ignoring the importance of such intermediate factors as corporative social aspirations, which are significant in the situations of nations of the East, for example. Among other things, this approach would contradict the opinion, generally accepted today, that the contemporary Iranian revolution experience is historically new and unique, although its most important features, incidentally, have still not been assessed with adequate thoroughness.

Let us begin by taking a look at how the term "Islamic revolution" is applicable to the events of 1978-1979 in Iran.

struggle and the leading role played by the working class in it.<sup>7</sup> V.I. Lenin foresaw that the revolutionary movement in nations of the East would be even more complex and diverse.

The reader understands, of course, that the example of the first Russian revolution is used in this case exclusively on a general methodological level for purposes of directing attention to the complication of the internal structure of revolutionary movements in the 20th century, including the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979. In all other respects the two revolutions constitute a striking contrast. While the proletarian nature of the bourgeois revolution in Russia was a factor which could in principle contribute to the future transition of the revolutionary process to a qualitatively higher stage, the Islamic aspects of the Iranian revolution after February of 1979 became factors contributing to the abrupt and effective retardation of the revolutionary process in Iran, while up to a certain time also clouding and obscuring its objective social content with special force.

Prior to February of 1979, however, the Islamic aspects of the Iranian revolution were still not reflected in any effective way in its popular, democratic nature. In the first place, there are no grounds for making the clergy's leading role in the Iranian revolution into an absolute: During the most crucial and critical moments in the revolutionary struggle Khomeini did not lead the masses, but the masses drew him along behind them.<sup>8</sup> In the second place, it would not be valid to assume that the masses were mobilized for the revolutionary struggle by appeals of official Shiite doctrine. The main role was played by the popular aspects of the religion, particularly the rituals and secret rites representing the "passions" of the Shiite martyrs. Although these aspects of the religion had little in common with the official Shiite doctrine, this did not prevent Khomeini from taking advantage of them.<sup>9</sup> In the third place, it was not only the mosque, but also--albeit to a smaller degree--such institutions as the university, the bazaar and so forth, which were the organizational nucleus of the revolution.

And so, with respect to the events of 1978-February 1979, the term "Islamic revolution" reflects mainly those aspects of the Iranian revolution which, with a certain degree of qualification, can be listed as its forms (or described as formal attributes). To express this idea more concisely, we could say (with the invariable risk in such a case of a certain degree of simplification): The revolution of 1978-February 1979 in Iran was popular and democratic in character and Islamic in form.

Now let us consider in what sense the term "Islamic revolution" is applicable to political events in Iran during the ensuing period--after February of 1979. No straightforward opinions have yet been expressed on this matter in the literature, since practically all the writers consider this period to be outside the framework of the revolutionary process in Iran. To what extent can this approach be considered justified?

Following the victory of the armed uprising in February of 1979, which resolved the main problems of the antimonarchical phase of the revolutionary struggle (which accomplished the antimonopolistic and certain antiimperialist tasks), the

clergy, which had come into power, did everything it could to direct the revolutionary movement of the masses into a channel in which its efforts to institutionalize the Islamic organizational and ideological forms could determine the main content of the popular and democratic revolution. This turn was perfectly natural for that social stratum which, because of objective historical circumstances, found itself at the head of the revolutionary struggle and which perceived common national goals through the prism of its own corporative interests.

The religious groups which came into power devoted their main attention to the Islamization of all social life and mainly to the creation of a new, Islamic political system of a theocratic type, designed not only to consolidate the clergy's political hegemony but also to perpetuate the social and economic conditions for its existence as a corporative social stratum. It was precisely in conformity with the strategic goals that leading figures of the Islamic Republic of Iran identified three stages of the "Islamic revolution": The first was reckoned from the time of their establishment at the helm of state control as a result of the overthrow of the shah's regime in February of 1979; the second began when the autocracy of the Islamic political movement was established in November of 1979, following the removal from power of the secular liberal trend, whose representatives the clergy had granted certain governmental functions in the beginning; and the third phase began with the defeat in June of 1981 of those secular groups in the ranks of the Islamic political movement which were opposed to the clergy's direct rule. In the last stage, which covered 1982 and 1983, religious circles also subjected most of the leftist forces, especially the People's Party of Iran, to brutal repression. The clergy thereby virtually eliminated not only the existing opposition to the clergy, but for the moment the potential opposition as well, and completely consolidated its state monopoly in the form of the world's first Shiite theocracy.<sup>10</sup>

And so, during the period 1979-1983 all of the efforts of the Iranian Shiite clergy, which had come into power in a completely popular revolution, were subordinate to the task of institutionalizing, constituting and stabilizing its state monopoly. This historically unique example attests to the capacity of religious, theological forces not only to head a universally popular, antimonarchical and antiimperialist movement and bring it to victory, but also subsequently to use the fruits of that victory for its own corporative purposes.

The Iranian clergy's combination of political radicalism with social conservatism has its roots in the shah's policy of accelerated bourgeois modernization of the nation, which affected not only the material welfare of the ministers of religion but also the degree of their influence among the broad masses of the population and consequently, the very foundations of their existence. Setting out by necessity on a path of revolutionary struggle, because in the existing situation the religion's right to exist could only be defended and the situation of its followers could only be consolidated by that route, even after the victory of the antimonarchical, antiimperialist movement the clergy continued in some cases to employ extremely radical methods and means of fighting for its socially conservative corporative goals.

This sort of efforts on the part of the religious groups was also necessitated by their opposition to right-wing elements in the ruling group itself, which



democratic revolution of 1978-February 1979, a crisis comprising the initial phase of development of the revolutionary process in Iran, which it entered immediately after the February victory and which, with the suppression of leftist forces, marked the final establishment of an authoritarian regime in the nation in the form of Islamic despotism.

This does not mean, of course, that the time frame for the Iranian revolution should be extended beyond the armed uprising of February, 1979. An interesting connection can be made between this and the general assessment and breakdown into periods of the Great French Bourgeois Revolution at the end of the 18th century which are now accepted in Soviet historiography. Although two phases of the revolution are identified--the ascending (1789-1794) and a descending phase (1794-1799)--the time frame of the revolution is ordinarily reckoned in accordance with the first, ascending, phase.

In summary we can conclude that following the victory of the anti-shah revolutionary struggle the Iranian clergy, which was at the head of the masses, undertook to and generally succeeded in successfully carrying out an attempt to turn a revolution Islamic in form into a revolution Islamic in substance, or more precisely, to give substantive significance to its formal elements. Therein apparently lies the political essence of the concept "Islamic revolution," which, as applicable to the period 1979-1983, acquires an even greater "right to citizenship" than the preceding phase. In this case it goes beyond the framework of the formal characteristics of the Iranian revolution, the popular, democratic character of which has now been drastically altered by its Islamic aspects.

It was certainly not without reason that we have only discussed the Iranian clergy's attempt to turn a revolution Islamic in form into a revolution Islamic in substance. "Any truth, if made 'excessive' (as [Ditsgen]-the-father said), if it is exaggerated, if it is taken beyond the limits of its real applicability," V.I. Lenin wrote, "can be carried to the absurd, and under these circumstances it even invariably becomes absurd."<sup>12</sup>

Despite all the term's real significance, the concept "Islamic revolution" cannot fully express the objective substance of the revolutionary process in Iran. While the use of this term for designating corporative social aspirations is not in conflict with the basic principles of Marxist sociology, it would be directly contrary to these principles to extend it to apply to the social essence of a popular, democratic revolution. Precisely this kind of thinking is characteristic of the Shiite clergy, which imposed the term "Islamic revolution" upon the Iranian people and is thereby attempting "to legalize" its baseless claims to the role of some sort of above-class force. The acknowledgment of the status of an independent social stratum, even if multi-class in origin, for the Shiite clergy does not at all rule out its accomplishment in the final analysis of perfectly specific social-class functions.

This raises the question of the objective social substance of the popular, democratic revolution in Iran and the role of the Shiite clergy in its realization. Two approaches, opposites to a certain degree, have already been advanced in the literature for assessing this question.



were attempting to "moderate" government policy to permit the petty proprietary groups (and then the large nonmonopolistic bourgeoisie) to take immediate and full advantage of the fruits of the revolutionary gains. Inasmuch as the main conflicts between these elements and the Islamic leadership ultimately had to do with the form of the state structure, the means and methods of struggle used by the clergy, which were "revolutionary" from the standpoint of the clergy's social corporative goals, were pseudorevolutionary from the standpoint of the tasks of the popular, democratic revolution.

The higher religious leadership made active use not only of right-wing elements in the ruling group, but also those leftist organizations which had taken a position of support or neutrality toward the regime, for its own purposes. On 26 December 1982, the IRNA, the Iranian Information Agency, disseminated a statement by Hashemi-Rafsanjani, one of the most highly placed figures in the Hojjat ol-Eslam regime, which frankly acknowledged that the Islamic leadership had not begun the immediate elimination of leftists and "liberals" because they could help to consolidate the regime. During the first two stages of the "Islamic revolution," however, the religious leadership still turned the main cutting edge of its repressive policy not so much against the leftist organizations--proponents of intensifying the social content of the democratic revolution--as against right-wing elements in the ruling group, a victory for whom would have immediately resulted in the establishment of a governmental policy with an openly bourgeois and pro-Western orientation.

It was precisely this fact which gave the clergy the broad support of the popular masses actively participating in the internal political struggle in the first two stages of the Islamic revolution. As a result it succeeded in retaining in the eyes of politically immature working groups of the population the aura of a fighter against capitalism and imperialism, the spokesman for general national interests and patriotic feelings. Contributing to this, along with the paternalistic and charitable activities of the religious leadership, was the seizure of American embassy workers in November of 1979 and their detention as hostages for more than 14 months, as well as the Iranian-Iraqi war which began in September of the following year (and still continues)--that is, events in fact extensively used by the clergy for purposes of the planned and purposive deactivation of the revolutionary and antiimperialist sentiments of the broad working masses.

It is noteworthy that the actions of the higher Islamic leadership contributed to a certain disorientation also of a considerable portion of the leftist forces, which were unable in time to distinguish between revolutionary and pseudorevolutionary methods, between an antiimperialist and a pseudoantiimperialist mode of action, between real interest on the part of religious figures in maintaining ties with the people and the illusoriness of hopes that they were capable of going beyond the dogmatic manipulation of the popular movement, and mystification of the social-class and political awareness of the workers, which were imminently inherent in the Islamic clergy.

What place do events of the period 1979-1983 occupy in the general course of development of the revolutionary process in Iran? Is it possible to unequivocally define that entire period as counterrevolutionary? We believe that this would not be an accurate assessment. The stages of the "Islamic revolution" of 1979-1983 are essentially phases of gradually intensifying crisis of the popular,

A.B. Reznikov writes the following: "It would be incorrect and baseless to call the Iranian revolution a bourgeois revolution. Iran's development along the bourgeois path has not been accelerated at all as a result of that revolution, and the bourgeoisie certainly did not come into political power--it did not even exercise political leadership of the revolution. Furthermore, the ideology of the revolution contained a far more powerful social charge and a far more clear-cut thrust toward social changes and the restructuring of society at the mass level than was the case in bourgeois revolutions of the past.... It can best be called a popular revolution, the social aspirations of which went unrealized, although the striving for 'a just social system' was, of course, an expression of the anticapitalist impulse of the workers."<sup>13</sup> In describing Khomeini's ideological views the author limits himself to pointing out their social utopianism.

In connection with the above R.A. Ul'yanovskiy rightly points out that acknowledgment of the popular nature of the Iranian revolution does not void the question of the revolution's class nature. "The nation's bourgeois development (in the narrow, economic sense) was certainly not accelerated as a result of the revolution, and the bourgeoisie did not gain direct political power. However, we cannot ignore the fact that to a certain degree the revolution is involving in the process of social modernization traditional groups of enormous numbers, linked with the small-scale commodity and petty capitalist structure--that is, groups of which a significant part are not only potential but actual agents of bourgeois relations--which were formerly left out of it. To eliminate or at least restrict the monopolistic elite, whose economic domination was supported by the monarchy and imperialism--this was the main task facing those groups and defining the class substance of the antimonarchical and antiimperialist revolution in Iran."<sup>14</sup> The author has the following to say about Khomeini's views: "Social utopia can be a form of social action conforming to the interests of a certain, specific class stratum (remember Lenin's approach to the ideology of populism)."<sup>15</sup>

While A.B. Reznikov actually denies the linkage between the clergy's political functioning and the bourgeoisie's social interests, young Soviet Iranian specialist L.Ye. Sklyarov defines this linkage so rigidly in his thoroughly interesting work that he depicts the expression of the interests of various strata of the bourgeoisie as an element of the clergy's completely cognizant strategic line. In his opinion, the religious figures, who first proclaimed themselves to be protectors of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, regarded this only as a means of drawing it over to their side in the course of the revolution and in the process of the postrevolutionary power struggle, and upon achieving their goals, abandoned the petty bourgeois slogans and assumed openly bourgeois positions.<sup>16</sup>

We believe that this approach is as unacceptable as the previous one. Although the clergy's main social-class base was from the very beginning truly made up of members of the petty and middle entrepreneurial-trade capital, the policy of the religious figures did not express their interests directly or immediately, not deliberately or purposively, but only with its own objective substance. Subjectively, it was more important for the clergy, as a stratum striving primarily to defend its right to exist, to meet the urgent needs of broad strata of the people which provided its main political support in the struggle to achieve

its own corporative goals. Precisely for this reason the religious figures sanctioned a large number of patriarchal-charitable and paternalistic measures right after the February victory. The fact that the clergy expressed petty bourgeois interests was due to a significant degree to its objective position in the society, its way of life and its historically developed social ties.<sup>17</sup> With respect to subsequent trends toward convergence with the large nonmonopolistic bourgeoisie, which were manifested more and more openly and clearly in the social policy of the regime, petty bourgeois in its class essence, they were not so much a result of a deliberate political choice as a result of the pressure of economic necessity. Nor can we ignore the potential for rapidly switching to openly bourgeois positions, imminently inherent in the petty bourgeoisie.

What we have said makes it possible to define the most important feature of the contemporary Iranian revolutionary phenomenon, which accounts for its novelty and uniqueness. It obviously has to do with that phenomenon, not rare in world revolutionary praxis, in which a bourgeois revolution is frequently popular in its objective social substance--with respect to its moving forces, methods of struggle and its universal demands for social justice. Revolutions of this kind, as the Marxist-Leninist classics repeatedly pointed out, ordinarily realize their substance through an acute struggle (open or disguised) between their bourgeois leadership and their moving forces. In general, the same thing occurred in the development of the Iranian revolutionary process following the February victory. With one significant difference, however.

Unlike past bourgeois revolutions, which were of a popular nature, the objective social substance of the Iranian revolution was realized in a struggle not of two, but of three, principles. The "Islamic revolution" of the clergy, which claimed the role of an above-class force, countered the popular revolution not directly but indirectly--through a liberal bourgeois trend, the agent of which, as we have already stated, was the pro-Western-minded intelligentsia. By placing its representatives formally at the helm of executive power, the clergy strengthened its possibilities for manipulating the popular movement and mystifying the class and political awareness of the working masses. This very fact, however, predetermined the separation of the religious figures from their political support, which, in turn, produced a need to strengthen their ties with those social groups which objectively comprised their main social-class base.

The subsequent removal of representatives of the liberal bourgeois trend from power by the clergy, which has since assumed direct responsibility for directing state affairs, could all the more not go unaffected by it. The assumption of direct control by the religious figures, which did not contribute to the establishment of complete unity of opinion in the higher echelons of state power, at the same time placed the clergy as a whole into the position which Bazargan's government and Bani-Sadr's presidency were in prior to it. In other words, by suppressing the "Thermidorian" trends of the liberal-minded and pro-Western-minded groups of the intelligentsia, the religious figures naturally found themselves disarmed before the inevitability of their own "Thermidorian" transformation.

In that situation the main task of the clergy--along with stabilizing and consolidating the Islamic regime, which was in most complete conformity



with the corporative interests of the ministers of religion--was that of strengthening its economic foundations. The need to restore the national economy, which had been disorganized and partly destroyed during the anti-shah revolutionary fighting and the Iranian-Iraqi war, like the needs of the war itself, inevitably led the religious leaders to "reconciliation" with representatives of large national capital, which had previously been pushed away not only from political power but from economic power as well.

As a result of all this, during the third phase of the crisis of the popular, democratic revolution, the "Islamic revolution" of the clergy, which had already virtually achieved all of its objectives, completely revealed its bourgeois social essence. The journalistic embellishment of the slogans put out "from the top" was preserved only to the extent that it was essential for conducting the war with Iraq and preventing mass opposition to the theocratic regime. The bourgeois counterrevolution--again, of Islamic cast--began its victory march.

On the basis of everything we have said the following definition can be proposed.

"Islamic revolution" is the main slogan of Islamic political movements of a diverse nature in many nations of the Muslim East, and each organization and group contributes its own substance to the concept. Stress on the Islamization of all aspects of social, economic, political and family life of the citizens of their nations and the proclamation of a "third path" of development, which differs from both capitalism and socialism, is a common feature of them all. Iran is the only Muslim nation where the slogan has been given practical embodiment. In Iran the "Islamic revolution" has taken on the character of a specific political movement, which emerged in the course of and as a result of the popular, anti-shah and antiimperialist revolution of 1978-February 1979 and expressed mainly the social corporative aspirations of the Iranian clergy, which were satisfied by the creation in that nation of the world's first Shiite theocracy. From the very beginning the slogan of "Islamic revolution" there was not so much a means of mobilizing the broad popular masses for a common democratic struggle as it was a tool for manipulating the mass movement and mystifying the class and political awareness of the workers. The implementation of this slogan after February of 1979 evoked a crisis of the popular, democratic revolution and then objectively opened up the way for a bourgeois counterrevolution.

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13. A.B. Reznikov, op. cit., pp 156-157.
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## INTERNATIONAL

### EGYPTIAN FAVORS STATE PLANNING OVER 'OPEN DOOR' ECONOMY

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 5, May 84 pp 42-43

[Article: "My Credo is Planning"]

[Text] Lutfi 'Abd-al-'Azim, well-known Egyptian economist and chief editor of the journal AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI has visited the Soviet Union. Before departing for his homeland he received our correspondents Enver Fazel'yanov and Ivan Men'shikov. In his talk with them he shared his views on Egypt's economic policy and on Soviet-Egyptian cooperation.

It is my conviction that Egypt's economy developed upwardly only during the period 1961-1965, under the first five-year plan, in the implementation of which the Soviet Union took an active part. Large and progressive enterprises were built for various sectors of our national economy with its assistance, on the basis of bilateral agreements on economic, scientific and technical and cultural cooperation.

This advance virtually came to a standstill in the situation which developed following the Israeli aggression in June of 1967. President Gamal Abdel Nasser died unexpectedly in 1970. When Sadat came to power he rejected the course of industrialization and proclaimed an "open door" policy--"infatah."

The enlistment of foreign capital for development purposes itself is a worthwhile thing, of course, because it can contribute to the creation of individual, modern production facilities (using Western technology, Arab capital and a local, skilled work force). From the very beginning, however, "infatah" met with serious objections in Egypt. The doors were opened wide to Western consumer goods, frequently similar to those produced in Egypt itself, which undermined the national interests and reduced sales of output for many local factories and plants. The Egyptian economy turned from the path of developing the industrial branches to one of developing trade and services.

The operations of the foreign banks appeared particularly dangerous. Instead of contributing to the development of our economy, they began to accumulate funds built up by the Egyptians in both their own nation and in other Arab countries, and to take the profits obtained therefrom out of the nation or to use them for crediting imports, thereby helping the Western companies in the competition with Egyptian state and private enterprises.

Oil began to play an important role in the Arab Republic of Egypt at the end of the past decade. Revenues from oil and from the Suez Canal, as well as money transferred by Egyptians working abroad, were increasing rapidly, but they were not so much going for productive purposes as "being eaten up." Although the average growth rates for the VVP [gross national output?] was 8-9 percent in the '70s, per capita industrial output remained almost at the former level, and the development of agriculture slowed to such an extent that Egypt became totally dependent upon imported food.

The results of the "open door" policy are extremely sad. The nation's foreign debt, which did not exceed a billion dollars prior to "infitah," has now reached almost 20 billion dollars. There is large-scale emigration of the work force, mainly the peasants. Around 2 million Egyptians are in Iraq alone, and hundreds of thousands have moved to the oil monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. This is having extremely deleterious social consequences. The deterioration of agriculture is causing particular concern. While Cairo was formerly provided with products from the Egyptian village, the rural residents themselves now want to buy them in the cities, which are consuming imported food in ever increasing quantities.

These facts confirm the main idea that the absence of scientifically based planning is having a most harmful effect upon the Egyptian economy. National production is virtually standing still as a result, whereas inflation is increasing uncontrolled. The most important indicators for the nation as a whole and for the individual sectors, as well as the training, the use and the emigration of the work force, must be planned.

It is my belief that there can be no development for Egypt without planning. This applies both to the state and the private sector. We have something different, however. While the former is operating according to a definite plan, the latter is functioning absolutely haphazardly, and this is harming the common cause. Naturally, the state sector is expected to accomplish the key tasks facing the nation, but there are considerable possibilities also for developing the private sector within the framework of a single, national plan, which would have Egypt's economic and social progress as its objective.

Foreign economic relations should be similarly planned, and this has not been done in Egypt. This is why imports are approximately 2.5-fold greater than exports. As a result of the one-sided orientation toward the USA American goods account for around a third of Egyptian imports, although less than 10 percent of our exports (primarily oil) go to the United States.

The current leadership of the Arab Republic of Egypt, headed by President H. Mubarak, has undertaken to alter the situation which has developed in our economy. It has the very best of intentions. Its course is encountering significant obstacles, however, created by those circles which supported Sadat. All sorts of speculators, who grew rich under Sadat, are attempting to frustrate all measures carried in the national interest. These people, who are called the Mafia in Egypt, are against everything which might infringe upon their own interests, that is, anything which might benefit the Egyptian people.

I would like to mention the fact that our journal AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI has been published for going on 25 years now. It has always taken patriotic positions. The scholars and journalists working on the journal are united in the belief that Egypt is in need of change. We were the first in the nation to condemn "infatih" in its specific form and were among the first to reject Camp David. We workers on the journal are for peace, but that agreement serves only Israel's interests. I might mention the fact that our journal is read not only in Egypt, but also in the other Arab nations.

With respect to Soviet-Egyptian trade and other economic relations, we can identify two stages in their history, which is 20 years old: one, the Nasser era, was extremely successful; the other has been less so, as we know. I speak for our journal and for the vast majority of Egyptians when I say that we are for restoring and further developing our mutually beneficial cooperation. This will make it possible to end the American monopoly on Egypt's foreign economic relations. We believe that the development of comprehensive production projects in the most important sectors of the Egyptian economy is the most promising area of cooperation. We already have considerable experience in this area.

From the Editors

"What should the national economy be like?"--the above interview deals with this question, which troubles the vast majority of Egyptians today, from members of the highest echelons of power to the rank-and-file workers. Because of the thorough differentiation of the Egyptian society the answers offered are extremely diverse, a fact borne out by a study of scientific developments and statements made by Egypt's political figures and its press in recent years. It is the predominant opinion, however, that the "open door" policy proclaimed and conducted by Sadat has not justified itself, that major structural changes are needed for resolving problems created in the '70s by the "consumer infatih."

Modern Egypt has considerable potential for economic growth. Deposits of a large number of minerals have been discovered in the nation. These include oil, the extraction of which reached 39 million tons last year. A solid energy base has been created, the foundations have been laid for heavy industry and thousands of skilled workers and specialists have been trained with Soviet assistance. The natural and climatic conditions are favorable for the production of valuable food and export crops. Although the cultivated area is extremely limited, two or more crops per year can be grown on the same field. The nation's geographic location is contributing to the growth of revenues from world trade. There are extensive possibilities for tourism.

Paradoxical as it is, however, the nation's economic development has been marked by the intensification of old disproportions and the development of new and unhealthy disproportions since the beginning of the '70s. And this is despite the fact that Egypt under Sadat had an enormous income both from internal sources (revenues from oil, from the operation of the Suez Canal and tourism, and money received from workers abroad) and external sources (a considerable portion of which he did not have to repay).

Such was the direct result of the Sadat regime's switch to the restoration of capitalist relations in the nation and the further integration of its economy



into the world capitalist system, which has itself been in the grip of an extremely acute crisis for more than a single year. The growth of Egypt's VVP has become uneven and irregular and has generally slowed down in comparison with the '60s. Agricultural output has not grown as rapidly as the population, and it has become easier for the ills inherent in contemporary capitalism--inflation, high prices and currency instability--to penetrate into the nation.

The facts indicate that the intensification of disproportions in Egypt's economy and the effect of the "free market" element have brought a perceptible deterioration in the situation of the workers, especially individuals with a limited income--and according to official data more than half the population is in that category. Opposition parties, which have been legalized under current President H. Mubarak, have become active as a result of this. They condemn the "open door" policy which led to the domination of foreign capital in Egypt and advocate a return to the practices of the '60s, that is, to centralized planning, as well as the further democratization of national life and rejection of the Camp David deal, which has discredited itself.

The nation's new leaders inherited a lot of economic problems, which snowballed in the '70s. While declaring his adherence to the "infitah" policy, President H. Mubarak at the same time called for its reform into "production infitah," in other words, he wants to continue encouraging foreign capital investments but to channel them into the production branches under rigid state control of the economy. In order to bring it back to a healthy state it is planned to focus efforts on tasks such as building up the state sector, combatting corruption, increasing control over budgetary outlays, eliminating the shortage of skilled personnel, and reducing imports. A trend toward the employment of planned methods for managing the economy is in evidence. An economic development plan for the Arab Republic of Egypt for the period 1982/83-1986/87 has been adopted and is being implemented.

It is still too early to draw any final conclusions or sum up the results. Only one thing is apparent--that the search for ways and methods of improving the Egyptian economy is taking place in a situation of conflicting positions and views among the nation's diverse social and political forces.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HISTORIANS OF ASIA MEETS

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 5, May 84 pp 49-50

[Report by Doctor of History Vl. Li: "The 9th Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia"]

[Text] Meetings of researchers in the humanities of various countries and regions have become a good tradition today. The 9th Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia (IAHA), held at the end of last year in Manila the Philippine capital, is among the outstanding events of this kind. The Manila meeting's "round table" attracted an extremely impressive audience--social scientists from 24 nations. Orientalists of the socialist states were represented by scholars from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Representatives of the Philippine national history school, which is being established, were especially active in the conference. At the same time, the hosts did everything possible to create an atmosphere conducive to scientific discussion, in which a number of trends could be precisely identified.

The first of these involved a persistent effort by patriotic-minded humanists of the East to rethink and "rewrite" their national history from the Stone Age to the era of the liberation uprisings and on to the establishment of achievements of the scientific and technological revolution. Scholars from the Philippines, India, Malaysia and other Asian states spoke with bitterness of the fact that the new generation of liberated nations frequently continues to learn from textbooks written from the Eurocentric standpoint.

Another interesting feature of the Manila meeting was the enormous interest exhibited in original historical sources, particularly archival and little-known documents, which comprise the foundation of any historical narrative. This trend was reflected especially in the structure of the conference itself, which was divided up into four special sections: new directions in the historiography of the Philippines; key problems in the study of Asian history; methodological questions in historical research; and special topics in the history of the Asian peoples.

The convening of the regular IAHA conference in the Philippines, which has been caught up in rapid industrial and urbanization processes in recent years, was closely linked to the intensive development of national research in the humanities. Many foreign scholars were literally amazed at the scope of these studies

(it should be pointed out that in the methodological respect they do not go beyond the framework of non-Marxist investigations). The fundamental works published in recent years unquestionably include the 10-volume Encyclopedia of Social History and Culture of the Philippines from Antiquity to the Present, prepared with the help of scholars from the nation's leading research centers. Each of the volumes, richly illustrated and based on new national documents and material, has a brief thematic title.

The first section, which held a large number of sessions on economic, military, agrarian, cultural, religious and other aspects of the nation's young national historiography, functioned with great success at the conference. Meetings on problems of the contemporary history of the Philippines were held in the crowded hall. The topics of reports having to do with the history of prewar Manila's social development and its employment problem, the history of the anti-Japanese armed resistance on the archipelago, the emergence and growth of anticolonial nationalism, the formation of a ruling political elite in the nation between 1950 and 1972, and the situation of the Philippine Muslims were submitted for scientific discussion. Just prior to the conference a number of topics in this subject area had been thoroughly discussed in new works by Philippine scholars on the history of Christianity's dissemination on the archipelago, in a documentary history of World War II, in "Historical Journal," the publication of the Philippine National Historical Society, and in other publications. This rapid development of historical science in the nation is quite naturally creating in the scholars a desire to learn about the achievements of foreign Philippine studies more extensively and completely, including those of the socialist nations. More than once in our conversations the Philippine historians spoke with great respect of the Soviet Orientalist school and of its leading center, the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The national historiography of the developing nations is being shaped in a situation of extremely acute ideological and methodological conflict with the traditional, Eurocentric historical schools. While a number of bourgeois Orientalists of the USA, England, Australia, Canada and other nations, attuned to the feelings of national awakening in Asia, have attempted to depict the postwar return of England, France, the USA and other colonial powers to Asia as some sort of model of "positive restoration," the progressive-minded historians describe this process as a form of "colonial reoccupation." This met with approval from many of the conference participants.

Attempts by certain bourgeois scholars to interpret the foreign policy history of the USSR, Vietnam and other states of the world socialist commonwealth in Asia in a biased light also met with failure. Extremely interesting in this respect was the fact that in the open discussion the conference participants did not support the premise of the bourgeois Eurocentric historians that all of the more acute conflicts in Asia are a product of the antagonism between the "super powers."

Reports describing original Greek sources on the social history of ancient India were among the scientific reports which aroused great interest among the participants in the IAHA conference. While describing the unquestionable value of these sources, Professor Aoarora of the University of Allahabad in India also noted that they need to be carefully compared with Indian sources, since they reflect

the "biased positions" contained in various records and statements. The conference participants were also acquainted with brief scientific surveys on the history of the spread of Hinduism in Nepal, with letters and diaries of Jesuit missionaries from the period of Christianity's spread in Southeast Asia, and with information on the history of Japanese seafaring in that region. Reports were presented in special seminars on the history of man's interaction with the environment, on traditional medicine and certain other specific subjects at the juncture between the humanities and the natural sciences. It is extremely noteworthy that these problems are directly related to the key problems of contemporary social progress in the liberated nations of the East.

There was also lively discussion on such subjects as the history of anticolonial and social protest, nationalism and the social revolution, the history of religious reforms, maritime and commercial trade history, the history of the enlightenment and emancipation of women, and others. The subjects were set up on a new historiographic basis. A report by Thai scholar (Penshri D'yuk) on "Russia' Political and Economic Role in Thailand's Foreign Policy From the End of the 19th to the Beginning of the 20th Century" reflected this. (P. D'yuk) concluded that Russian had objectively countered consistent efforts by England and Japan to consolidate expansionist positions in that Asian nation. The conference participants gave a positive reception to a report by Doctor of Economic Sciences G.I. Chufurin on the history of the development of transnational corporations and their influence upon the contemporary social and economic development of the nations of Southeast Asia. The author of this article presented a report on the evolution of the political sophistication of the intelligentsia from the age of Asia's awakening to the present. In a statement on this report in the discussion Professor Lopus, prominent Philippine scholar, said that in his opinion the first generation of the new intelligentsia in Asia appeared in the Philippines as a result of the anticolonial liberation struggle which developed at the juncture between the two centuries. The theses of reports by Soviet scholars were accepted for publication in the IAHA's "Scientific Notes."

The Soviet scholars were surrounded by attention and respect all the time they were in Manila. The discussion and the exchange of opinions which began in the academic halls were continued in talks with prominent public figures of the nation. I recall a meeting with Blas Ople, minister of labor of the Philippines and president of the Philippines-USSR Society. During the conversation Blas Ople expressed special interest in problems of the military history of the East--and with good reason, as I learned later. During World War II, which occurred during his youth, he was one of the combat commanders of the anti-Japanese armed resistance on the archipelago. The president fervently supported the idea of conducting joint Soviet-Philippine activities in connection with next year's commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the ending of World War II.

On the eve of its departure from Manila the Soviet delegation received Professor (Lesli Bouzon), prominent Philippine scholar and general secretary of the conference, who expressed his great gratitude to the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and to its leaders, Academician Ye. M. Primakov and Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. Kim, for their cooperation



with IAHA and expressed his hopes that the Soviet scholars will develop scientific contacts with the association and take a more active part in its 10th conference, which will be held in Singapore in 1986.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### BOOK ON AFRICAN STATES' FOREIGN POLICY REVIEWED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 5, May 84 pp 62-63

[Review by A. Ol'gin of book "Nezavisimaya Afrika: vneshnepoliticheskiye problemy, diplomaticheskaya bor'ba" (Independent Africa: Foreign Policy Problems and Diplomatic Struggle) by A.A. Shvedov, under general editorship and with foreword by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences An.A. Gromyko, Izdatel'svto politicheskaya literatura, Moscow, 1983, 350 pages: "The Foreign Policy of Africa's Independent States"]

[Text] The book being reviewed deals with the foreign policy and diplomacy of the African nations, an important question which has still not been adequately studied by Soviet and foreign Orientalists and Africanists. Its importance stems from the fact that the states of Africa have become an influential force, whose role is steadily growing in contemporary international relations.

The merits of A.A. Shvedov's work include particularly his systematic approach to the study of the diplomatic activities of nations of the continent, his description of the relationship between the internal policy of the African regimes and their foreign policy course, and his investigation into the main directions of foreign policy of both the states of Maghreb and the nations of Tropical Africa. The author takes a broad approach to the problems under study, which permits him to consider the foreign policy doctrines of the leaders of leading African states, to analyze their policy both within the region and in the international area, to reveal the expansionist orientation of the course conducted toward Africa by the imperialist powers, and to demonstrate the principled line taken by the Soviet Union, which attempts to develop mutually beneficial cooperation with nations of the continent.

The author has managed to avoid separating general theoretical concepts from the specific analysis of the material, which is characteristic of many works on the national liberation movement and contemporary problems of the developing states. The foreword to the book, written by Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences An.A. Gromyko, states that the author's main task was to bring out what is most substantive, characteristic and topical in the foreign policy of the African nations, and there can be no question that he achieved this objective.

A.A. Shvedov also presents an extremely well executed study of crisis situations in Africa and of the origin and development of conflicts and ways to resolve them.

The author tells not only about the successes, but also about the failures, of the diplomacy of African states. He shows the results of errors in the area of foreign policy and how the imperialist powers take advantage of them to achieve their own goals.

A.A. Shvedov proceeds from the Marxist-Leninist concept of the social conditionality of foreign policy, which makes it possible for him to identify with substantiation the typical features in the international activities of states with a socialist orientation, on the one hand, and nations taking the capitalist path of development, on the other.

In his study of the foreign policy of the North African states the author devotes special attention to Algeria, as a nation whose people made an extremely important contribution to the struggle against the colonizers and which is presently playing an active and important role in Africa, in the Arab world and in the non-aligned movement. In the sections dealing with Tropical Africa, the study of the basic principles and factors in the foreign policy of states in the southern part of the continent is of special interest.

The study has an extremely solid historiographic foundation. A number of the sources have been drawn upon for the first time.

With all the book's merits, we still need to mention the fact that it does not adequately discuss the ties of the African nations with such states as the FRG and Japan, which play an important role in contemporary international relations. It would seem that the author could have devoted greater attention to the sub-regional African groupings.

In general, the current importance of the subject, the solid Marxist-Leninist methodological foundation for the study and the thoroughness of the analysis presented in the monograph provide the basis for stating that it has been received with interest by both the specialists and the general reader.

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## INTERNATIONAL

### EGYPTIAN'S BOOK ASSAILING SADAT REGIME REVIEWED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 5, May 84 pp 63-64

[Review by A. Georgiyev of book "Kharif al'-Khadab" (Autumn of Fury) by M.H. Heikel, Beirut, 1983, 565 pages (in Arabic): "An Inglorious Time"]

[Text] A new book by well-known Egyptian journalist and politician M.H. Heikal, "Autumn of Fury," has drawn a great deal of attention from broad groups of the public in Egypt and other Arabic nations. In the book the author presents a critical interpretation of the infamous years of Sadat's government in Egypt (1970-1981).

That period was characterized by repressive processes, of course. The development of the largest Arab nation was turned backward along a path of establishing capitalism in its ugliest forms, with corresponding changes in the political superstructure. Sadat's Egypt fell into powerful financial and economic dependency on Washington and found itself isolated from the Arab world and excluded from the general Arab struggle against Israeli expansion.

It is a fact worth noting that the book was written by an individual who had always maintained bourgeois-nationalistic views, a person whose position has kept him close to the development of Egyptian policy to one degree or another over the past 20 years. Heikel's book is written from the standpoint of an Egyptian patriot. The author does not discuss the past for the sake of digging up the past as such but in order to assess it from the standpoint of lessons for modern Egypt, for the sake of a better future.

Heikel demonstrates the damage done to Egypt's basic national interests, damage which is difficult to correct. Within the nation this involved the establishment of a regime of dictatorial, almost pharaonic, power, constant attacks on those who opposed the existing institutions from the left and even from the right, an uncontrolled influx of foreign capital into the nation under the so-called "open door" policy, the encouragement of parasitism, extravagance and corruption, disturbance of the historically developed balance in relations between Egypt's Muslim and Coptic communities, and a great deal more. In foreign policy it was the virtual undermining of the international prestige gained by Egypt during the era of President Nasser, the nation's transformation into a tool of American policy, and its isolation from the Arab world.



All of this provides the basis for the author to call the Sadat period "an historical error, an error, unfortunately, worse than a crime" (p. 14).

Heikel begins the "history of the beginning and the end of Anwar Sadat's era" by describing his first policy steps. Even then the individual demonstrated an inclination toward opportunism, political accommodation and lack of principle with a considerable dose of adventurism and vanity--qualities which developed to the fullest later, following the 1952 revolution and especially during his period as president.

Heikel assigns a significant place to events having to do with the October War of 1973, which dispelled the myth of the invincibility of Israel's military machine and convincingly demonstrated the fact that by operating on a united front the Arabs could achieve success in defending their legitimate national rights and interests. Even during these crucial moments, however, in Heikel's opinion, the political leadership headed by Sadat did not measure up to its historical responsibility.

It is absolutely apparent from the information contained in the book that the Egyptian leader wanted only "to heat up slightly" the crisis in the Near East, and no more. At the same time, in Heikel's opinion, the forcing of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians and their advance into the Sinai created a fundamentally new situation: A powerful alliance of forces was being forged, capable of achieving a just settlement in the Near East; the Arabs were fighting together for the first time; the "oil weapon" had been put into play; the Soviet Union was on the side of the Arabs, and so forth. "Sadat, however," Heikel underscores, "continued to think in the same terms as prior to the beginning of the military operations" (p. 163). As a result the fruits of the October War went to the USA and Israel.

The author describes step by step how the United States used Sadat to implement its old neocolonialist plan of turning Egypt into a tool of its Near East strategy. The author convincingly demonstrates how this metamorphosis in Egypt's orientation was in fundamental conflict with its national interests, its historical traditions and political principles.

What happened on 6 October 1981 at a parade in honor of the 8th anniversary of the October War, when, according to Heikel, the "Egyptian people killed their pharaoh for the first time," was the logical conclusion of Sadat's governing.

Contemporary Egypt has inherited a difficult legacy. Despite this, however, Heikel ends his work on an optimistic note. He believes that his nation is capable of overcoming the difficulties and finding ways to resolve the difficult problems facing it.

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## NATIONAL

### WORK OF PARTY COMMITTEE BUROS DESCRIBED

Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 10, May 84 (signed to press 15 May 84)  
pp 27-32

[Article by V. Churilov: "The Party Committee Buro Member: Activity, Competence and Efficiency"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee gives constant attention to improving the work of party committees, including party gorkoms and raykoms. Only recently the Central Committee examined reports of the Saratov Party Obkom, the Central Committee of the CP of the Moldavian SSR and the Glazunov Party Raykom of Orlov Oblast. The resolutions adopted on the basis of the reports direct party committees to affirm the Leninist style of operation in all their many-sided activities -- a creative style that ensures a scientific approach to all social processes, constant reliance on the masses, a high level of efficiency, specificity and exactingness, as well as an uncompromising reaction to any manifestations of formalism, bureaucratism and sham.

A meeting took place in Kharkov between members of the buro of the oblast party committee and members of buros of the gorkoms and raykoms of the party, V. Mysnichenko, first secretary of the Kharkov Obkom of the CP of the Ukrainian SSR, gave a talk. Under discussion were the tasks of elevating the role and raising the level of responsibility of the members of the gorkom and raykom buros for the implementation of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and subsequent plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Committee and also for carrying out the proposals and recommendations contained in the speeches of Comrade K. U. Cherneko.

It was stressed at the meeting that the main responsibility for carrying out party policy at the grassroots level lies with the city and rayon party committees. As organs of political leadership they are called upon to do everything necessary to ensure steady growth rates in industrial production, successful implementation of the Food Program, development of the creative activity of the masses and the realization of measures directed toward raising the level of the people's wellbeing.

Fully mastering this creative and innovative style in large measure depends on the work of the gorkom and raykom buros of the party which during the period between committee plenary sessions conduct the everyday activities

of the city and rayon party organizations. During the course of the concluded election campaign, the composition of gorkom and raykom buros of the party in the oblast qualitatively improved. More than 400 party, soviet, Komsomol and economic leaders, as well as production leaders and innovators were elected to them.

Any elected post in our party, it was noted at the February (1984) plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee, is a responsible post. One should look upon election to a party committee as sort of an expression of faith on credit. But this faith expressed by party members in their comrades must be justified by dint of selfless work. Such are the instructions of the participants of previous meetings and conferences.

Members of the obkom buro N. Saulov foreman of metal workers and assemblers of a turbine factory, L. Shabinskiy, a member of the buro of the Bogodukhovsk party raykom, and skilled in machine milking of the Pervukhinsk Sugar Combine and others spoke at the meeting and expressed the position that our party does not acknowledge formalistic membership, when a person is merely listed on the roster of one or another party organization and does not participate in its work. Even more unacceptable is the Communist, the recipient of our trust, who behaves passively in the election organization, shows no initiative and deals with matters without enthusiasm.

The qualities of a genuine organizer and Communist elected to the buros of the gorkom and raykom of the party show themselves best in an atmosphere of harmonious work, when the election organization members work smoothly as one in an atmosphere of collectivity and efficiency.

"It is precisely efficiency," A. Myasnikov, first secretary of the Kulyansk Gorkom, stressed in his speech, "that brings success. An important component of this success is the high quality of the preparation of questions for the buro. For us to achieve this goal, as a rule, a commission is established, made up of members of the gorkom buro, specialists and activists and also party staff workers. A secretary, who is a member of the gorkom buro, heads such a commission. The commission conducts openly all its work in studying one or another problem, checking on the state of affairs in a local party organization or a workers' collective; it relies on Communists and non-party activities. It acquaints the workers of those enterprises and institutions undergoing checks with the materials of the check so that before a discussion of the question at the buro, they can take measures to eliminate the shortcomings uncovered. When discussing reports about the work of local party organizations, we surely invite members of the buros and party committees of these organizations."

Unfortunately, it was indicated at the meeting that not all gorkoms and raykoms deal so responsibly with the preparation of questions for discussion at the buro. The drafting of decisions is sometimes done carelessly, without substantial preliminary study. The decisions are often simply excerpted from documents of higher party organs or from previously adopted resolutions of the same organization.

At the meeting the following fact surfaced. Last June a question was prepared for discussion by the buro of the Bliznyukovskiy party gorkom about the work of the party organization of the rayon agricultural chemistry unit in strengthening party and state discipline. To prepare the question a commission was set up with a raykom buro member at the head. However, commission members dealt with their obligations in a formalistic manner. They practically copied word for word the points of the draft decision from a resolution adopted by the raykom buro a month earlier based on a report of the partkom and the administration of the Kolkhoz imeni Gazeta Pravda on the development of agricultural production. However, the most shocking fact was that the raykom buro did not "notice" this and without any special changes affirmed the draft decision. The obkom buro of the party gave a justified assessment of the unprincipled position of the raykom, its buro and of the first secretary personally.

It was noted at the meetings that buro members are able to gain a good understanding of questions and to introduce well argued observations and proposals only when they can acquaint themselves with the state of affairs and the necessary documentation several days before a meeting. Are such procedures observed everywhere? In the report and other statements it was not hidden that in several gorkoms and raykoms the preparation of materials for discussion at the buro is late and they are distributed to buro members right at the meeting. Some members of the buro are forced to remain silent.

It was stressed at the meeting that every meeting of the buros of the gorkom and raykom is in its own way a school of collective work, a school of political leadership for all comrades invited. From buro members party activists learn political and competent approaches to the solution of large and complicated problems; they also study the principled and objective nature of the party, its exactingness and sensitivity. This is why it is so important to create during discussion an atmosphere in which every buro member feels a genuine interest in the opinions of his comrades, reacts in a party-spirited way to criticism and strives to make his contribution, A. Gavrish, a member of the Sakhnovshchina Raykom Buro and a field team leader of a mechanized sugar beet growing team at the P'yatirichka Kolkhoz explained at the meeting.

At the meeting it was noted that much here depends on the first secretary of the gorkom and raykom of the party, the organizer of the collective effort. Meeting participants stressed that he more than anyone must be sensitive and attentive to the opinions of his comrades at work. If he listens only to himself and "leans" on others by virtue of his authority, one can hardly expect special activity from other members of the buro. It was said at the meeting that it is not accidental that in some places buro meetings take place "at the bidding" of the first secretaries, without discussion and debate, and decisions on matters of principle are made without discussion.

It is necessary, it was said at the meeting, to decisively speak out against such a style of work. Buro members who sincerely think that if they support the first secretary without reservation and do not express their candid opinions they are thereby rendering good service are deeply mistaken. In fact, such "support" can have (and does have) a tremendously negative effect on the training of party leaders.



In this regard the first secretary of the Zachepilovka Raykom A. Dzibalo was criticized at the meeting for neglecting the opinions of Communists when deciding staff questions. Without consulting with party committees of the rayon enterprises he recommended to the post of kolkhoz chairman people who were not thoroughly checked and tested. There was leadership turnover, and the rayon remained among the laggards. And what about the members of the raykom buro? They silently agreed with the willful actions of the first secretary and thereby failed to help him look at himself critically in time, to soberly evaluate his actions and to change the style of his activity.

Critical reflection on what has been accomplished and intolerance toward complacency and self-justification are among the most important requirements of the Leninist style of work, it was stated at the meeting. Therefore, sham, ballyhoo, passivity and indifference, condemned by our party, must be forced out by principled and constructive examination of all questions at the buros. It was noted at the meeting that at the meetings of the buros of the Izyum Gorkom and the Kegichevka, Velikoburlukskiy and Sakhnovshchinskiy Raykoms of the party this very businesslike and critical approach to problems under discussion is clearly still lacking; shortcomings at times are discussed in general terms; criticism has an abstract, anonymous character; a liberalism and an all-forgiving attitude are shown toward workers who are just marking time or failing on the job.

Meeting participants justly stressed that criticism at buro meetings must be voiced loudly and clearly. Not only those who err but also those who do not utilize all the opportunities to raise the level and quality of work and who show passivity, inertness and stagnation in their activity must be subjected to criticism. In this regard, it is very important that the criticism is direct, devoid of diplomatic niceties and petty calculations. The worth of the criticism, it was said at the meeting, is defined not by the sharpness of expression but by the truthfulness, the demonstrativeness and the social meaningfulness of the questions posed.

It is difficult to overestimate the role and meaning of the gorkom and raykom buros in work with staff personnel. This, it was stressed at the meeting, is the key task of party committees. While exchanging thoughts about how gorkom and raykom buros influence the selection, placing and training of staff, members of the Dvurechanskiy Raykom, the director of the sovkhos Topol' A. Nikulin of the Lozovskiy Gorkom, the chairman of the council RAPO N. Panchenko and others noted that in work with staff personnel a precise and well thought out system is important as nowhere else. Neither frequent personnel turnover nor any kind of ossification of the staff is tolerable here.

"In order to make fewer mistakes in selecting people," the first secretary of the Ordzhonikidze Raykom V. Annenkov reflected, "the raykom buro must consider the opinions of Communists and workers' collectives which permit us to more deeply study the political, work and moral qualities of leaders as well as their professional preparation. Reliance on local party organizations has helped the raykom establish a reliable reserve of staff personnel."

While stressing that many buros of party committees have in recent years improved their work with personnel, the meeting participants concentrated their main attention on shortcomings and errors that still exist. It was stated, for example, that a solicitous relationship with personnel is not everywhere combined with a highly demanding relationship. Over the course of the last 6 years the chairman of the Lyubotin Gorispolkom has been changed four times, and each time the person occupying that position was removed for serious failures in work and improper conduct. It would seem that this should have put the Kharkov Raykom Buro and especially its first secretary E. Bondarenko as well as the chairman of the rayispolkom L. Zadorozhnyi on guard. Alas, again a clearly weak leader was recommended for this position, and what is more he conducted himself improperly in his everyday life. However, he was relieved of his post only after the intercession of the obkom of the party

Meeting participants were also upset by the fact that several gorkom and raykom buros do not always deal in a principled manner with leaders who abuse their positions, crudely violate party and state discipline and allow cases of money-grubbing to pass. Thus, several managerial workers of the Krasnograd Rayon, having lost their sense of modesty have been building dacha type private houses with garages, cellars and other outbuildings not provided for in the plans. A member of the raykom buro, chairman of the rayispolkom G. Matyushchenko has been "reticent" to use his authority; in essence he removed himself from control over the observance of the rules of the horticultural association in the rayon. It is clear that it is impossible to accept such an approach to a job with which one is entrusted. Meeting participants justly stressed that a Communist who takes a compromising position toward violations and shortcomings must without delay receive a sharp party rebuke in the rayon and city party committees.

Members of party gorkom and raykom buros, it was stated at the meeting, from the first secretary to the worker and kolkhoznik are called through Communists and work collectives to strengthen the fight against such shameful occurrences as squandering state property, sham, abuse of one's position, misappropriation and bribes. There must be no lenience shown to those who grab as much as they can from the state. Such is the line of the Central Committee of the party, and it must be firmly and conscientiously brought to life. In this regard, meeting participants stated that it was important to openly discuss at plenary sessions, meetings of activists and in the press those who did not justify the high trust of the party and people. When a guilty worker is let go under "honorable" conditions, as they say, or "by his own desire," no effective lesson is provided either to the guilty party or others. It is necessary, it was said at the meeting, that each worker, regardless of position, answer for his work and actions in the first instance to the party organization and collective where he works. And this must be done in accordance with the strictness of our laws.

An analysis of the shortage of staff personnel, it was stressed at the meeting, shows that for many higher level posts (nomenk'latura posts) several party committee buros do not have a well prepared, effective reserve. This means that there is no efficient system for working with managerial staff personnel

and for studying and checking them in practical jobs. In some places the establishment of a reserve is handled in a formalistic way; just about the whole job is reduced to compiling lists. There is available a so-called "paper" reserve; it has no real meaning, nor can it have one. The raykom and gorkom buros, it was said at the meeting, should clarify completely this important matter.

In the report and in the speeches it was noted that the level of work with staff personnel depends on how effectively control and checks on fulfillment are applied. To select people, to check, and if necessary to show and to teach--this is the essence of the organizational activity of the party committee. However, at the meeting it was noted that several gorkom and raykom buros are given to listening to reports of the same party organizations and adopting numerous resolutions on the same questions instead of strengthening organizational work directly in the work collectives and in the local party organizations. Last year, for example, the Barvenkovskiy, Borovskiy and Volchanskiy party raykom buros decided questions having to do with raising the efficiency of agricultural production on kolkhozes and sovkhoses 10 to 15 times each. However, because the resolutions adopted were not backed up by vital organizational and political work, no noticeable changes for the better in the economic condition of the enterprises took place.

Meeting participants stopped for a detailed look at issues like removing propositions from control, eliminating duplication and parallelism in control activity and conducting interim control over the implementation of an adopted proposal. It was stressed that the gorkom and raykom buros organize the fulfillment of tasks not apart from economic and soviet organs but through them. In connection with this the practice which has become entrenched in some places of creating all kinds of staffs and commissions was condemned.

Supported at the meeting were party committees which together with rayispolkoms, union organizations, komsomol groups and committees of public order put together coordinated plans for the conducting of checks of enterprises and organizations. After their coordination with the gorkom and raykom secretaries, other checks, excluding planned ones, are not conducted.

Concerning the removal of propositions from control, the opinion of the meeting participants was unanimous. Checking should be done only after final completion. It should not be done mechanically based on certification or information received from party organizations, as is sometimes done, but necessarily based on the study of the matter on site, with a strict evaluation of that which is completed.

Of course, meeting participants noted, it is impossible to get by without any certifications and information at all. However, it is possible and necessary to reduce their number. Gorkoms and raykoms which categorically forbid the solicitation of information from on site about the carrying out of measures projected by a proposal, unless it is provided for by the proposal, were spoken of with approval at the meeting.

Nevertheless, the paper "hypnosis" is still in evidence. L. Zinchenko, a member of the Moscow Raykom Buro and an electrical assembler at an electro-mechanical plant stressed in her talk that there are still workers who attempt to replace vital work among the people with paper-creation, the composing and sending out of large numbers of instructional and report materials. The stream of proposals and other documents from above which direct us "to examine," "to analyze" and "to study" negatively influences the quality of our work, she noted. Practice, however, has shown that instead of the proposals and instructions it is enough to draw up a work plan for implementation or to examine the measures at a regular meeting of the secretaries of the party organizations.

Speakers pointed out the necessity of strengthening communication with local party organizations and work collectives and of insistently strengthening conditions in them that exclude complacency, undertaking the unobtainable, attempting to justify inactivity or the inability to do a job with references to so-called "objective difficulties," and of striving so that each Communist possessed the qualities of a political warrior and worthily fulfilled a leading role in production and public life and also served as an example in everyday life.

The role of the party apparatus in this is great. It is called on to ensure the strict carrying out of the party line, the implementation of Central Committee decisions. It is also called upon to set a tone in this work throughout the course of its implementation. At the basis of this activity there must be a deep analysis of tendencies in economic and cultural construction. It is necessary to sensitively grasp these tendencies and to introduce well thought out proposals and practical recommendations. The buros and the gorkom and raykom secretaries, it was noted at the meeting, are striving to organize the work of the party apparatus so that all its workers functioned creatively with full devotion and spent a large part of their time in party organizations doing vital organizational work.

At the same time in speeches at the meeting and during discussions, dissatisfaction was expressed with a situation that develops at times in informational materials and summaries and the writing out of speech texts for secretaries of gorkoms and raykoms take up too much of workers' time. It happens that instructors have almost no time to work with people and to visit local organizations and work collectives.

The fault for this, it was said at the meeting, lies not only with the secretaries and members of the obkom, gorkom and raykom buros. The very approach to the evaluation of the work of party committees encourages excessive paper-creation. A commission visits a raykom to check on one or another issue and is interested in whether it was discussed at a buro meeting or not. If it was not, it is as if the matter did not exist. Vital organizational work remains in the shadows.

The conversation at the meeting of the buro members of the Kharkov Obkom with the members of the gorkom and raykom buros was useful and businesslike. It is clear that the meeting's participants also touched on other problems in



one way or another related to the future improvement of the buros' style and methods of operation, the enhancement of the role and authority of their members and raising the level of militancy of the local party organizations. The general opinion was that for the work of the party committee buros to satisfy fully the Leninist norms of party life, it is necessary to fundamentally break down the stereotyped and antiquated methods of leadership and to more deeply, in a highly demanding way based on party principles, approach the examination of questions introduced for buro discussion and also to resolve practical problems in a more qualified and concrete manner.

The main speaker stressed in his concluding remarks that all the comments and proposals expressed at the meeting will be studied and summarized and will undoubtedly help the buros of the obkom to introduce substantial improvements in the style and methods of operation of the oblast committee as well as of the party gorkoms and raykoms. It was acknowledged advisable to conduct such meetings in all oblast rayons with members of the party committees and local party organizations buros. All this, in the opinion of the meeting participants, will contribute to the successful implementation of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the tasks of the 11th Five Year Plan.

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## NATIONAL

### CONTROL FROM ABOVE, BELOW IN PARTY APPARATUS VIEWED

Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 11, Jun 84 (signed to press 29 May 84)  
pp 40-44

[Article by N. Burmistrov: "Combine Control From Above With Control From Below"]

[Text] Issues of the style and methods of the functioning are becoming especially important to each party committee and local party organization at the present stage. The substance of these questions and ways to resolve them are profoundly and comprehensively elaborated in the decisions of the 26th Party Congress, subsequent plenums and decrees of the CPSU Central Committee, and in addresses by comrade K. U. Chernenko. All these emphasize that well-organized control in party organizations over the implementation of party lines and directives as well as of their own decisions is an indispensable condition for raising the level of party leadership. Control is the most essential feature of the Leninist style, which all party organizations must persist in mastering.

The fundamental principles on control drawn up by V. I. Lenin even today have in no way lost their topicality. The founder of our party and the Soviet State taught that after the goals and purposes are determined, the decision made and the party workers in place, the center of gravity of party work must be concentrated on the organization of matters, on the practical implementation of what has been recognized as necessary and expedient. He held that control must be implemented through the entire chain of command, beginning with the decision-making organ itself, and ending with all local groups taking part in the common effort. The personal participation of party organ leaders in control work is absolutely necessary. The personal participation of leaders in this work, their regular monitoring of local conditions, and visits to subordinate party units--all this indisputably can accelerate the implementation of party decisions and orient all party apparatus personnel to devote continuous and close attention to what is and how it is done in subordinate groups.

At the same time V. I. Lenin believed that control from above does not exhaust the entire matter of organizing the implementation of decisions. It must be augmented by control from below. As many communists and non-party members as possible must be attracted to participate in monitoring the

actual state of affairs. Only mass, all-encompassing control permits the party committees and primary organizations to implement the adopted decisions. Control from below, indicated V. I. Lenin, is also needed in order to "become convinced by deed, by experience, whether, and to what degree precisely the decisions adopted are correct, and what corrections they require due to political events that took place after their adoption." ("Polnoye Sobraniye Sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 11, p 133).

The Leninist demands for organization of control and monitoring of implementation remain immutable for our party and all its organizations. At the 26th CPSU Congress it was said that in the current situation the entire system of control must function especially efficiently and effectively and that the party organizations should put intensification of control as the main thrust of all efforts to improve the style and methods of party leadership. The art of leadership, it was noted at the congress, does not consist of producing and disseminating directive instructions at every opportunity, but, having adopted a decision, of striving for its strict implementation at the prescribed time. Control over the execution of decisions must be implemented systematically and effectively, simultaneously from above and from below.

Party committees and primary party organizations have recently intensified their attention to establishing effective party control. This increases the success of their work in guiding social and economic processes and promotes increased efficiency of social production and a more rational utilization of material and labor resources. Well-organized control cuts short mismanagement and wastefulness and helps to create an atmosphere of high exactitude and responsibility in every labor collective for the task entrusted to it. The experience of many party committees confirms again and again that the better they monitor the implementation of party decisions, the more they are attuned to suggestions and critical comments from ordinary workers, the more fully they carry out their leadership responsibilities.

Party committees have available many forms of organizational work essentially embodying control from above. These, as mentioned above, are personal visits by secretaries, bureau members, and officials of the party apparatus to enterprises and institutions for the purpose of familiarization with the state of affairs. In recent years many party committees have begun the widespread practice of sending special brigades to perform comprehensive monitoring of party-organizational, ideological and economic operations. Such monitoring usually precedes the presentation of reports by leaders of subordinate party as well as soviet, economic and public organizations at plenums and sessions of committee bureaus. Here the results of their activity are analyzed, shortcomings and omissions are uncovered, and recommendations and advice to improve the style and methods of leadership are issued.

There also are other forms of control from above. At the present time, for example, party commissions of party committees have noticeably expanded their sphere of activities. With increasing frequency they participate in the monitoring of the implementation of party decisions and engage in the study of economic, political and internal party problems facing the party organizations, as well as the state of staff performance.

And in what forms is control from below implemented?

It can be said without exaggerating that the forms of control from below are diverse to the same degree as our public and productive life itself is diverse. Workers, kolkhoz members and specialists, be they communists or non-party members--these are concerned participants in creative activity and the strictest monitors at their own production sections and in their own collectives. Neither serious breakdowns nor the slightest omissions and slips in performance can escape their gaze. Their experience, their opinions, their suggestions and critical comments are of primary importance to the practical implementation of party plans and its decisions and directives. Communists and non-party members share their observations, ideas and suggestions at party and workers' meetings, permanent production consultations, economic and production technology conferences, gatherings and seminars, and in such independent workers' organizations as tutorial councils, economic analysis buros, and others. Much business-like criticism and many useful ideas are contained in letters from workers sent to party and soviet organs. They contain performance evaluations of officials and discussions of operating methods of management organs. A sensitive attitude toward suggestions and signals from the rank and file makes it possible to genuinely combine control from above with control from below.

It was noted at the February (1984) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee that to listen to the word emanating from among the workers, from the foremost edge of socialist construction, to hold council with the working people--today this must be the foremost responsibility and a profound internal need of each communist leader.

At the basis of party control lies the principle of democratic centralism, in accordance with which the activity of all party, state and public organizations is structured. The organic combination of two principles in party control--centralism and democratism--makes it possible to successfully attain the main political and social objectives, unswervingly raise the effectiveness of the work of party organs, cultivate a sense of responsibility among communists for the state of affairs in their party house, and involve the working masses in direct management of state and public affairs.

Of course, the understanding of the requirement of combining control from above with control from below cannot be formal or simplistic. The point is not that in taking one decision or another under control, the party committee would determine with arithmetical precision that so many measures will be implemented within the apparatus, and so many--locally. As everyone knows, in party practices it is at times difficult, or simply impossible, to differentiate between the processes of decision-making and control; it is also often impossible to separate one form of control from another. An oblast or city party conference is under way, for example. This is the highest organ of the corresponding party organization, and, naturally, it adopts decisions determining its activities for a prolonged period. But the conference is also a rostrum for a thorough discussion of the current state of affairs and for revealing existing shortfalls and deficiencies



in the style and methods of leadership by the reporting organ. About the same can be said of such organizational forms as meetings of the party or party-economic aktiv, and several others.

At the last election conference of the Kokchetav city party organization, critical comments were addressed to the party gorkom in regard to its methods of managing local party organizations. In the decision of the conference it was written that this leadership must be improved. In accordance with the adopted decision, the gorkom buro developed a number of measures. The gorkom departments received specific instructions with indication of the time frame and responsible individuals. Special attention was devoted to the state of affairs in the party organization of the respirator plant, where the insufficiently active position of the party committee had a negative effect on the atmosphere prevalent among the workers in shops, departments and services. Secretaries and staff members of the gorkom visited the plant. They assisted there in straightening out the political and economic processes. Slightly more than a month after the conference, the gorkom buro reported at a plenum on the measures carried out. But by this time, some other facts of life at this enterprise became known. At an open party meeting in shop No. 4, with party gorkom instructor N. Yemel'yanov in attendance, the communists spoke frankly of the factors hindering a broad introduction of the brigade form of labor organization, pointed to the low level of production mechanization, and criticized the administration for not displaying any concern for the installation of a semi-automated line acquired long ago. The implementation of [measures on] these comments has now been taken under control not only by the plant party committee and administration, but also by the production and transportation department of the party gorkom.

Consequently, for the party committees, the requirement of combining control from above with control from below means that it is necessary, on the one hand, to organize the work of the party apparatus in a well thought-out manner and to implement to the fullest extent the control functions entrusted to them. On the other hand, it is necessary to listen to the voice of the rank and file workers with the utmost attention and to display concern to ensure that their critical comments and suggestions, no matter where voiced, not remain in vain, but be taken into account in the development of technical organizational and mass-political measures, serve the cause of mobilizing new reserves, and promote the improvement of the style and methods of operation of management personnel.

The experience of many years is convincing that comprehensively thought-out organization of control in the party apparatus serves to increase efficiency, performance and discipline, and at the same time helps to avoid proliferation of paperwork and lip service, prevents manifestations of bureaucracy and red tape, and ensures the unity of word and deed. The broad attraction of communists and non-party members to control work accelerates the implementation of party decisions, and permits the party organizations to take the experience of the masses more fully into account and to rely on it better in their activities.

The CPSU Central Committee sets an example in the organization of control to all party organizations. A thorough study of local conditions, close relations with party committees and local organizations and with the working masses permit the party central committee to make timely decisions on the most important economic and political issues and to consistently implement the measures worked out. Just recently the CPSU Central Committee performed a comprehensive analysis of the activities and heard reports from the Saratov obkom of the CPSU, the central committee of the trade union of workers in heavy machine-building, the party committee of the Ministry of Railways, the Ural scientific center of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Moldavian CP Central Committee, the Economics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and the Kuybyshev gorkom of the CPSU, adopting decrees on the basis of these reports aimed at improving the style of party leadership, strengthening constructive relations between scientific and production collectives, and creating a valuable reserve of personnel for various sectors of the national economy. Local party committees and party organizational and political work among the masses.

To improve control and verification of implementation is the urgent objective of party organizations. It is necessary to persistently improve the techniques and methods in this sector of party work. This is dictated by the entire current situation.

The economic and sociopolitical objectives being attained by the Communist Party and the Soviet state have been greatly expanded. The demands made of leading economic personnel--from brigade leader to minister--have risen. The public activity of workers has grown at the same time. In these conditions, issues of control and verification of implementation in the activity of party committees and local organizations are increasingly coming to the forefront.

At the same time, as noted at the 26th Party Congress and at subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, this sector of party work still remains a bottleneck in many party organizations. Paperwork methods of leadership are still strongly in evidence. The practice of preparation of decisions and control over their implementation in many cases bears the imprint of stereotype and inertia. Instances occur when some party committees strive to remove decree implementation from control, without thorough verification of the local situation. Most often this is used to conceal a desire to demonstrate "attention" which is allegedly devoted to the decrees adopted. But in fact it turns out that a great deal of what was contemplated remains on paper.

The effectiveness of control depends to a great degree on publicity, on how fully and in how timely a manner the masses were informed of the work being carried out by higher organs. Following the Leninist principle of publicizing control, the party is taking steps to ensure that communists and the broad masses would be aware of the activity of central and local organs. Deserving of approval is the practice that has come to exist in Belorussia, where leaders of ministries and departments of the Belorussian SSR periodically at plenums of the republic CP Central Committee present

reports on the course of action on the criticisms and suggestions addressed to these organizations. The materials of the plenums are set forth in the press in quite some detail and are used by speakers and lecturers. Work with criticism and suggestions is widely publicized in many party committees of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi and Sverdlovsk Oblast.

Publicity of control is inseparably linked to its mass character. The more people are informed of the decisions adopted, and the more reliable information is available to the masses about the progress in implementing these decisions, the more actively they participate in practical work, and the more successfully matters proceed. It is precisely publicity and mass character that best ensure the combination of control from above with control from below and mobilize the creative energy of Soviet people. Here is one of the numerous facts confirming this generally indisputable proposition.

The workers at Ot'yezzhenkaya Farm of the Rassvet Kolkhoz (Baryatinskiy Rayon, Kaluga Oblast) outdid themselves last winter, the milk yields not only did not drop in comparison with the summer period, but even increased somewhat. The farm collective strived to fulfill the decision adopted on increasing output. The farm party group headed by communist N. Fedosov made sure that not only the stock breeders would be well-informed of the results of the large-scale competition, but all kolkhoz members as well. Every 10 days the party group met to summarize the results of their work. Communists and non-party members were invited to the meetings. Realistic targets were set for each milkmaid for a 10-day period, month and quarter, and achievements as well as omissions in their work were thoroughly discussed. Colorful graphs of progress in meeting the goals were hung on a stand in the recreation room. There one could see daily performance indicators of the leading and lagging workers. The farm was visited almost daily by kolkhoz party organization secretary L. Sycheva, kolkhoz chairman V. Trunev, and zootechnicians Ye. Novikova and M. Yevseyeva. The extensive publicity accompanying the efforts of the farm collective to fulfill the adopted decision ensured the successful completion of the wintering season by the cattle.

In organizing effective party control, an important role belongs to local party organizations. At the 26th CPSU Congress it was emphasized that local party organizations should make better and more full use of the right granted them to monitor the performance of the administration. Whether dealing with personnel questions, fulfillment of economic plans, or improvement of working and living conditions of people, the party organizations must maintain positions of principle and firmly adhere to the party line. The local party organizations use various forms and methods in which control from above is in direct conjunction with control from below. Reports by production managers are presented at party meetings, which are the highest organ of the party organization, as well as at party committee and bureau sessions, and decisions binding upon them are adopted there.

Fruitful work is performed by commissions on the implementation of control over the activities of the administration and over the functioning of the

apparatus. They reach the primary production units—the sections and brigades, individual workers and kolkhoz members in their attempts to ensure that mutual and self control is implemented everywhere; that each worker would consider his worker's conscience to be the strictest monitor. As a rule the commissions carry out their activities in close cooperation with groups and posts of the peoples' control, the "Komsomol searchlight," and permanent commissions of trade unions. Communists working in the commissions pointedly and as a matter of principle raise issues on eliminating uncovered shortcomings. Party organizations apply measures of party sanction to managers who fail to ensure timely elimination of the shortcomings uncovered by the commissions.

In the course of the last election campaign, some party organizations created a number of new commissions: on control over the implementation of the food and [electric] power programs, the economical consumption of raw materials, supplies and power generation fuel resources, ensuring the safety of transported freight and traffic safety, improving the working and living conditions of the workers, and others. With assistance of the commissions, the party organizations bring party work closer to the objectives of economic and social development of their collectives and cultivate a high sense of responsibility among management personnel and ordinary workers for furthering State interests.

Control in our country is implemented along various directions: along the lines of party, State and economic organs, as well as along the lines of peoples' organs of control, trade union, Komsomol and other public organizations. All forms of control are guided and coordinated by party committees and local party organizations. The mission of party organizations is to ensure that the Leninist standards for methods of carrying out control work are observed everywhere, and that the objectives set by the party are attained everywhere. These objectives are once again expressed with complete clarity in the decree by the CPSU Central Committee "Further improvement of control and implementation verification in the light of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress: (1981). It states there that the party views control and implementation verification as a tested means for improving the performance of party, Soviet and economic organizations, strengthening the organizational level and discipline in all elements for the task entrusted them.

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## NATIONAL

### READER COMPLAINS OF QUOTAS FOR PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' in Russian No 11, Jun 84 (signed to press 29 May 84) pp 71-72

[Letter to editor by party buro secretary V. Ushenin, Sverdlovsk: "A Doubtful Decision"]

[Text] Dear Editor! I have read the note "Are such orders necessary?" in your periodical, condemning the practice of issuing instructions in regard to who and by what date is to be enrolled in the party. In this connection I decided to write to you. On 20 July of last year the session of the party committee of the Unipromed [further explained] Institute discussed the question of the work by the party buro of our plant in selection for party membership.

One the items in the decision adopted by the party committee reads: "Ensure the enrollment of at least two people into the ranks of the CPSU prior to 1 September." That means that we had to enroll two people within a period of 40 days. Our plant party organization enrolled one comrade.

At the session of the institute party committee a party penalty was imposed upon me for failing to carry out the degree. I consider that it is very difficult to comply with a decision by the party committee with a specific indication of the date and number of people to be enrolled into the party. Such decisions verge on the practice of forced boosting of party enrollment, which has been long condemned.

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## NATIONAL

### CONTROL INCREASED OVER 'PROBLEM' MUSICAL GROUPS

Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian 27 Mar 84 p 6

[Article by V. Volkov: "For Purenness of Sound"]

[Text] At the June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, there were serious critical remarks on such popular form of art as the stage. "It is impossible, for example, not to see that at times, on the wave of this popularity, musical groups come to the surface that have programs of dubious quality, which is ideologically and esthetically damaging." These words were addressed above all to young artists, for it is mainly they who are the nucleus of such collectives. What about this area?--V. Mokyeev, Astrakhan.

In our country, there are dozens of talented musical groups that work in a professional manner, giving their all on any stage, be it in a village club or in the largest halls of the big cities. However, there are many opportunities in this field that are not being covered. Open discussions arising in the press on the genre of musical groups speak of serious problems here.

It is possible to agree with music fans and critics who, to a large extent, are justified in criticizing some musical groups for the lack of content in the programs that they present. Indeed, in their concerts, a number of collectives use adaptations of folk songs that distort their content and melodic basis. Many ensembles tolerate changes in confirmed programs, slovenliness in their costumes and unrestrained behavior on stage.

Not long ago, the USSR and RSFSR Ministries of Culture, along with organizations of composers, examined the artistic and creative activities of musical groups. It turned out that a significant portion of participants does not have musical training, 16 percent have completed musical schooling and 31 percent studied but were not graduated. As a result, in the RSFSR alone, 41 collectives were disbanded for having a low level of professionalism and a number of groups were advised to prepare a new repertoire.

In answering the critical article "And the Coachman Sang 'Padam-Dudam,'" published 12 July 1983 in SOVETSKAYA KUL'TURA, the RSFSR states that "musical groups will bear the responsibility for performing unconfirmed programs." With

the renewal of more than half of all members of musical groups who are competitive prize winners, the question of the possibility of having them retain this title will be reviewed. At this time, group members who are not professional composers may comprise only 20 percent of composed programs.

On the other hand, the goal has been set of making more active use of professional composers in the preparation of musical works for musical ensembles.

Let us recall the fruitful results in the past and in the present of the cooperation of A. Pakhmutovaya with "Pesnyary," and of M. Tariverdiev with "Meridian." The album "NLO," recorded by D. Tukhmanov and the group "Moskva," is extremely diverse stylistically and is characterized by fresh instrumentalizations. E. Artem'yev and the group "Boomerang," as well as S. Gruenberg and the group "Myes," are continuing productive experiments in the area of electronic chamber rock. The public has liked the music of composer A. Rybnikov from the performance Yunon and Avos' in the Moscow Theater imeni Leninist Komsomol with the participation of the group "Rok-atyel'ye." M. Braun, leader of the group "Sipoli," wrote the musical "Maugli" for the TYUZ [Young Spectator's Theater] in Riga. It was innovative on account of its musical decisions.

In the past 4 to 5 years, certain steps have been taken to raise the professional level of stage musicians. In particular, at the initiative of the RSFSR Composers' Union, special departments for stage music have been organized in many music schools of the republic. There have already been several graduating classes that have provided new qualified personnel for orchestras, instrumental ensembles and musical groups. Included in the curricula of these departments, in particular, are lectures on the fundamentals of jazz improvisation and arrangement.

Creative competition, one of the effective means of revealing talent and discovering new names, is being called upon to play a large role in the training of the artist. In competition, not only is the degree of talent and professional preparation of the performer tested, but also his general level of culture, breadth of thinking, artistic taste and ideological maturity. Existing creative strengths are examined and objectives are established for tomorrow. But stage competition is still less frequent than one would like. Meanwhile, let us recall that it was precisely the recent Seventh All-Union Competition of Stage Artists that revealed to us new facets of the Moscow musical group "Avtograf" which deservedly was the prize winner.

In the repertoire of this group, in particular, is the very striking and topical composition "Ireland-Ulster." We would also like to mention the Tallinn group "In Spe," the works of which represent a curious blend of stage melodies and music of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. In recent days, at festivals and during tours, interesting programs were presented by the groups "Ruyya," "Dialog," "Gunesh," "Blits," "Solnechnyye Chasy," "Kaseke".... The geography of these collectives (Baltic, Ukraine, Central Asia and Transcaucasia) shows that strictly speaking there is no "periphery" in our music.

The best of our musical groups are striving to reach a new level of musical and poetic substance.

There are, of course, no prepared recipes for solving many problems associated with musical groups. But it is clear that it is not possible to achieve high quality and professionalism or to teach the necessary genre culture without solving organizational questions that have to do with the situation of the collectives in the very structure of the country's concert life. It is thought that the philharmonic society in which the artists work should have more responsibility for the quality of group performances. And not just answer for quality but assist the artists in selecting cadres, in formulating the repertoire and finally, in outfitting the group. For a philharmonic society is not just the booking of tours and concerts, but above all it is an artistic organism which should resolve questions of creativeness.

Hundreds of musical collectives in the country are taking part in the all-union review of all genres of stage art, which will be carried out in 1984-1985 by the USSR Ministry of Culture in cooperation with creative associations. Without doubt, it will reveal new names to us.

9746

CSO: 1800/359



## NATIONAL

### ACADEMICIAN STRESSES GRAVE DANGER OF ALCOHOL TO CHILDREN

[Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 July 1984 carries on page 3 a 1,300-word article by Academician of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences F. G. Uglov. Uglov cites examples from history and his own experience of mental deficiencies evident in children of drinkers. He describes an experiment in which 1,500 mothers took part: "deviations from the norm were observed in only 2 percent of children born to mothers who never used alcohol, in 10 percent of those whose mothers used it 'in moderation,' and in a shocking 74 percent of those whose mothers drank heavily." He goes on to explain the possible catastrophic consequences, including death from blood poisoning, of the breastfeeding of a baby by a mother who drinks or of giving even a few sips of alcohol to a child of ten or under. He seeks through several frightening stories to dissuade young women, among whom alcoholism is rising faster than among men, from drinking.

CSO: 1800/478

## NATIONAL

### ATTITUDES, MOTIVATIONS OF HOOLIGANS EXAMINED

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Jun 84 p 3

/Article by V. Lisovskiy, professor, doctor of philosophical sciences, Leningrad: "The Cowardly Superman"/

/Text/ Almost a year has passed since this article was printed in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. During that time there have been many debates in various students' classrooms. Of course, far from all of my respondents had read the article, but the fundamental questions which it had raised, on the emergency of the so-called "fashionable" groups in the young people's environment, on some children's questionable enthusiasm for, and blind imitation of western styles, had left none of the discussions' participants indifferent. After each debate my pockets bulged with notes.

I recall that at one of the meetings in a young people's dormitory we made up our minds to gain an understanding of this figure, this "superman from the gateway," secret leader of one group or another. Is this really some powerful personality who draws young people to himself? Among the many reasons which explain why street gangs are formed, one stood out: they say that to a teenager it is very important to prove himself in the eyes of his contemporaries, to look more mature, independent, manly perhaps. All the external attributes, often adopted blindly, without hesitation, spring from this. "Just a moment," others objected, "do the street and outdoor gangs really not help demonstrate individuality?" Quite the contrary, there is a strict rule in operation: "Do as the others do," and just you try and step out of line, even by a pace!

Often too late, parents wait, "Our son never did anything bad before!" They are dissembling. It is a familiar situation to lawyers, psychologists and teachers when boys who are usually good take part in crimes. It would seem that their entire former way of life would have clearly ruled out that possibility. But repeatedly we are convinced that the very exposure to this same "herd instinct" and the inability or unwillingness to resist another's will often play a fatal role here.

In the heat of the debate, I receive a note: "Listen! Do not attack us with your accusations, or we will beat you up when you leave!" I read the note aloud and suggested that the "authors" come up on-stage so we could exchange opinions openly and honestly. The "supermen," of course, did not respond. Just what I expected. They are used to acting sneakily, prudently considering on whose side the power lies. In very fact, the street leadership turns into cowardice.

But was this just a chance note? An analysis of opinions and of sociological inquiries leads to an extremely disturbing conclusion: in the last few years the figure of the "superman," whom we have become accustomed to judge mainly by his outward appearance, is becoming more closely identified with the image of the ordinary hooligan.

Seventeen-year old Boris N. writes me from a settlement for minors: "Being of liberty bored us. We knocked about with our guitars and bottles of wine around courtyards and parks. We beat up innocent bystanders to look bold and brave to the girls. We were proud of our dashing behavior, and bragged about it in front of our friends. And only here in the settlement have I come to understand that in reality, by myself I was not living, and had not been allowed to live normally by my environment...." It goes without saying: a belated understanding.

Encountering teenage crime, which is distinguished at times by cruelty and cynicism in puzzlement we ask: what is the source of the indifference to another's pain, to human suffering? We construct various hypotheses, get lost in conjectures and run to science for explanations. But how would the children themselves answer this question? In the same settlement where the author of the above letter finally began to ponder the purpose of his life, it was suggested to the children that they write compositions on the theme "Is It Difficult to Be Sensitive?" Here are a few excerpts:

"In our outdoor gang the spirit of rivalry and cruelty set in unnoticeably. We thought it was daring to insult or beat up a passerby or humiliate a woman. They began to fear us. So we came to believe we could do anything we wanted...."--Oleg S.

"Drinking caused everything. We drank often, and so we always needed money. At first we took small change away from young children, and then we started robbing grownups, rushing upon them with the whole group...."--Yuriy V.

The first time my friends and I beat up a passerby for nothing, I shook with fear all night. In the morning, when they called us to the police station, my experienced friend, who had been brought in several

times, said, "Do not worry, they will put you on the register and that will be the end of it." And that is what happened. I got bolder...."--Roman G.

The authors of these compositions are not from another planet, and they did not come by their style, their taste in secret or in the dark of night, but openly, in broad daylight, surrounded by adults. This means that their environment had no effect. And a chain has been stretched, stretched from defiant behavior to uncontrollability.

Read these confessions bitterly and painfully.

Once during a debate when I was quoting similar statements from juvenile delinquents, someone in the hall reproached me: "How can you compare us with criminals and intimidate us with the idea that it is all unavoidable? We are ordinary young people who dance as we please and socialize with whomever we want." Well, what about that? As they say, God grant that these warnings turn out to be unnecessary. I answered my opponent in the words of V. A. Sukhomlinskiy: "Criminals who raise their hands against man often are born in places where the idea of the beautiful and the lofty being foremost in the sphere of human relations is crushed and distorted and corrupted."

Yes, without mincing words, I intentionally began to lay it on thick in our debate. And today, continuing the conversation we had already begun, I purposely pick out the dark sides and focus attention on them. And as in the debate, I want to convince my opponents that from blind imitation and the herd philosophy "being like everybody else," from the immorality and non-spirituality of the time, how easily (though unnoticeable at first glance) the path is laid to misdemeanors, which are paid for with years.

And one more argument in confirmation of the aforesaid. Research shows that the overwhelming majority of persons who have a few crimes on their record, committed the first of them while still minors.

It seems to me that lately a militant, aggressive slogan, formerly quite popular among 16-year old Komsomol members, has somehow unnoticeably been lost. It said, "Let the ground slip away from under the feet of hooligans!" Unfortunately, this is not often the case....

At one of the debates, a Leningrad schoolteacher turned to me and said, "In calling the discussion 'Who Will Argue with a "Superman,"' you have not quite defined the goal and the idea behind our conversation precisely. I suggest a correction: 'Who Gives Battle to the Superman'""?

I fully subscribe to this correction.

12659

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NATIONAL

#### UPGRADING OF LIBRARY SERVICES URGED TO STIMULATE READING

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 May 84 p 2

/Article by V. Tsybul'skiy: "Who Will Guide the Reader?" under the heading "Reflections on the Results of One Sociological Survey"/

/Text/ It is known that people read very much in this country. And the yearly research of a group of sociologists of the USSR State Library imeni V. I. Lenin corroborates this conviction. Reports and articles by scientists are full of measuring figures: More than 90 percent of the public in the country and in the city read newspapers every day; approximately 80 percent are accustomed to reading books, and the private collection of an "average" worker amounts to 120 volumes.

The survey conducted by sociologists in Magnitogorsk illustrates this: On the average, each metallurgical worker reads 3 books in a month, and 65 percent of those surveyed get books from the library. Is this a lot or a little? It depends on what it is compared with. Here is the data of the Gallup Institute: Half of Americans never take a book into their hands at all, and according to the observations of French sociologists, 75 percent of French workers do not read any kind of literature.

But this same research also contains other figures that reflect problems, concerns, and doubts. They illustrate the drop in libraries' prestige, the gradual change of the librarian from wise adviser and expert on literature into a dispenser of books, and that a considerable percentage of readers (up to 40 percent) still turn to a book less than once a month. I would like to speak here of this alarming sociological research data in more detail.

The sociologists observed the behavior of worker readers in the libraries of various cities in the country. Instead of consulting the librarian for

advice on "what to read," half of them use the so-called "indirect recommendations" of other readers; that is, they simply browse through the piles of books on the library shelves, choosing books on the principle that the books that are very worn out and rebound are more interesting. Only 14 percent of visitors consult the librarian for advice, and only 2 percent know how to use the catalogue. The rest "put to sea" at their own risk in what is openly available. The librarian could make a suggestion, but he is often idle. Why is it like that?

According to the information of the RSFSR Ministry of Culture, only 60 percent of public libraries today are staffed with specialists having higher and secondary specialized education.

But professionally trained people who like books and working with readers do not always stay at a library for long. The fact is that at the present time a librarian's salary is still low; it is considerably lower than the average salary in the country. And work with readers must be built on individual contact, which requires much time and effort. Imagine that it is necessary to establish contact with each reader, to go with him through the library room, and to find out what his interests and tastes are. To the credit of the Ministry of Culture, it does not strike a post of being offended. Ispolkom culture departments made a request to enterprise and business managers to make additional payments from their funds to librarians for the additional enlightening, educational, and professionally oriented work which they conduct with enterprise workers and members of their families.

The "Statute on Library Work in the USSR," approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in March of this year, established such a measure legislatively. State and public agencies, enterprises, organizations, and institutions are obliged to be responsible for "improving the living conditions of library workers and their economic and moral incentive." So now the matter is up to managers of enterprises and institutions. It will depend very much on them to keep libraries from being left without a librarian.

As the surveys of readers show, the following opinions are wide-spread: "There are no good books in the library" and "You cannot get a good book anywhere," etc. Incidentally, those who subscribe to a library are not the only ones who think that way. Someone who has never been there but knows the state of affairs from hearsay has the same opinion. But rumors are often a dubious item. For example, according to the sociologists' surveys, the workers of one enterprise were convinced that there were no books by Levi and Paustovskiy in the plant library. But they are quietly standing idle on the shelves there.

In the opinion of specialists, the struggle against the library book shortage would be won if publishing houses would strictly implement

the joint decree of the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade and the Ministry of Culture which obliges them to supply books to libraries first of all and then to the book trade. Unfortunately at the present time, only 40 percent of libraries' orders are filled. But again, this is only one side of the matter. There is also another.

Every year, republic libraries distribute notices to thousands of readers with a request to return books taken. In each large library, there are up to 1,000 readers who owe books.

The new statute on libraries increases the responsibility of readers for the loss of books. Now when a library book is lost or damaged, the reader is obliged to pay its cost tenfold. However, life's experiences suggests that punishment, no matter how severe it may be, does not solve the problem. And that means that, as usual, much will depend on us and you, the reader, on our human and reader culture.

Perhaps there is no person now who would speak disrespectfully of a book. But here is a paradox: A book's prestige has never been so high in the country, but the amount of time given to reading books is decreasing. It is not because people do not want to read. To the question: "On what would you spend your free time with a shortened work day?" the majority of people who were surveyed characteristically answered: "On a book!" It is interesting that the prestige of the so-called television viewing is lower by far (only nine percent of the people surveyed agreed to devote their additional time to watching television). In reality it is precisely television that "eats up" almost all of the workers' leisure time, while approximately four hours per week are spent on reading.

It is true that television also forms readers' interests. It is known that films made from novels of contemporary writers are predominant among filmed literary works. These books are also the most read by the public. For example, for a long time the most popular novel in the country--where people watch television almost twice as much as in the city--was the novel of Anatoliy Ivanov: "Shadows Disappear at Noon;" approximately 40 percent of the people surveyed had read it.

A question arises in connection with this: If television seriously influences the public's reading interests, then apparently it is necessary to use it for broader and more serious and thought-out propaganda of literature.

In the last two to three years, increasing attention has been paid in educational television broadcasts to meetings with actors, directors, musicians, and other workers. Meetings with writers also take place, but fewer of them. Broadcasts of literary criticism are mainly broadcast on an educational program. We have "Film Panorama," "Companions of a Film Viewer," and "Creative Portraits of Actors," but not enough of "Literary Salons" or meetings with critics or library workers, which would lead to a discussion of the classical heritage of the past and contemporary literature.

And that is why many new and well-written works remain books for the "chosen." And that is why the opinion about Russian classics that "We went over them in school; that means we know them" still exists and has not been refuted by anyone; it robs many people of the enjoyment of a new reading of Pushkin, Gogol', and Tolstoy... Indeed, according to the data of sociologists, 72 percent of adult readers do not direct their attention to the works of Russian writers at all after finishing school. It is sad!

Many workers become propagandists of books. The range of reading interests of such a person is especially broad. The other members of the brigade know of his passion for reading and treat it with respect. They read the books recommended by him (but most often he does not just recommend, but brings them to the brigade), and impressions are readily exchanged. All of this forces one to think over the question: Would it perhaps make sense for a librarian to visit work brigades more often and to establish active reading groups in work collectives more energetically? Would it not be the surest way to increase the library's prestige in the eyes of a working person? Such steps have already been taken and are producing good results.

The sociological service of the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant in Togliatti has paid attention that a number of production brigades have a "personal librarian," so to speak. A kind of collective agreement has been concluded between the plant library and the brigade. The library provides the workers with needed and even scarce literature. The brigade assumes the responsibility of safeguarding a book. Collective responsibility also encourages a collective interest in reading. Spiritual communication and discussion of the material read firmly enter the life of the brigade. But the main thing is that the librarian's role as adviser and competent expert in questions of literature inevitably increases. It stands to reason that the hiding of some of the books by a library becomes simply unnecessary in these circumstances. Of course, this is only one of the ways of forming demand for reading. What other steps should be taken is for specialists to decide.

More than 83,000 titles of books with 1.7 billion copies are published annually in our country. But simply to publish a book is only half of the matter. This priceless spiritual wealth should become the property of each individual. And he has the right to expect the library's active help.

12478

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## REGIONAL

### CHERKASSY OBKOM FIRST SECRETARY ON FIRING OF OFFICIAL

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Jun 84 p 2

[Article by M. Odinets, correspondent (Shpola, Cherkassy Oblast): "The Shpola Lessons; Party Life: Position and Duty"]

[Text] A party raykom plenum in Shpola at the end of last year dismissed First Secretary I. I. Guglenko of the rayon committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine from his position and imposed a severe party penalty on him. What led up to this event was reported to us by Ivan Kondrat'yevich Lutak, first secretary of the Cherkassy party obkom.

"Of course, you know Vladimir Ivanovich Kravchenko, chairman of the Communist Kolkhoz in the rural community of Matusov?" he asked. "Well, this is what happened: He once came to the obkom and asked for an appointment. From the agitated testimony of the chairman, a member of the raykom buro, I learned much about the operational style of the party raykom that we, I must admit, had not even suspected...."

The obkom secretary spoke of what had happened with bitter disappointment, and this was quite understandable: The dismissed secretary had been nominated and approved for this position during his tenure as obkom secretary, and he had been in Shpola more than once over the years without ever noticing anything suspicious. Furthermore, the reports of party obkom personnel who went to the rayon were not particularly upsetting, although the rayon indicators left much to be desired against the general background of perceptible advances in oblast agriculture. Then suddenly there was the report of flagrant violations of collective management, the first secretary's tendency to take arbitrary action and disregard the interests of farms, his abuse of his official position and his violation of the standards of morality and elementary ethics. It was a pity that this had happened in Shpola, which has not always had the best administrators.

But people here also remember party raykom Secretary Nikita Dmitriyevich Bubnovskiy, who came to this position from the local material and technical supply center and later became secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. In those years, and that was a third of a century ago, the central newspapers referred to Shpolyanskiy Rayon as an academy of advanced experience.

But the years went by, and the proud name of Shpola as a progressive rayon gradually dimmed, first in the republic and then in the oblast. Recently, the rayon has been known as an underachiever. In spite of their identical conditions, the neighboring Zvenigorodskiy and Gorodishchenskiy Rayons obtain much high grain yields. In Katerinopol'skiy Rayon, where the land is poorer, corn harvests are much larger. The rayon is also lagging behind seriously in animal husbandry. Over the first 3 years of the five-year plan, Shpolyanskiy Rayon fulfilled the state plan only for egg procurements, representing 1 of 10 types of agricultural products.

Of course, the party obkom was well aware of this lag and it discussed raykom reports at several meetings of the obkom buro and sent brigades to assist in correcting the situation. The discussion of the report at the end of the year before last was particularly heated. At this time, the obkom buro demanded that rayon administrators radically improve the situation on fields and animal husbandry farms. When the administrators had been rebuked, they returned to Shpola, made a few speeches, held a few meetings and things soon settled down in the same old routine.

But Chairman V. Kravchenko of the Kommunist Kolkhoz, holder of two Orders of Lenin and the Order of the October Revolution and delegate to the 26th CPSU Congress, was displeased by the attitude of raykom personnel. The farm where his father had once been chairman had become a special farm for the fattening of livestock--one of the largest in the rayon and in the oblast. By the end of last year, there should have been 12,500 head here. This required more facilities to be built each year, but the builders were, quite frankly, acting irresponsibly. Each year delivery schedules were violated flagrantly by the rayon farms which were supposed to send calves to the special farm for fattening. Last year they failed to deliver more than 4,000 head to the fattening facilities in Matusov.

At buro meetings and in personal conversations, the kolkhoz chairman asked the raykom secretary and buro members each month to support the farm by convincing the negligent builders and the flagrant violators of shipment schedules to change their ways. He wrote reports on the matter but received nothing in return other than half-hearted and totally unsecured promises. Then he decided to criticize the first secretary directly for Guglenko's irresponsible attitude toward problems in animal husbandry and other branches of rayon agriculture, for his virtual abandonment of his duties and for his failure to listen to the wishes of communists. Finally, he criticized him for his unscrupulous behavior and his involvement in group binges.

The facts were irrefutable. The buro members--Second Secretary V. Denisyuk of the party raykom, Chairman V. Musyura of the rayispolkom, First Deputy Chairman I. Udovik of the RAPO [rayon agroindustrial association] council and Chairman M. Kapusta of the people's control committee--had to act in line with their official party positions and the requirements of the CPSU Charter and support the principled statements of the extremely upset farm administrator, subject their own work to a discerning self-analysis and correct the behavior of the raykom first secretary. But no, each pretended that nothing in particular was going on and acted as though the obstinate kolkhoz chairman might be guilty of

slander. In short, not one of them had the courage to admit that the criticism was fair and to set the first secretary straight.

It was then that Vladimir Ivanovich, deeply disappointed by the indifference of people accountable to the party for the state of affairs in the rayon, appealed to the obkom of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

Obkom officials fully sympathized with the chairman's story and his appeal for help. A representative commission was formed immediately and it spent almost half a month investigating rayon affairs and studying the first secretary's work style and methods. Soon the party obkom buro heard the report of the Shpolaynskiy Raykom on agricultural management. Its activity in this area was described as unsatisfactory. After discussing the obkom buro decision, a plenum of the Shpolyanskiy party raykom noted that the work style of the raykom buro did not meet the requirements of the 26th CPSU Congress. It was guilty of flagrant violations of collective management and it had failed to create an atmosphere of highly principled behavior, exactingness, severe criticism and political acuteness in response to violations of party and state rules and the standards of communist morality. The raykom first secretary, as mentioned above, had to vacate this office.

I attended the Shpolyanskiy Rayon party conference held soon afterward. The delegates pointedly criticized the party raykom for its incorrect work style. The raykom secretaries and other buro members were accused of unprincipled behavior. The party obkom buro was also the target of a deserved reproach at this conference. "Is it possible that the unsatisfactory behavior of the former first secretary became apparent only in Shpola?" asked old communist R. Fomenko. "Were his administrative qualities in his previous positions in Lysyanskiy and Zhashkovskiy Rayons investigated sufficiently before the man was recommended for this high office?"

V. Kravchenko has been the chairman of the Kommunist Kolkhoz for 18 years--already 2 years longer than the period when his father, a party veteran, headed the farm. When Vladimir Ivanovich was 25, the people in the neighboring village elected him the "head" of their kolkhoz. And when his father suffered a serious ailment and his health began to fail, the kolkhoz members in Matusov expressed the unanimous wish that the young Kravchenko head the farm in his native village. Vladimir Ivanovich has placed the highest value on the trust of his fellow-villagers. Whatever he may be doing or planning, he always asks himself: "How would my father deal with this situation? What would he do in my place?" And then he asks himself the main question: "What will people think of my plan? Will they understand? Will they agree?" This has helped him to avoid erroneous, arrogant, hypocritical and hasty decisions and actions.

Concluding his account of the entire matter, Ivan Kondrat'yevich Lutak declared:

"Of course, what happened in Shpola was an extraordinary incident for our oblast party organization and, frankly, an extremely unpleasant one. But it also taught the obkom personnel a lesson--all of them, without exception. In

essence, it was expressed quite well by Comrade K. U. Chernenko: 'Party committees cannot take charge of economic affairs unless they first take charge of the economic administrators. We must always remember this.'"

As for Shpola, a new first secretary--N. Grishko--has been elected there, and the obkom is certain that the situation there will be corrected through the efforts of the new administration and all communists in the rayon, and that Shpola will regain its good name.

8588

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## REGIONAL

### KARDAMAVICHYUS ON LITHUANIAN PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL WORK

Vilnius KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 30 Mar 84), pp 24-34

[Excerpts from article by Vitautas Kardamavichyus, candidate member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Buro, chief of the Organizational Party Work Department of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee: "Toward New Successes: Results of Reports and Elections in the Lithuanian SSR Party Organization"]

[Excerpts] In the republic party organization, reports and elections have come to a close. Reports were given on work done in 5,271 party groups, 3,704 shop and 5,622 primary party organizations and 58 party gorkoms and raykoms.

Those giving reports at the reporting-election meetings and the communists who spoke analyzed how each family of communists, each elective organ and each party member are carrying out the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the 18th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress, and decrees of the May and November (1982) and June (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenums, and how they are improving party leadership of production and organizational and ideological work.

Almost 98 percent of the party members met in party group report meetings. More than 70 percent of the communists participating in the meetings spoke at them. Communists also participated actively in meetings of shop and primary party organizations. Practically all delegates participated in the work of city and rayon party conferences; 978 persons spoke. One out of three speakers were workers or kolkhozniks; 31 percent were women.

At the party meetings and conferences, communists unanimously approved the peaceful domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU Central Committee and pledged through selfless labor to make a worthy contribution to fulfillment of 11th Five-Year Plan plan quotas and to further strengthening the economic and defensive power of our native land.

The communists came to the unanimous opinion that the overall trend toward an improvement of economic indicators is a result of the strengthening of party, state and labor discipline. In resolutions adopted at the meetings

and conferences, even stricter application of the means of social, administrative and economic influence was planned for those who break labor discipline, drunks, and those who steal public property; it was also planned to use every opportunity to make sure that a healthy labor climate prevails in every collective, so that not only yearly plans but also plans for the 11th 5-Year Plan as a whole and adopted socialist obligations might be successfully fulfilled and socialist responsibility might be carried out.

A lively and mutually beneficial discussion took place concerning questions of the further improvement in the style and methods of party work. Delegates speaking at the conferences unanimously supported orders and measures developed by the CPSU Central Committee aimed at continued improvement of the style and methods of work and the decisive battle with the red-tape style of management. The party demands that the number of decrees and conferences be kept to a minimum, particularly the duration of the conferences, that a majority of mass measures be carried out after work, and that more time be given to active work among the masses. It is recommended that the work of a party organization or labor collective not be judged by how many and what measures they have passed or decrees they have enacted, but according to the actual situation in production and worker education, the solution of social problems, and the status of party, state and labor discipline. The conferences obliged gorkoms, raykoms and their buros to continually work at improving the style and methods of labor, not only in party organizations but also in soviet agencies and trade union and komsomol organizations, so as to increase their authority and their role in public life in every way possible.

Improvement in the style and methods of labor received a great deal of attention at the 26th Party Conference of the city of Shyaulayay. Conference delegates discussed how to eliminate work shortcomings and stressed the necessity of consolidating the forms and methods of work in all collectives in accordance with the needs of the time. Moreover, there are many good examples, worthy of imitation, in the work of the Shyaulayay communists.

The party gorkum and its buro focus the attention of party organizations on the solution of the important problems of improving the effectiveness and organizations for the fulfillment of state plans; that continually emphasize that good results can only be obtained through cooperative efforts supported by the initiative and activity of party organizations, and through strict observation of the principles of collective leadership.

During the period under review, the required amount of attention was devoted to problems of organizational-party work. Continued concern was shown for strengthening party ranks and for the training of young communists. In 1983, the republic party ranks was increased by 7,030 communists, i.e., it grew by 3.1 percent. During the reporting-election campaign alone, 2,526 of the best representatives of workers, kolkhozniks and intelligentsia were admitted to the party. Party organizations of kolkhozes, sovkhoses and goskhoses accepted more mechanics and livestock workers as candidates for party membership. There was an increase in workers in the Kaunas and

Panevezhis municipal party organizations and of workers and kolkhozniks in the party organizations of the city of Kapsukas and Skuodasskiy, Kretingskiy, Shyalyayskiy, Ukmergskiy, Kupishkskiy, Lazdiyskiy, Shilutskiy and Rokishkskiy Rayons. This is not the case everywhere, however. Fewer workers were trained and accepted into the party in the Druskininkay and Klaypeda municipal organizations, and party organizations in Raseynskiy, Vil'nyuskiy and Ionavskiy Rayons had a decline in the number of workers and kolkhozniks accepted, and accepted fewer than the average for the rural rayons of the republic. During the last three years since the previous reporting party conferences, the republic party organization has grown by almost 16,000 members; 186,835 communists were united in their ranks as of 1 January.

After perusing materials from meetings and conferences that have already been held, we see that questions of improving the structure of party organizations have been analyzed in them in depth. The problem of the growth of the number of the lower party links is particularly emphasized. It is clear that the more shop organizations and party groups there are, the more effectively economic, ideological and political education work can be organized in shops, brigades and farms. Also the role of each party member is increasing significantly, and his responsibility for the common welfare is increasing. Over the last 3 years, the number of party committees in the republic has increased by 55, and primary party organizations have increased by 292; more than 100 primary party organizations with party bureaus have been added; 383 shop party organizations have been established, as well as 832 party groups. The number of labor collectives with no party organizations in them has decreased. These structural changes have made it possible to strengthen the party influence on the solution of economic and political problems. Communists taking part in the discussions emphasized the need to increase the number of party groups in brigades, as well as a need to make them more active in their work.

In the small collectives and brigades, where there are still no opportunities for establishing party organizations, party organizers are being chosen to carry out organizational and political work. Approximately 8,000 communists are carrying out this public mission in the republic. The new form of work is being widely used in Zarasayskiy, Shalchininkskiy, and Kapsukskiy Rayons. Considering the wishes expressed by communists, party gorkoms and raykoms should hold party organizer seminars more often, generalize the experience of their work, and give them the necessary procedural and practical help.

One of the most important tasks of effective organizational party work is the unconditional implementation of adopted decrees. It has been correctly emphasized in accountability reports and in speeches by many communists that the most immediate and long-term tasks of party organization intended to solve certain problems must be specifically and clearly stated in the party meeting decree. It is therefore necessary that all points of the decree be specific, so that they might be monitored and so that the responsible executors and time periods might be indicated therein.

The most important thing, however, is to organize fulfillment of the adopted resolutions in an exacting and business-like manner and to attain workable results.

In examining the various spheres of collective life and in analyzing the scope and results of its work, communists have an active positive influence on the business of collectives by the various forms of their activity, and they provide constant party monitoring of implementation of party and state decrees.

Commissions for monitoring of the administrative activity make an important contribution to the strengthening of party control in the economy. At the present time, approximately 90 percent of the 3,775 commissions created within the primary party organizations of the republic are analyzing economic problems. However, the conclusion can be drawn from the reports of commission chairmen at meetings that all commissions are still not working creatively and with initiative throughout the year. The constant attention of elective party organs must be given to questions concerning the purposefulness and effectiveness of commission work, generalization of the forms and methods of their activity and member training. It would also be worthwhile to learn from comrades, i.e., from the residents of Kretinga. As of 1981, their party organization has been used as a reference point in the republic due to the accumulation of progressive experience in matters of monitoring administrative activity, and a specific area of control has been chosen--problems of the efficiency of livestock breeding.

The Kretingskiy party raykom and primary party organizations are showing particular concern for one of the most massive forms of party control in the rayon--the work of commissions for monitoring administrative activity. Commissions such as this have been established in 29 out of 34 organizations of the rayon agroindustrial association. Administrative activity regarding improved efficiency in livestock breeding is monitored by 20 commissions. The activity of the commissions is closely related to local production conditions and labor results. While previously the commissions were more concerned with problems of milk production, lately most of them monitor beef and pork production.

By increasing the production of livestock products and their sale to the state, the communists of Kretingskiy Rayon have strengthened party control over the establishment of a strong feed base. In 1983, an average 28.9 quintals of grain were milled from each hectare; on the whole this was almost 11,000 tons of grain more than in 1982. The rayon holds one of the foremost places in the republic in terms of the amount of procured grase feeds per standard head of cattle. In terms of qualitative livestock breeding indicators, the people of Kretinga have substantially exceeded the average republic indicator. Obviously, the fact that 70 percent of committee chairmen chosen in Kretingskiy Rayon have a higher or secondary education has a great deal of influence on the successful operation of the commissions.



Problems in the selection, placement and training of personnel were examined from all sides at the meetings and conferences. It was observed that primary party organizations and party gorkoms and raykoms are studying the personal qualities of people more carefully and in-depth; for this reason, competent specialists with authority in the labor collectives were directed to managerial work. The managers were presented with the task of providing a good microclimate in the collectives and the creation of organizational and economic conditions in which each member of the collective might be of the greatest use to society.

It should be mentioned that many communists who spoke during the reporting-election campaign on interrelations between managers and subordinates and on the assignment of young agricultural specialists and mass professions personnel in rural areas stressed the need for a comprehensive solution of economic and social questions, stressing that this is one of the most important conditions of management. Thus, L. Lelyukas, chief of mechanic workshops of Kemenay Kolkhoz, Pasvalskiy Rayon, said at the reporting-election meeting of the primary party organization:

"Although our kolkhoz is the farthest away from the rayon center, thanks to the efforts of the primary party organization and the administration we are able to have on the farm enough kolkhozniks from the mass professions --mechanics and livestock breeders. The guarantee of success is constant work at keeping young people in the village. We have many young people under 30. At present, 25 people are studying with a farm stipend at various educational institutions."

It can be concluded that municipal and rayon party organizations of the republic have markedly accelerated their work of late with managers of all links and categories. This is also indicated by the high achievements in the area of the economy and in the social and cultural realm as well as improvement in the overall qualitative makeup of personnel. More managers of collectives have been chosen from young, capable, educated specialists of the national economy, who have distinguished themselves by their organizational and administrative abilities and attractive human qualities; more women have been promoted to responsible positions, as well as people of different nationalities.

Some shortcomings, however, have not been avoided: hasty decisions in personnel placement, too much faith in individual managers, liberalism in regard to them, insufficient exactingness. Mistakes in the solution of personnel problems--this is not just the people who have comprised themselves or who are not coping with the tasks that have been entrusted to them; there is significant economic and moral damage to the collectives they are managing. Party committees and primary party organizations must be responsible for personnel work and must constantly use Leninist principles to manage the choice, placement and education of managers. They must be concerned not just with the working managers, but must also think about their future replacements. In essence, there must be an improvement in the work with management personnel reserves. We have learned to plan and draw up personnel reserves on paper. This is now our duty,

having here and there overcome firmly established formalism in the work with reserves to attain its practicability, quality, and reliability. We must concern ourselves with further training of personnel reserves according to plan, and with increasing their occupational and ideological and political level.

To touch each person, to train him in a spirit of communist conviction and to direct him to creative labor--this is the task for improving ideological work and increasing its effectiveness that was proposed at the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

During the period under review, by using the multiple facilities for ideological influence and forms of this work, communists tried to give people belonging to different social groups and age categories a deep understanding of domestic and foreign policy of the party and Soviet government; through their active creative work they helped the fastest realization of the vital tasks of the 11th Five-Year Plan. The arsenal of educational and indoctrinational resources were more fully utilized for this purpose and the best trained, competent and educated propagandists, capable of working with people were recruited. A great deal of attention was given to the effective political education and mass political studies.

However, as noted in the reports and discussions at reporting-election meetings and conferences, ideological, instructional and propaganda work must be more closely tied to a solution to economic and socioeconomic problems. More attention must be given to the labor, international and patriotic education of youth. Education work should also be accelerated where people live, there should be increased parent responsibility for the upbringing of their children and an improvement in preventive work with so-called "difficult" adolescents, to instill legal culture in society and respect for Soviet laws and the rules of socialist communal living.

It is gratifying that the work of all party groups and secretaries, shop and primary party organizations, buros, partkoms, raykoms and gorkoms without exception received a satisfactory evaluation.

During the period of the reporting-election campaign, the makeup of the elected party aktiv and party workers improved from a qualitative standpoint. There were more workers, rank-and-file kolkhozniks, engineering and technical workers, women and specialists of the national economy with a higher education among them. Workers and kolkhozniks constitute 53.1 percent and women 33.4 percent of the committees and buros of primary party organizations. Some 70.1 percent of communists with a higher and incomplete higher education, 29.8 percent of engineering and technical workers and agricultural specialists, and 48.1 percent of women were chosen as secretaries of primary party organizations.

Positive changes were accomplished in the improvement of the qualitative composition of party gorkoms and raykoms. Workers and kolkhozniks comprise almost 45 percent of them, and women more than 33.5 percent. Some 320 honored party and labor veterans who participate actively in the indoctrination of young people were selected to the committees.

The composition of members of gorkom and raykom buros of the Communist Party of Lithuania has qualitatively changed. It has been filled with the foremost production workers--workers and kolkhozniks, women.

Despite the positive changes occurring in industry, construction, transportation, agriculture and other sectors of the national economy, analysis of the work done in accountability reports and speeches by communists revealed shortcomings: untapped internal resources, specific breaches of labor, plan and financial discipline, cases of waste, in short, everything that retards progress for the labor collectives.

During the reports and elections at primary party organizations, more than 39,000 critical observations and suggestions were made, and at the conferences--more than 4,000. The critical observations and suggestions were immediately correlated at buro meetings and sessions, and more than 75 percent of them were implemented even during the reporting-election campaign period. Implementation of the remaining critical observations was set up for investigation.

Almost 11,000 responsible party, Soviet and economic managerial workers of our republic and country participated in the work of the meetings and conferences.

Various information and statistical data was prepared for conference delegates and guests on economic and social achievements for the period under review, as well as graphic materials on the structure of party organizations, photo stands with portraits of communists--leaders in production, secretaries of the best party organizations, propagandists; expositions of new industrial products were organized, as well as achievements in other sectors of the national economy. Special newspaper editions were dedicated to the conferences.

During the reporting-election campaign, achievements and shortcomings were analyzed, the accumulated experience was generalized, prospects were outlined, purposeful and specific resolutions were adopted. The communists set about making them a reality.

It is the duty of the responsible workers of the republic party apparatus to render comprehensive procedural and practical help to the newly-elected party aktiv, to give prompt recognition and support to valuable innovations in the work of party organizations, to help in the generalization of advanced experience, and when necessary to defend their correct and principled decisions. In attempting to have all party workers assimilate a Leninist style of labor, the amount of paper work, particularly office work must be reduced, and efforts must be made to spend the majority of work time in the collectives, to have individual discussions with communists and non-party members, to know the personal qualities, inclinations and capabilities of people as well as their aspirations, and in this manner to purposefully formulate public opinion, wise material demands, a high degree of spiritual culture and moral qualities among workers. Active work among the masses consists of an in-depth analysis of the overall activity

of each collective and subsequent local work putting party decrees into practice and monitoring of their implementation; it also consists of attentive and effective analysis of letters, critical remarks and suggestions from workers, and frequently it is also a difficult and tense struggle for a high degree of human awareness and for the triumph of justice.

The reference point for the activity of a party worker is the continued raising of the level of national prosperity, based on the securing of important economic and cultural achievements.

Great and important tasks were assigned to party organizations and working collectives at the December (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the 9th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The communists of Soviet Lithuania, having closed ranks and combined the efforts of all workers of the Republic, are full of energy, optimism and resolution to fittingly put the plans of the party into practice.

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## REGIONAL

### WW II PARTY UNDERGROUND WORK IN BALTIC REPUBLICS

Vilnius KOMMUNIST in Russian No 3, Mar 84 (signed to press 30 Mar 84), pp 89-92

[Review by P. Ternovskiy of book "Partiynoye Podpol'ye. Deyatel'nost' Podpol'nykh Partiynykh Organov i Organizatsiy Na Okkupirovannoy Sovetskoy Territorii v Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny," [The Party Underground. Activity of Underground Party Organs and Organizations in Occupied Soviet Territory During the Great Patriotic War.] Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CPSU Central Committee. Editorial Board: N. I. Makarov (chief), A. A. Babakov, et al., Moscow, Politizdat, 1983, 352 pages]

[Text] This book permits an even deeper understanding of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people in the years of the great battle with the fascist aggressors in the rear of the enemy. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet nation was prepared in advance for battle with the strike force of world imperialism--fascism.

The communist party led the Great Patriotic War against the German Fascist aggressors from the very first day. A scientifically based program of an armed struggle with the fascist aggressor was developed, based on Leninist teaching concerning defense of the socialist homeland. One of the most important components of this program was the establishment of a partisan movement and a party underground in occupied Soviet territory, whose mission was to wage war in the rear of the enemy.

Tens and hundreds of thousands of Soviet people, following their hearts and the command of their conscience despite the danger, answered the summons of their own communist party and joined the ranks of those who fought against fascist aggressors. This was an unprecedented flight of purely national Soviet patriotism.

In its vast documentary material, the book shows how at the very beginning of the war the party's central committee and the Soviet state developed in their decrees a program for restructuring the entire life of the country into a military mode. They disclosed the predatory and aggressive goals of Fascist Germany, revealed the just and liberating nature of the war from the standpoint of the Soviet Union, and gave special attention to the mortal danger hanging over our native land.

A directive of the USSR Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] and the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] of June 29 1941 and a VKP(b) Central Committee decree "Organization of the Struggle at the Rear of German Forces" adopted on 18 July 1941 contained specific instructions concerning the development of a partisan movement and the creation of a party underground. This program was developed in an order of USSR People's Commissar of Defense I. V. Stalin on 5 September 1942 "Tasks of the Partisan Movement." It was stressed in the order that the German Fascist troops could only be defeated by simultaneous military actions of the Red Army at the front and continued strikes by the partisans against the enemy in the rear. The partisan movement had to be a national one for this reason.

The regular Red Army was the main, decisive force in the battle with the enemy. Actions on the part of partisan formations and diversionary groups and underground organizations and groups in the rear of the enemy were additional ways of resisting the aggressor.

The monograph emphasizes that the party established underground party committees and organizations to manage all forms of the struggle in occupied Soviet territory. They were the organs of political leadership; the leading role of the party in the national struggle in the enemy's rear was chiefly accomplished through them.

Workers of the VKP(b) Central Committee visited the rear of the enemy periodically, generalizing the experience of the partisan and underground struggle and giving practical help to the underground party committees and the headquarters and political organs of the partisan formations. The republic, oblast, and kray party committees were the direct organizers and managers of the partisan struggle. A State Defense Committee decree of 30 May 1942 formed the central staff of the Partisan Movement at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, headed by P. K. Ponomarenko, VKP(b) Central Committee member and Belorussian KP(b) first secretary. The Ukrainian, Bryansk, Western, Kalinin, Leningrad, Karelo-Finnish and after this the Belorussian, Lithuanian and other Partisan Movement Headquarters (ShPD) were created by this same decree. These staffs were generally headed by secretaries of union republic and party obkom central committees. Specifically, the Partisan Movement Staffs (ShPD) were headed by A. Yu. Snehkus, secretary of the Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee. For all intents and purposes, the ShPD's were military operations organs of communist party central committees of union republics, and party kraykoms and obkoms, and operated under their direct leadership.

Political organs of the Red Army also handled the organization of the partisan struggle in the enemy's rear, in close contact with party organ. As part of the political administration fronts, departments were established for party and political work among the population and Red Army forces active in enemy-occupied territory; departments were created in the armies and called upon to help party organizations of rayons near the front in the formation of partisan detachments and the maintenance of communication with them.

The book describes the enormous, difficult and complex job of organizing the battle in the enemy's rear.

Experience in underground work was acquired at the cost of great sacrifices. Many underground committees were destroyed and their secretaries and bureau members were tortured in fascist torture chambers. The party central committee and republic and oblast party organs were constantly concerned with the expansion and replenishment of the party underground network with new forces. Special schools to train the necessary personnel were set up from the first days of the war. From the period of 15 July 1942 to 15 January 1944 alone, 6,501 persons were trained at schools of the Central Partisan Movement Staff: partisan movement organizers, detachment commanders and commissars, intelligence workers, radio operators, komsomol workers (p. 55).

The monograph gives a detailed analysis of questions of party structure in the system of underground committees and organizations. At the basis were Leninist principles, requiring the adaptation of the underground structure to specific conditions of the struggle (see V. I. Lenin, Complete Works, v 22, p 260).

According to the monograph, the strength and vitality of the party underground was that it reached out to the people with all of its roots. Every segment of the population behind the front line deeply believed in the party and actively followed its call, making every effort to destroy the invaders (p. 330).

The most centralized and efficient form of the struggle in the enemy's rear was the **/Partisan Movement/** [in boldface]--an open armed struggle. It was directly headed by underground party committees, which for the most part were in the partisan formations. This mass movement went out to the people with all of its sources, and existed because of them, most clearly and perceptibly expressing the will to fight (p. 337).

From small, previously uncoordinated detachments and groups, large partisan formations were established through the efforts of party organs, communists and non-party patriots; entire partisan krays and zones were then formed, where life was lived according to Soviet laws. Partisan staff headquarters coordinated its activities with Red Army offensive troops. In all, more than a million men fought in the partisan formations.

The authors of the monograph correctly note the prominent role of the Institute for Military Commissars in strengthening and developing the partisan movement. They headed all party and political work among the partisans as well as among the population.

Along with the partisan movement, the **/Underground Organizations and Groups/** [in boldface] were another organized form of the struggle with the invaders. It is characteristic that many of them were established on the personal initiative of communists and also quite often on that of non-party activists. More than 220,000 brave Soviet patriots fought in a single formation with

partisans in the underground, and together with secret partisan reserves they numbered more than a million men.

The book broadly explores the political work of the party among the population and partisans in the occupied regions. This work was complicated not only by the cruel regime of the aggressors, but also by the stepped-up ideological work done among residents by the Hitlerites. One of the circulars from German Fascist Army Headquarters stated: "We must not only defeat the Red Army with weapons, but also in the battle against Bolshevik propaganda, as liberators of the country, we must obliterate the idea of communism in the oblasts that we occupy..." (p 222). The invaders tried in every possible way to develop enmity among the nations of the Soviet Union. Goering's famous green briefcase contained a directive to occupation sectors, demanding that they "use differences between Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians and Russians..in the south..between Ukrainians and Great Russians in the interests of Germany" (pp 222-223).

The zealous accomplices of Hitler's aggressors in conducting ideological operations among the population were mainly bourgeois nationalists. In Belorussian, Lithuania, and the western oblasts of the Ukraine the Hitlerites were aided not only by Belorussians, Lithuanians and Ukrainian nationalists but by Polish nationalists who had connections with Polish emigrants in London and worked on their instruction. The occupying forces also used the most reactionary clerical leaders, particularly those of the Catholic Church. The Vatican had an agreement with Hitler, about sending Catholic missionaries to occupied countries. Bishop T. Matulyenis was designated clerical administrator of the occupied territory as far as Moscow. Along with the advance units of the fascist army, the Soviet people were showered with a stream of slanderous anti-Soviet literature. The press, radio, movies, the theater--all means were used in the hostile ideological work.

Under incredibly difficult conditions, the communist party waged an unprecedented struggle for the minds and hearts of the people in the enemy's rear. A truly inestimable role was played by the printed word of the party, which brought to the population of the occupied regions the light of truth and exposed lying fascist propaganda and the brutality and violence of the invaders and established truth in our victory over the enemy. Thus, during the years of the occupation of the Ukraine, Lithuania, the Crimea and Smolensk, Moscow and Leningrad Oblasts, party committees from these republics and oblasts alone printed and distributed 358 million leaflets, newspapers and brochures to the people and partisans in the enemy's rear, including 314.5 million from the Ukrainian KP (b) Central Committee, approximately 11 million from the Lithuanian KP (b) Central Committee, etc. (p 240).

Radio was used extensively in political work. Beginning in July 1941, Central Radio Broadcasting systematically broadcast to the Soviet people, under the yoke of the German Fascist invaders. In Moscow a Lithuanian radio editorial staff was also created, headed by Yu. Banaytis. Leaders of the party and of republic government, writers, art figures, military figures and commanders of the Lithuanian formation of the Red Army appealed



to the people of Lithuania over the radio. In 10 months of 1942 alone, there were 163 such broadcasts (p. 269).

In areas where partisan formations were deployed, collective audiences of the Moscow radio broadcasts were organized among the population. Partisans and members of the underground received summaries by radio of Sovinformburo [Soviet Information Bureau] and other important materials and then duplicated them by hand or in the form of leaflets and used them in newspapers, battle leaflets, etc. These materials were among the fundamental sources of verbal propaganda: discussions, lectures, and reports to the people.

Throughout the entire year, discussions were among the most widespread and effective forms of communication with the population. Indeed, every partisan and member of the underground served as an agitator and discussion participant. Lecturers from the VKP(b) Central Committee and republic, kray and oblast party committees also spoke behind enemy lines. Meetings and assemblies were also held in towns and villages of the occupied regions, particularly in partisan krays and zones, and partisan amateur talent ensembles and agitation brigades performed as speakers.

The monograph notes that the political work done by members of the underground and party organizations frustrated the attempts of the Hitlerites to poison the minds of the Soviet people with the toxin of savage nationalism and racial hatred. The enemy was not successful in sowing seeds of national discord among the nations of the Soviet Union or in instilling lack of trust in the Russian people. Hitlerites also lost their stake in their accomplices from the camp of bourgeois nationalists, clerics and kulak elements, who had tried to go into action in territories of the western oblasts of the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic area (p. 301). The population filled the ranks of partisans and underground workers.

The book gives a great deal of attention to the formation and consolidation process of the party underground at every stage of the war in the Baltic Soviet republics, particularly in Lithuania. Certain important points expressed in the monograph are useful to remember, in my opinion.

The rapid movement of the German Fascist armies did not allow advance preparation for the war in the enemy's rear in the Baltic republics. Nonetheless, underground organizations and partisan detachments created by local communists, Komsomols and Red Army soldiers and commanders who had been encircled went into operation here from the first days of the occupation. Thus, after the occupation of the Lithuanian SSR, many communists remained behind the enemy's lines and became organizers of the partisan and underground struggle. The Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee in Moscow regularly sent out organizer groups to the republic territory. By July-early August of 1941, the Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee created six organizer groups of six to seven men apiece, made up of party and Soviet workers and sent them to many cities and districts of the republic: Kaunas, Shyauliyay, Mariyampole, Ukmerge, Rikishkis, Alitus. Having established communication

with communists and komсомol members, the groups created partisan detachments and underground organizations (p. 147).

In March of 1942, the Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee sent two large groups of leading party and komсомol workers to occupied regions, headed by Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee Secretary I. Meskupas-Adomas. One of these groups developed the operation in northern Lithuania and the other in the south. However, soon both groups perished in battles with the invaders. In April of 1942, the Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee adopted a resolution to choose 200 men for work behind the enemy lines from the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division and 200 men from the Lithuanian communists, komсомol members and non-party activists evacuated to the eastern regions. The future underground workers and partisans underwent special training, after which they were sent out into the Lithuanian territory in small groups. Each group was well armed and equipped with rations. Created in November of 1942, the Lithuanian staff of the partisan movement continued the work of training underground members and partisans and sending them to Lithuania (p. 170).

On 6 January 1944, the Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee adopted a resolution on "Organization of Underground Oblast Committees of the Lithuanian KP(b) Committees." Northern and southern KP(b) party obkoms were established. They strengthened existing party organs in the enemy's rear and established a number of new ones. By the middle of 1944, there were 20 party uyezd committees and 29 volost committees in existence in Lithuania. Under their direct leadership the network of underground organizations in Vilnius, Kaunas, Shyaulyay and other cities in Lithuania grew substantially, despite major breakdowns in 1943 (p. 87).

The active struggle in the enemy's rear continued in the Baltic republics even in the final stage of the war. The monograph notes that in the Lithuanian SSR, despite extensive losses borne by underground organizations in Vilnius, Kaunas and other cities of the republic, the number of underground workers steadily increased. The network of anti-fascist organizations also grew stronger under the leadership of the party underground. On 6 January 1944, the Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee adopted a special decree, "The Creation of Mass Anti-Fascist Organizations in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Lithuanian SSR." In carrying out the orders of the Lithuanian KP(b) Central Committee, underground party committees accomplished a great deal of work in establishing new anti-fascist organizations and committees. In Lithuania during that same year there were approximately 3,000 anti-fascists and members of the underground (see pp 200-201).

One of the chapters in the book also describes the activity of party underground organs for re-establishing Soviet power in regions liberated by the partisans and for organizing economic and political life in them.

The group of authors at the CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism and Leninism has created an extremely valuable scientific work. For the first time, from Marxist-Leninist positions, it gives a generalized

historical sketch of the creation, strengthening and basic directions of the activity of underground party organs and organizations throughout the occupied territory of the USSR during the years of the war with the German Fascist invaders that were the most difficult for the Soviet people. In a large body of factual material, the book convincingly shows the huge decisive role of the Communist Party and its Central Committee in organizing and managing the national struggle in the enemy's rear. All forms of the struggle are revealed in dialectical interrelationship: the armed partisan movement, underground activity, the people's resistance, expressed by sabotage and the breaking of political, economic and military measures of the occupation forces. Indeed, this dialectic contains the discovery of the essence of a historically unprecedented unique social movement, a national struggle in the occupier's rear which caused the enemy a great deal of harm. This serves as a formidable warning to all modern-day imperialist warmongers.

The struggle of the Soviet people in the enemy's rear gives evidence of the uncompromising class struggle on the part of the land of victorious socialism with the fascist invaders and oppressors of the people. According to the monograph, this struggle was exceptionally active and efficient and served as an important military-political and strategically effective factor in the victory of the Soviet Union in the war (p. 340).

The book also enables the conclusion to be made that the party underground brought a profoundly international character to the struggle of the Soviet patriots behind enemy lines. The war confirmed the words of V. I. Lenin, that the self-sacrifice of the Soviet people "will give us millions and millions of allies in all countries" (V. I. Lenin, Complete Works, v 40, p 242). Citizens from many occupied European countries, forcibly mobilized by the Hitlerites, fought valiantly as a part of our partisan detachments and units. In turn, up to 50,000 Soviets participated in the European Resistance Movement.

The authors of the book admit that they were not able to clarify all questions connected with the activity of the party underground completely enough. Many questions still require further development. Nevertheless, this does not diminish the value and the great social significance of this study. It serves as a valuable handbook in ideological work and is of interest to a mass audience of readers.

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BLACK MARKET OPERATION UNCOVERED, LEADER EXECUTED

Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 1 Jul 84 p 4

[Article by A. Malevanny: "End of a Nest of Thieves"]

[Text] The judicial process has been completed in the case of plunderers operating in Tokmak Meat Combine. Bostanov, the head of the pre-slaughtering station, led and directed the criminal group. It included livestock inspectors, the director of the combine, shop chiefs, and clerical workers. They entered into a deal with representatives of a number of farms, and used all possible machinations to plunder livestock.

Day after day, step after step, the court, chaired by member of the Kirghizian Supreme Court Nailya Alimovna Ibragimova, and consisting of people's assessors P. G. Buglak (a worker in the republic Geology Administration) and communications engineer M. M. Gusev, traced the facts of crime and tried to expose the roots which fed the evil.

One August day in 1978, Anzor Turganovich Bostanov turned up at Tokmak Meat Combine in person. Incredible! The chief of the pre-slaughtering station of Frunze Meat-Canning Combine--what a figure! He behaved in a fitting manner--independent and proud. With everything about his appearance and carriage, and the manners of a successful man, he imparted content and confidence.

Those who knew the opportunities of the pre-slaughtering station and those who couldn't grasp the subtleties of its operation alike guessed that Bostanov was walking along a vein of gold. And he would not step across it--oh, no! Furthermore, in various spheres, he had the necessary people, whose favor and patronage, not disinterestedly, he enjoyed, which gave him the reputation of an influential and all-powerful operator.

So, when the Frunze pre-slaughtering station was eliminated, Bostanov did not remain without work; he was offered the same position in Tokmak Meat Combine. And though there was no vacancy there, and he himself did not have a local residence permit, this did not in any way hinder his employment.



~~Not only that, he brought along from the capital people he had worked with~~ before, and to whom nothing had to be explained--cattle inspectors Nogoybayev, Berdiyev, and Saparbekov. He also could not get along without the tally clerk Kirichenko, who had thoroughly mastered all the ins and outs of so-called "black book-keeping." And he transferred the adroit weighers Zavorozhnaya and Beschelnaya, skilled in deception. For cadres already well-seasoned in Frunze Meat Combine, he picked new inspectors--Khutugov, Osmonaliyev, Maychinov, Suyunchiyev, and Tabaldiyev, unerringly recognizing in them associates who were similar in spirit.

A certain Suyunchiyev, who had served two terms for theft, was worth something. Osmonaliyev had spent 9 years in places not too distant. Even Bostanov himself, in his time, before coming to Kirghizia, had answered charges in court.

Bostanov's "crew" soon got fully rolling. Record padding [pripiska], short weights, juggling of documents--these were all in their arsenal. They violated the elementary requirements of the book-keeping and techniques of collecting livestock. The manipulations reduced to one thing: to get as much unaccounted-for (stolen, simply speaking) surplus meat as possible, which the combine operators commonly called "reserve live weight."

He could turn this "reserve" into real, hard cash. Because the opportunity opened up for an illegal maneuver--livestock record padding. The on-paper number of livestock came into the combine, but the actual cows and sheep were plundered and sold off. During 3 years at the pre-slaughtering station, the thieves created a "reserve" of 469 tons of cattle, 212 tons of swine, and 290 tons of sheep.

The documents, meanwhile, were kept fully up to date. True, the strict, businesslike word "document" in no way approaches the forged papers which were concocted by Bostanov's trusted ones--Kirichenko, Burykina, and the others. They carried out "double book-keeping": in a rough copy (for themselves) they wrote one thing, and in the station books (for trusting inspectors) they entered revised, improved, false data which agreed with the "chief."

But this was, so to speak, domestic, internal accounting. How did the forgery get past subsequent stages of production? After all, livestock from the station came into the slaughtering shop, where it was recounted and weighed again. There it would immediately reveal the discrepancy between the actual number of head and that written in the accompanying invoice. But everything went quietly. The skin-curing shop counted skins, and the refrigeration shop, carcasses. But even with these re-divisions, the deception passed through freely.

Incoming livestock and the original documents were counted, weighed, checked and re-checked by a whole army of clerks and weighers--Tret'yakov and Sultanmuratov, Beschelnaya and Zavorozhnaya, Aliyev and Isakov, Pryadkin and Gaydakova, Kupriyanova and Butkina, Tashmatov and Orozaliyev, Oleynikova and Golovenko.... Observe: all these were not merely technical workers, but

~~materially responsible workers. Since they managed to see nothing, what~~  
caused the mass blindness?

It turns out that weighers and clerks, foremen and senior foremen were trading on their material responsibility--retail and wholesale. Bostanov established a "fixed rate" for them: for adding one head of cattle, 25 rubles; a sheep, 5; a pig, 10. And these people, racing with one another, obsequiously distorted the documents, receiving stolen money for their zeal in deception.

...It was truly distasteful to hear the explanations of these people, resembling children's prattling ("they told me to, and I wrote it down," "they said to--I did it," and so forth). And not a shadow of embarrassment or repentance. "What do you want from us?" they argued. "We are only tiny cogs...." Yes, but "cogs" or a thieving mechanism. Without them, it would not work, it would break down.... But it did work. And not just for a year. Because the "cogs," periodically oiled by Bostanov, unfailingly turned the components and parts.

But not everyone on the combine agreed with this degrading role. Senior foreman of the slaughtering shop K. Abzhalbekova declared firmly: "No! I will only collect livestock according to the account." Strictly speaking, she did not demand anything outstanding, she only insisted on punctual observance of the official instruction. But even this trifle hindered the plunderers. The intractable foreman was transferred to the technical department as an information engineer.

And Bostanov's gang had to fork out for services rendered. Of course, Combine Director Toktogonov cost them more than an ordinary tally clerk. They paid him mainly to keep his mouth shut. And he diligently kept up the appearance that he didn't suspect a thing.

Well, what about the inspectors? Every year they came from the ministry to the combine, and over the course of a month-and-a-half to 2 months, checked the financial and business activities. They noticed isolated flaws and cases of negligence, but overall and on the whole--pastoral, nothing else!

Was it really impossible, out of reach, if not to expose the entire picture, then at least one fragment of it, to follow up a thread, to feel uneasy, sense something wrong, bad, to use professional intuition?--we tried to find out from A. Ukolova, deputy head of the inspection department of the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry. And the answer: no, it is impossible, because we carry out document auditing. (The word "document" was stressed, pronounced with emphasis.)

How does it work, the more skillfully the documents have been put together, the more worthless auditing is? But then what use is it? And as for everything else, it turns out that the inspectors of the pre-slaughtering station are not concerned with it at all. What can you say? Might as well throw up your hands!...

~~Meanwhile, vast resources were vanishing from the combine.~~ But perhaps when the hidden evil came to light, the ministry inspectors experienced a feeling of wounded pride, of damaged professional self-esteem? Not a bit. And this deserves attention. Because a man who can't take a self-critical and exacting look at himself, who can't get angry at himself for complacency and unconcern, can scarcely derive from personal defeat a bitter but honest lesson. Let's call things by their right names: the inspectors of the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry suffered a clear defeat by the thieves, who had them wrapped around their finger for over 3 years.

Taken all together, one circumstance in this story leaps out: a number of officials explicitly disregarded their service obligations and instructions. The things which we call work discipline. Let's take the cadre members of the combine. They knew very well that most of Bostanov's "crew" lived in Frunze, and they certainly saw that many of them were not even allowed to get near work involving material responsibility. And of course, they guessed that these people were not driving to Tokmak every day for the sake of 140-ruble salaries.

Of course, the question of being accepted to work is decided by the administration. But the registration procedure is entirely the responsibility of the department of cadres. And if they had stuck to the letter of the appropriate instructions in this regard, then the road into the combine would have been closed to Bostanov and those close around him in every case for the work which they tried to do.

All right, the cadre members passed. But what stopped the party organization from raising the question about disruptions in cadre policy, about the suspicious reinforcements which had arrived in the collective? After all, there were discussions on this topic at the enterprise, there were persistent rumors about dirty deeds being done at the pre-slaughtering station. In short, the awl was sticking out of the sack, and in order not to see it, one had to be either very short-sighted or without principles.

At first glance, the work of the station appears to be regulated by reliable control actions which were impossible to get around. But when you dig just a little deeper you discover a rotten core inside. For example, the schedules of collecting livestock. They were put together in the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry at a high level with the participation of deputy ministers of agriculture and procurement. (Tokmak Meat Combine was invariably represented by Bostanov, with his "private accountant," Dar'ya Kirichenko.) They held discussions, drew contracts, made agreements, elaborated.... But the deputy ministers would talk, gossip, would go away with a sense of duty fulfilled--of course, they had drawn up an important document!

Bostanov would turn that document to his advantage in form and implementation. And nobody took an interest in why the schedule was nearly always violated. Why, for example, were distant rayons of Dzhabul Oblast yielding 4 to 4.5 times more livestock than planned? This would have led a specialist to serious and far-ranging conclusions. He would also have wondered why livestock collection at the station so frequently dragged on for 24 hours, or even longer.

Could it be that there was no one to investigate these irregularities? That was in fact the case. For the period of mass livestock delivery, so-called interdepartmental commissions are created from members of three ministries--meat and dairy industry, agriculture, and procurement. Their function is to regulate, direct, and control the process of collecting livestock at the meat combine. But, in that case, would Bostanov and his gang really have had such a free and easy life?

But the well-intended commissions were just for form's sake. And for form's sake, they sporadically dropped in on the combine, making superficial conclusions which did not obligate anyone to anything. Isn't this as good an example of record padding as padding livestock records?

...These, it turns out, were exactly the rear services needed by the thieves operating at the pre-slaughtering station: tame weighers and tally clerks, a bought director, short-sighted inspectors, and interdepartmental commissions who didn't know their business. In short, the conditions for theft were the very ones that were most propitious.

But the list would not be complete without a mention of the assistance willingly or unwillingly rendered to Bostanov's "gang" by officials of certain village and settlement soviets, and also many other not over-scrupulous or discriminating people. They had certainly never heard anything about Bostanov or his partners in the thieves' trade. Nevertheless, the facts were available. There was talk about it. The chairmen of a number of village and settlement soviets, wishing to free themselves from organizational work in procuring meat among the population, are tempted by agreements with local procurers. We will help, they say. All you have to do is cunningly stay innocent. Five or 6, maybe even 10 certificates are needed to say that such-and-such citizens delivered this steer, this hog, and that sheep. That is all that is required, the rest is our concern.

These sweet words were not resisted in Bystrovskiy Settlement Soviet, Kichikeminskiy and Alamedinskiy village soviets in Keminskiy Rayon, and Vasilyevskiy, Tash-Moynokskiy, and Arashanskiy village soviets in Alamedinskiy Rayon. And their chairmen knew that they were getting into record padding and deception, that the experienced procurers were not going to the trouble without any self-interest. But they wanted at any cost to report that the meat plan had been fulfilled! They wanted to shut their eyes to the money orders which people were receiving for undelivered livestock, although even the most naive person would realize that nobody would pay money for nothing. But when somebody is seriously paying the bills for nonexistent livestock, giving out receipts without getting the goods, it means that somebody is making a profit. You don't need the intuition of Sherlock Holmes to guess that papers worth nothing are being converted into crisp bills at the meat combine. Thus, certain chairmen of village and settlement soviets, manifesting complete irresponsibility, directly promoted the machinations of these dealers.

...Various people brought livestock to the meat combine. They were the kind that are willing to warm their hands with the people's property. Bostanov, Nogoybayev, Berdiyev, and the others of the gang recognized thievish livestock deliverers with a trained eye. Criminal deals with them were conducted



without excess ceremony: you have ready cash for me, I "save" a hundred rubles for you, two sheep....

Investigators Kerimkulov, Kharin, Sukhobrus, and others scrupulously and with precise protocol reproduced each episode of theft, recreated the scene and the characters.... Episode by episode, an uncommonly monotonous picture took shape.

Sokulukskiy Rayon: Chief Livestock Specialist Mishustin and Chief Veterinarian Suleymanov of Kolkhoz imeni XXI Parts"yezd put together fictitious documents for sheep delivery. Berdiyev and Nogoybayev registered a large flock as usual. The sheep were sold, the money was divided. Alamedinskiy Rayon: procurers Mustafayev and Dzhumabekov from the inter-farm feeding association brought pigs to the combine; Bostanov, Khutugov, and Suyunchiyev recorded the weight and divided the money. Issyk-Atinskiy Rayon: Chalov, head of Sheep-Raising Kolkhoz imeni Kochkorbayev, brought sheep; Osmonaliyev and Ngoybayev recorded 200 head and divided the money. Keminskiy Rayon: two procurers from a feeding association brought cattle; Berdiyev, Maychinov, and Khutugov recorded the number and divided the money....

The rayons changed, and the farms, and the people making the deliveries, but the subject was the same: "delivery, recording, dividing the money," "delivery, recording, dividing the money".... Their entire life was wrapped up in this, its interests, joys, and sorrows. The profits stood in the spotlight. For their sake, Bostanov did not even spare his own son. With his own hands, he pushed him into the rotten thieves' den. He worked as a livestock procurer, and his father opened up the path to profit for him, helping him to "learn all about" livestock. He exhorted him: take, son, grab, rake it in!...

But no matter how much money the plunderers were rolling in, none of them believed that their well-being would last long. Fear crept behind each in an obsessive shadow. In order to forget, they drank together and alone, they drank themselves blind.... The more cautious Tabaldiyev and Saparbekov decided to slip away from the "gang." Tabaldiyev moved to Rybachye, where he got a job as head of the cheese department in a meat combine, and Saparbekov became a night-watchman.

Even the calculating, cold-blooded Bostanov got nervous. He got a divorce, after first signing over to his wife their home in Kislovodsk and great valuables. The ruse, however, did not succeed. It was established that there was a divorce certificate but there had been no legal proceedings. This meant the document was fictitious, and thus the person who served it was found.

...They sat in the dock embittered and estranged, openly hating one another. The thieves' bonds turned out to be utterly rotten. It could not be otherwise. The day of reckoning had come.

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In the name of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic, the court sentenced A. T. Bostanov and D. K. Nogoybayev to the maximum punishment--execution.

M. A. Berdiyev and Z. Kh. Khutugov received 15 years in prison; A. Toktogonov, 12 years. All three will lose the right to hold a materially responsible position for 5 years after completion of their sentences.

K. Osmonaliyev was sentenced to 12 years in prison, N. T. Maychinov to 11, K. Saparbekov and T. Tabaldiyev to 10, and M. D. Suyunchiyev to 6. The property of those sentenced was confiscated; a sum of almost 900,000 rubles was recovered from the thieves' damage to the state.

The sentence was greeted with great approval by the community of the republic.

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## REGIONAL

### LITHUANIAN EMIGRATION HISTORY OF 20'S, 30'S RECALLED

Vilnius SVYTURYS in Lithuanian No 5, Mar 84 (signed to press 11 Mar 84)  
pp 18-19

[Article by Alfonsas Eidintas, Historical Sciences candidate: "Where Lithuanians Had to Live - In Alien Homeland, Far From Native Country"]

After the December 1926 coup d'etat in Lithuania, the fascist national party came to power. Like all bourgeois parties that had governed the country up to that time, the nationalists encountered many of Lithuania's complex problems. One of the most complicated of these problems was the problem of unemployment. No bourgeois party was able to solve it. The bourgeois land reform did not satisfy the landless peasants and those who had only a little land. Capitalist conditions and the unsuccessful economic policy of the Lithuanian bourgeoisie prevented the new landowners from establishing themselves firmly within their acquired plots.

One of the peculiar results of such economic policy in bourgeois Lithuania was the mass emigration of its population. Low standard of living, low wages, and slow industrial development were compelling the poor segments of the population to seek solution outside Lithuania's borders. Mass emigration of the population to other countries, particularly to South America, developed between 1926 and 1930, that is, in the first years of the fascist regime in Lithuania. About 45 percent of the natural population increase then emigrated from the country. Bourgeois statistics indicate that 10,364 people emigrated in 1926; 18,064 in 1927; 2,941 in 1928; 15,999 in 1929; and 6,428 in 1930. Most of it was spontaneous emigration to Brazil whose large estate owners were seeking to increase the coffee output and paid the shipping companies for the transportation of emigrants from Europe to their coffee plantations. In four years (1926 to 1929) 23,107 people emigrated to Brazil from Lithuania, and during the entire period between 1920 and 1940, as many as 102,500 Lithuanian people left the country, of which 30 percent went to the United States.

Just to keep up appearances, the fascist regime had to pretend to be solving the emigration problem. The bourgeoisie could solve it in two ways; by developing the economy and agriculture to provide work for the increasing population, or by restraining the emigration and limiting it by law. However, the bourgeoisie did not want to sacrifice its class interests, it did

not care about the difficult situation of popular masses. Limiting emigration would not have allowed the impoverished population to go abroad, and this threatened to give rise to worker unrest. Social inequality strengthened the country's revolutionary movement. That is why the fascist regime was promoting "the national unity idea", the nationalism, pretended to care for the welfare of popular masses, and did not restrict the emigration. On the contrary, a theory for settling the Lithuanians abroad began to be developed, and attempts were made to put it into practice.

Something similar was implemented by the Italian fascists whose attempts to conduct "a planned transfer without losses" of a part of the population to foreign countries were actually copied by the Lithuanians of the same convictions. Lithuania's envoy to Italy, V. Cerneckis, in his April 28, 1927, report to foreign minister A. Voldemaras amply explained the structure and the methods of operation of the Italian fascist emigration organization. First the envoy quoted B. Mussolini as saying, "I think it can be said that emigration is an evil since it reduces the number of active elements in our nation - they become the red blood cells in the anemic foreign nations. However, this evil will be lesser if we prepare for it, if it is properly chosen, financed and arranged - briefly, if it is organized. Its effect will then be more significant and it will weigh more in the balance of international values." Italian fascists gave material support to the emigrants by supplying them with credits.

V. Cerneckis' report attracted the attention of Lithuania's fascist government. The interior ministry ordered a three-volume publication from Italy on the activities of the General Emigration Commissariat. On November 28, 1928, the interior ministry emigration adviser requested that the Lithuanian legation in Italy to do everything possible to somehow obtain other commissariat publications, such as emigrants' guide-books, instructions, etc.

It was a beginning, although the bourgeoisie had no lack of its own planned emigration "theoreticians". On December 28, 1926, Romanas Karuza wrote a comprehensive report "On the Question of Lithuania's Emigration." In the report, which was sent to the minister of the interior, he stated that because of economic difficulties in the country and a large increase in population it is necessary "for the ragged part of population to find better life opportunities beyond the country's boundaries," since otherwise "the crowd of malcontents and economically unproductive citizens is very dangerous to the political stability of the state. R. Karuza proposed to turn the Lithuanian emigration wave to Canada where only a few emigrants went so far as the cost of passage to this country was very high - 1,800 to 2,000 litas. Karuza proposed to work out a special agreement with the Canadian government which would allow to reduce the transportation costs, provide credit to emigrants, employment guarantees, and would enable the emigrants to receive Lithuania's consular protection in Canada. "The removal of the dissatisfied, poor element from the state limits would facilitate the solution of problems for the landless, the indigent and the unemployed, and would right away improve Lithuania's political and social situation," wrote this bourgeois social worker. After his ideas met with government approval, R. Karuza suggested



that the special Lithuanian and Canadian convention should establish an annual emigrant quota of 20 to 25 thousand people and open a Klaipeda to Halifax sea line. Lithuania's consulate in Canada, among other things, should be in charge of settling the Lithuanians in agriculture, keeping the "national interest" in mind, and organize the emigrants into national groups. At the end of the report R. Karuža "did not forget" to ask for the appointment as Lithuania's consul in Canada.

The proposal was in keeping with the nationalist wishes. On February 8, 1927, the foreign ministry instructed Lithuania's envoy in London to obtain complete information about the possibilities of emmigration to Canada. A reply was received shortly from the immigration and colonization department stating that Canada supported the immigration of farmers who had a certain amount of capital, and that it also admitted without restrictions farm workers and domestic workers. Resourceful Canadian businessmen set up a special office called "Lithuanian Colonization Bureau of Canada." Its secretary C. Baisas (Charles Bice) in a December 20, 1929, letter to Lithuania's interior ministry asked to allow the Lithuanian farmers to go to Canada and work on leased plots of land. The bureau offered to provide every kind of information to Lithuanian immigrants and asked the ministry to advertise its activities.

The possibilities of settling in agriculture in the countries with Lithuanian immigrants were investigated by the members and chiefs of fascist government missions. On July 29, 1928, Lithuanian consul in Argentina visited the Lithuanians living in the city of Berisso. Out of a thousand immigrants hardly 50 came to the meeting. Those who came boycotted the consul's speech and asked him and the "Lietuva" association delegate to leave. The consul's only explanation was that all this was the result of communist activity among the immigrants. On August 28 the consul went to the "La Clave" agricultural settlement in Mendoza province and made an inspection of land parcels allocated to the Lithuanian agricultural settlement.

With the further increase of emigration, the nationalist government started looking around more actively for possible locations of Lithuanian settlements abroad by sending there its emissaries. In 1929, the interior ministry sent to Brazil Kaunas Vytautas Didysis University lecturer T. Daukantas. He was provided with free passage and an amount of 6,000 litas, and traveled all over the Sao Paulo state covering 9,000 kilometers. He prepared a "Brief Review of Emigration to Brazil" for the interior ministry in which he indicated that the Lithuanian government must organize the emigration since emigration from such an agrarian country like Lithuania the emigration will unavoidably continue further. T. Daukantas came to the conclusion that organizing the colonization in Brazil is both possible and can be achieved. Apparently convinced by this optimistic conclusion, in 1930 the government appointed T. Daukantas Lithuania's consul general in Brazil. Before leaving for the new assignment, T. Daukantas promised to see to it that the emigrants do not assimilate there, and to look after their educational and cultural needs.

Lithuania's fascist government was interested not only in the prospects of resettling but also in the emigrants general disposition and their political orientation. The emissaries sent abroad sometimes actively tried to influence the emigrants attitudes to the nationalist government's advantage, and to weaken the activities of Lithuanian emigrant groups hostile to fascism. In 1930 the interior ministry sent Juozas Daugela to Brazil to investigate the emigration conditions. After returning from Brazil, in his July 14 report to interior and foreign ministries he indicated that although most Lithuanian organizations were run by Catholics, all leaders have become discredited in the eyes of immigrants because of their dishonorable activities, and nobody believed them. Although the Brazilian police abolished the Lithuanian communist organization, a new communist organization would be formed if the government would not take the appropriate steps in this matter. To his report J. Daugela attached a paper on the "General Situation of the Organization and Development of Lithuanian Colony in Brazil", in which he tried to review the activities of Lithuanian emigrants organization with a particular attention to political climate. With the support of the fascist government, J. Daugela published in Brazil a newspaper, of nationalist orientation, LIETUVA. It was he, by the way, who was suspected by the progressive emigrants of denouncing the Lithuanian communists to the Brazilian police prior to the May 1 celebration, who were then arrested. Shortly after J. Daugela's departure to Lithuania, at the end of May the police searched the Lithuanian communist organization again, arrested a number of its leaders, seized the archives, publications and printing types.

A rather peculiar ideologist of Lithuanian colonization abroad was the Kaunas University geography professor Kazys Pakstas. Having himself lived abroad for some time (in USA) he later moved to take up residence in Lithuania, and well realizing that in agrarian Lithuania the bourgeoisie will not be able with its economic policy to provide work for an increasing population, K. Pakstas tried to give a meaning to the emigration idea and make it popular by explaining that "the first and the most important purpose of emigration is to secure more living space for the nation and its present and future development. Although K. Pakstas belonged to the clerical wing, his ideas coincided with the nationalists' way of thinking. As a known colonization "expert" K. Pakstas was sent to investigate the emigration prospects to another continent - Africa.

Sending K. Pakstas to Angola indicates that the Lithuanian bourgeoisie was dreaming to establish agricultural settlements not only in the countries which already had many immigrants but also in those which had only a few of them or none. This is also substantiated by the voyage to the Union of South Africa by another interior ministry emissary, Rev. J. Janilionis. He visited Cape Town, Pretoria, Johannesburg and its vicinity, registered a complaint in the local press against emigration restrictions, became acquainted and talked with the emigrants from Lithuania. In his October 31, 1933 report to the foreign ministry Rev. J. Janilionis indicated that the emigrants from Lithuania living in the Union of South Africa were mostly of Jewish nationality (about 50,000). There were barely 400 Lithuanians and their numbers were

declining as many were dying from the hard labor in gold mines; only a few were still arriving from Lithuania since the Union of South Africa restricted the immigration. Janilionis also tried to interest the South African Union merchants in Lithuanian goods such as forest products, paper, leather products, amber and handicraft.

The consideration of the resettlement question in the circles of Lithuanian bourgeoisie became more active shortly before the Lithuanian World Congress which was organized by the nationalist government. The bourgeois workers in general agreed on colonization; however, disagreements arose concerning its location and direction. It was clear to the bourgeoisie that the emigration could start anew on the same scale as in 1926 to 1930. As K. Kasakaitis wrote, "With the improvement of the world economic situation the emigration wave from Lithuania will rise again -- there is no doubt about it". The search to find a location for an organized emigration was therefore intensive. K. Pakstas was for the resettlement of Lithuanians...in Angola. Arguing that the natural and economic conditions in the Portuguese colony were most convenient for resettlement and that any family with funds of 20,000 litas can establish itself fairly well in Angola, Pakstas proposed to let first a small group of about a thousand people settle there, give it the financial support and help the newcomers to organize themselves. In his opinion, a backward colony was most useful for resettling the Lithuanians since "the Lithuanians should settle in those countries where they would encounter fewer Europeans and so would preserve their national identity and their language, which they are unable to do in both Americas". L. Ryselis who lived in Buenos Aires proposed to resettle the Lithuanians in Argentina. One good agronomist would do in accomplishing this, who would explore the agricultural conditions in Argentina, prepare the resettlement plan and the estimate. One economist and a doctor would also be enough. Resettlement in Argentina was also approved by T. Daukantas who proposed to select the location for it in the Tucuman province. E. Pažera affirmed that the best opportunities for the emigrants were in Brazil. He was imagining a Lithuanian colony there as some unusual separate republic with its own schools, a church, a hospital, a bank, postal service, factories, workshops, warehouses, etc., and a number of necessary intellectual people such as priests, teachers, agronomists, economists, and lawyers. Pažera suggested to settle in Brazil first those Lithuanian emigrants who had already lived there before and who already had worked on the farms.

The question of the choice of location for the resettlement was therefore temporarily open. Considerable amount of attention was devoted to it at the first Lithuanian World Congress organized by the fascist government seeking to strengthen its influence among the emigrants. Progressive emigrant delegates at the congress bitterly criticized Lithuania's fascist regime. However, the majority of delegates represented the bourgeois and clerical organizations, and they were in control of the congress work and decisions. Thus in line with professor K. Pakstas' thinking, the congress decided "that one and the most important goal of emigration is to assure more living space for the nation and its present and future development, and also to become its real friend and working partner in all cultural, economic and political areas, and its supporter in difficult times..." It was therefore necessary to continue further



the studies of resettlement in suitable locations and to start the actual resettlement of Lithuanians. It was anticipated that the funds for this purpose would be provided by the Lithuanian government, the banks, the Society of Assistance to Lithuanians Abroad (DULR), and the World Association of Lithuanians established at the congress.

This organization was established and supported by the nationalist government, and therefore was not popular abroad; its decisions actually were not carried out and it did not develop its activities. Direct handling of resettlement matters was the responsibility of the government subsidiary -- DULR. In 1937 the society's secretary K. Kasakaitis was arguing in the press that DULR "had to be ready to consider the real facts of life and prepare a project for planned resettlement."

Sending special emissaries to the countries for prospective resettlement was not discontinued either. From August 1, 1938, to February 19, 1939, DULR chairman Rapolas Skipitis was sent by the government to investigate the emigration situation and its new opportunities in South America. He visited Lithuanian colonies in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay. Upon returning to Lithuania R. Skipitis prepared and submitted to the government a 44-typed page report marked "Secret" with the title "The Lithuanian Colony in South America".

In this report R. Skipitis furnished abundant data about the emigrants' life in the South American countries. He indicated that there were 24,000 Lithuanians living in Brazil, 24,000 in Argentina, and 5,000 in Uruguay. Most of them (90 percent) emigrated during the period after the first World War and came to live here without savings. The majority of them live in poverty, especially in Brazil. DULR chairman recommended more active involvement in the life of Lithuanians abroad, since the consuls only had slight influence on the emigrants and did not coordinate their work with DULR. After evaluating the situation of emigrants in South America, R. Skipitis concluded in his report that under the existing conditions it was not possible to establish there either a Lithuanian agricultural colony, a printing plant, or a bank. As a rightist bourgeois worker R. Skipitis was not looking for the causes of emigration in Lithuania's economic lag, weak industrial development, and lack of government concern for the working people, etc.

R. Skipitis delivered his report to the prime minister on August 17, 1939. Soon the second World War started, and regular contacts with the Lithuanian emigration broke off.

Lithuania's Communist Party had asserted that emigration created conditions for the workers to be exploited in new locations. It was urging the workers not to go into a new slavery. "Demand work and bread in Lithuania itself", wrote CPLi in its November 27, 1924, pamphlet.

The restoration of Soviet government in Lithuania in 1940 finally buried the reactionary plans of Lithuanian bourgeoisie to colonize a part of the Lithuanian nation abroad. The place for Lithuanians is in Lithuania, where in the family of Soviet people the socialist Lithuanian nation is building its prosperity.

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## REGIONAL

### KRASNOYARSK KRAYKOM CHIEF FEDIRKO ON WORK OF LOCAL SOVIETS

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 July 1984 carries on page 2 a 1,400-word article entitled "Local Initiative: Party Life: The Leadership of the Soviets" by P. Fedirko, first secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Kraykom. Fedirko discusses the work of local soviets in newly built areas of the kray where large territorial production complexes are under development. He singles out the Noril'sk Gorkom for praise. Fedirko advocates greater participation for the soviets in coordinating the work of the many ministries and departments involved in developing the region.

### RYAZAN OBKOM CHIEF PRIYEZZHEV ON BRIGADE SYSTEM IN AGRICULTURE

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 July 1984 carries on page 2 a 1,600-word article entitled "The Developing Contract: Party Life: Decisions on Control" by N. Priyezzhev, first secretary of the Ryazan Obkom. Priyezzhev describes progress in introducing the brigade contract in the agricultural sector. According to him the 1983 figure for gross agricultural production in the oblast was 916 million rubles, a 10 percent increase over the 1982 figure. Labor productivity rose by 12 percent and profits for kolkhoz's and sovkhoz's reached 210 million rubles. However, Priyezzhev goes on to describe delays and shortcomings in introducing the collective contract on a large scale, criticizing in particular work in the Novoderevenskiy and Sarayevskiy rayons.

### UZBEKS TOLD TO SHUN MULLAHS, SEE PHYSICIANS

[Editorial Report] Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 13 July 1984 carries on page 3 a 400-word article by Kh. Gizitdinov, deputy chairman of the Scientific Methodological Soviet on Propagandizing Atheistic Knowledge and candidate of philosophical sciences, and by Sh. Mardiyev, director of the Samarkand branch of the Republic House of Scientific Atheism. The article is titled "Fight Prejudices" and it deals with atheistic work in Samarkand Oblast. The authors give two instances in which specific individuals who were seeing local mullahs and tabibs for illnesses nearly lost their lives through neglecting their conditions. Each was finally persuaded to see a doctor and pulled through in the end. One is quoted as saying, "For a long time I believed the tabibs could heal any sickness. But now I know that only a physician, with his knowledge and experience, can help a sick person."

## IMPORTANCE OF FIGHTING PILGRIMAGES TO UZBEK HOLY PLACES

[Editorial Report] Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 12 June 1984 carries on pages 2 and 3 a 4,500-word round table discussion written up for publication by A. Tyurikov and V. Zhuravlev. The article is titled "Efficacy in Atheistic Training" and records the statements made by the discussants: A. K. Kuchkarov, director of the Tashkent Interrepublic Branch of the Institute of Scientific Atheism, CC CPSU Academy of Social Sciences; M. A. Usmanov, doctor of philosophical sciences; M. Z. Zakirov, doctor of geological and mineralogical sciences; T. K. Kasymov, chairman of the Tashkent "Biruni" Makhallya [neighborhood district] Committee; A. V. Simonov, member of the soviet of mentors at the Tashkent Tractor Factory imeni Fiftieth Year of the USSR; M. Tashpulatova, secretary of the Tashkent Assembly Factory's Komsomol Committee; V. G. Popova, teacher at Tashkent School No 233; A. A. Takibayeva, secretary of the primary organization of the "Znaniye" Society at the Tashkent Tractor Factory imeni Fiftieth Year of the USSR.

Interspersed within the long article's round table format are the following boldface quotes [boldface passages within slantlines]:

/An important task of atheistic work is the struggle against pilgrimages to so-called 'holy places': to various types of mausoleums, mazars [cemeteries], 'holy' springs, trees, stones, etc., to which are attributed miraculous abilities to heal different diseases.

/One occasionally comes across instances among youth when erroneous evaluations are given to traditions and the culture of the past; one sometimes sees certain young people equate church and folk art, religious and folk customs and rituals. It is no secret that some of them are fascinated by elements of religious rites. This fashion, if you will, is by no means as harmless as it may seem at first. It is here that an erroneous notion of religion can begin to penetrate into the awareness of people just entering on their own independent lives. A relentless battle must be fought against this. One of the main tasks of scientific atheist work is to arm the young with Marxist-Leninist analytical methods for appraising the complex phenomena of the sociopolitical and spiritual life of society. Komsomol committees can and must render enormous aid in this.

/One of the basic requirements of communist education is to raise the quality and effectiveness of scientific atheist work among children and youth. Atheistic convictions among the young generation are the most important factor in the diminishing of religion's influence and in the expanding of the sphere of mass atheism.

/Under present world conditions, complicated by imperialist circles, there is a bitter ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism. The USA and its allies have declared a "crusade" against the USSR and the countries of the socialist camp. In this struggle religion, and in particular Islam, are being given a role which is by no means a minor one./

In the discussion A. Kuchkarov characterizes what today's atheist lecturers and propagandists are up against with "an example which is perhaps not so typical as it is worrisome. A respected man who was also an excellent specialist with a higher education and an exemplary family man once said to me 'Of course, I do not believe that there is a god in heaven, nor in either heaven or hell. But sometimes something like this happens to me: In complex decisive moments I catch myself summoning in my mind some unknown force to which I appeal for a favorable conclusion to some matter. And always, or nearly always, when I perform this peculiar act things turn out the way I want them to. And willy nilly I think there may actually be such an unknown force which guards those who believe in it from harm and fulfills their wishes. I know this is naive and silly, but I can't do anything to stop it. And I've met people who were very sympathetic to me, who call me to prayer...'"

A. Simonov continues this line of thought. "Life, as they say, is not just holidays. The misfortunes that sometimes befall people in life's complex situations, the loss of relatives and close ones, can, if comrades are late in offering help, leave people open to 'mentors,' clericals, and sect adherents of all types who reassure them and at the same time attract them to religion." Simonov regrets that labor union organizations sometimes show less sympathy toward one of their bereaved members than old women believers.

T. Kasymov stresses the importance of atheistic work directed at people in their residences for two reasons: workers have more free time now and are spending it where they live; and such people as pensioners, housewives, and invalids frequently remain outside the sphere of systematic ideological education since they are not directly involved in social production. It is these individuals that show the greatest influence of various vestiges of the past. Women constitute a majority of those not involved in social production and as such are in particular need of atheistic training. "The struggle with archaic and irrelevant traditions," says Kasymov, "is a very complex and delicate matter. Many holidays such as 'uraza-khait,' 'kurban-khait' [the holiday of sacrifice], 'paskha' [Easter], 'rozhdestvo' [birth] are perceived as folk holidays by a part of the populace who are ignorant of their religious essence and of the harm to health and morals they cause; nor are they aware of the economic damage they cause to society.

I. Zakirov notes that the most effective means to counter self-styled mullahs, sheiks, tabibs, and others who make their living without being involved in socially useful labor is by combating the superstitions that support them with scientific explanations for natural phenomena. Relying on such charlatans for medical help sometimes leads to lamentable consequences, he says. He cites the harm to active participation in society wrought by observing religious rituals and going on pilgrimages to so-called 'holy places.' "It is no coincidence that bourgeois clerical propaganda strives to convince Soviet people that observation of religious rituals is part of the national folk tradition, as though this is one of the criteria for the faithfulness of a Soviet citizen to his past."

M. Usmanov outlines the arguments of the "widespread front of the imperialists' ideological attacks" directed at distorting the situation of religion and freedom of conscience. In speaking of "alleged religious repression" says Usmanov, "the bourgeois ideologues give undue prominence to those propositions of Marxism-Leninism in which its incompatibility with religion are propounded." He concludes with a call for a differentiated approach to the varying roles of Islam in the developing countries.

#### KRASNOYARSK KRAYKOM CHIEF RAZUMOVSKIY ON KOMSOMOL

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 July 1984 carries on page 2 a 1,500-word article entitled "With Confidence and Responsibility: Party Life: The Committee and Youth" by G. Razumovskiy, first secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Kraykom. Razumovskiy describes efforts to strengthen party control over the Komsomol.

#### PENZA OBKOM CHIEF KULIKOV ON SHORTCOMINGS IN PARTY WORK

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 July 1984 carries on page 2 a 1,600-word article entitled "Your Position: Party Life: Style and Methods of Management" by F. Kulikov, first secretary of the Penza Obkom. Kulikov writes about shortcomings in party leadership over industry. He cites several instances of mismanagement and corruption leading to the dismissal of both party and industry officials.

#### KEMEROVO OBKOM CHIEF CHERNYAK INTERVIEWED ON PARTY WORK

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 July 1984 carries on page 2 a 1,700-word interview with L. A. Gorshkov, first secretary of the Kemerovo Obkom. The interview, entitled "An Organ of Political Leadership," was conducted by A. Chernyak, PRAVDA special correspondent. Gorskov discusses oblast party organizations and their work with industry, as well as the effort to increase the responsibilities of local Soviets.

#### KRASNOYARSK OBKOM CHIEF REVIEWS BOOK ON METALLURGY

[Editorial Report] Moscow KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 28, 13 July 1984 carries on page 2 an 850-word book review entitled "Industry Beyond the Polar Circle" by P. Fedirko, first secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Kraykom. Fedirko reviews "Big Noril'sk" a book written by Anatoliy L'vov and published by Metallurgiya. The book details the development of the Noril'sk Mining and Metallurgical Combine.

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